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 INTRODUCTION ‘ ‘
Docs corporate crime warrant consideration different
front tltat
afforded to other criminal acts from. the point of View
of assessment of
guilt or innocence arid sanction or penalty“?
What is corporate crime. anducan’ it be prevented b
y the law,
enforcement agencies. whether the police - or the. Cor
porate Affairs
Commission, or must it be allowed to just occur if
the perpetrators are
prepared to take the consequences on conviction?
'
ls the white collar criminal different in any relevant aspect
s front the
blue collar criminal or the criminal without any collar at al
l'?
(‘.an the community be protected from corporate cri
me and its
consequences by the enactment of restictive legislation whic
h may, and in
all probability will. stultify enterprise. or is it a necessary
consequence of a
free ettterprise economy?
These and many other questions of a similar nature
have been
concerning interested persons for some years, eSpecially
in Australia since
the introduction of ntore restrictive legislation and onero
us penalties by‘ the
Corporation legislation of the 1960’s. The need
for the legislative
amendments themselves followed thecollapse of commerci
al.enterprises in
the late 1950’s (Reid Murray Limited, H. (i. Palmer
Limited) and the
mining awareness of the ease with which affairs and co
ndttct of companies
could be legitimately withheld front creditors. shareholders and
employees.
The atmosphere generated by these events,
the Commissions of
linquiry held in the United Kingdom (the Greene,
Cohen and Jenkins
(‘mnmittees), tlte_contparable experience ~in.th
e United States and Canada,
all provided a basis» for legislative change.
i ‘
The incidence, however, of breaches of
the Companies Act, the
provisions of the Crimes Acts relevant to misapp
ropriation and failure to
account and, tnore latterly, the Securi
ties Industries Act; has not
diminisheds Indeed, as the Australian economy l
tas become more diversified
and dependent upon the raising of moneys u
pon the public market, the
opportunities for manipulation have become mo
re numerous and availed of.
Hence the current problems. Hence the concern
leading to this seminar, the
deliberations of which are set forth itt theaccom
panying papers.
Whilst no, doubt it is necessary for the pro
tection of shareholders,
intending shareholders, creditors and‘employ
ees that the activities 'of
companies and officers of companies should be
subject to a'degree of
statutory regulation and control. it is merely
to state the obvious to say
that such controls and regulations must not be
required to be carried out
0
in such a way as to defeat their own object. The imposing of restrictions
which would hamper the activities of honest men in order to defeat an
occasional wrongdoer should no't be the intent of any legislation. and the
wisdom of placingl unreasonable fetters upon business which is otherwise
conducted in an efficient and honest manner is a consideration to be kept
in mind at all times. -
The intention of this seminar was not to solve any problems —- this
must await a later time and perhaps the outpouring of ideas at further
seminars. Rather did the Institute hope to provide a forum at which the
knowledge and experience of persons concerned in the corporate field could
be made known.
Rodney Purvis.
  
 THE DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF CORPORATE OFFICERS
The Honourable Sir Richard [:‘gglestou, Kt.
l ' . President of" the Trade Practices Tribunal
The subject assigned to me is (to give it its full title) “Duties and
Responsibilities of (‘orporate Ofﬁcers under the Companies Act (including
the issue of a prospectus), the Crimes Act (conspiracy, false pretences and
fraud) and the Securities Industries Act." This is a fairly considerable 'ﬁeld
of study, and I shall endeavour to reduce its bulk by some attempt at
classification.
Offences under the Companies Act.
There are tnore than one hundred sections of the Companies Act that
create specific offences. and some of them create several. In addition,
section 37‘) contains a general provision making it an offence for a person
to do that which by or under the Act he is forbidden to do, or not to do
that which he is required or directed to do. or otherwise to contravene or
fail to comply with the provisions of the Act. For an offence for which
penalty is not specifically prescribed, the penalty is a ﬁne not exceeding
one hundred dollars (section 379 (3)).
We can dispose first of those offences that are directed to making the
machinery function. and do not involve any moral turpitude. There are
some sixty sections that create offences of this kind. Usually they impose
liability on the company (or corporation) and on any “ofﬁcer in default”,
which means (section 380 (3)) an officer who “knowingly and wilfully (a)
is guilty of the offence; or (b) authorizes or permits the commission of the
offence”. The range of offences spreads from the failure to supply to a
member requesting it a copy of the memorandum and articles, for which
the penalty is $30 (section 34 (4)) to failure to send a copy of the
accounts to persons entitled to receive notices of meeting (section I64) for
which the penalty is $400 with a default penalty of $50 per day. I have
chosen the cutoff point of S400 because, apart from one offence rated at
5500 (section 42) and another at $500 or three months (section 374C) the
next lowest maximum ﬁne is Sl,000. and one assumes that offences in this
class are regarded as involving something more than a mere failure to
comply with machinery provisions.
Before going on to deal with the more serious offences, it must be
pointed out that the term “ofﬁcer" by deﬁnition includes a director, so
that the term “ofﬁcer in default“ would include a director of whom it
could be said that he had either committed the offence himself, or had
authorized or permitted its commission. There are also, however, some
offences in the less serious class speciﬁcally attributable to directors. Thus a
director who knowingly contravenes the provisions relating to minimum
subscriptions or statements in lieu of prospectus is liable to a penalty of
5100 (section 48). The obligation to ﬁle and deliver a quarterly report and
 halt--year|y accounts, in the case of a hmrowing corporation, is imposed on
the directors of the corporation. The penalty in respect of the quarterly
report is $400 with a default penaltv of $100, but for the half-yearly
accounts, strangely enough, it is only $100 with a default penalty of $20
(section 74F). A director who fails to vacate his ofﬁce when he loses (or
fails to obtain) his share qualification is liable to a penalty of S400‘and a
default penalty (section 116) and a director who authorizes a loan to a
director in breach of section 125 is also liable to a penalty of $400. Other
offences in this class are created by sections 129 (failing to disclose an
arrangement for payment for loss of ofﬁce in connection with a takeover
offer), 194 (failure to make out a statement of affairs when required), 200
(failure to submit a statement of affairs to the meeting of creditors, and
kindred offences). There is also a small group of offences in this category
in which the formula is “every director who fails to take all reasonable
steps to secure compliance” (section 135) or “fails to take all reasonable
steps to comply with or to secure compliance” (sections 166 and 199). This
formula appears later in connection with the more serious offences. and will
be discussed in that context.
The next type of offence classiﬁed according to penalty includes those
in which ﬁnes over $400 dollars with or without imprisonment can be
imposed, but which are not considered sufﬁciently serious to be made
indictable. Section 381 provides that if the penalty is more than six
months, the trial must be on indictment; if it is six months or less, or if
imprisonment ,is not provided for (unless the offence is declared to be
indictable) the offence can be dealt with summarily (e.g., section 27 (8)).
Many of these offences are attributable to the company or any ofﬁcer in
default, others to the company and any person who is knowingly a party
to the act in question (e.g., section 45). Others are specifically aimed at
directors (e.g., section 44 (8), breach of undertaking to comply with the
requirements of the Stock Exchange). The lowest penalty is the $500
already mentioned (section 42 — issuing a prospectus without having
registered a copy). The highest is $2,000 or six months, but in some cases
the penalty is $1,000 or six months or both (e.g., sections 117, 180W).
The offences carrying the $2,000 penalty, with or without
imprisonment as an alternative, are:
Section 37 — issuing a form of application for shares without an
accompanying prospectus.
Section 38 - inviting deposits without a prospectus.
Section 39 — non-compliance with provisions as to type-size, contents
etc., of prospectus.
Sections 40 and 40A — publicity relating to share issues.
Section 124(1) — failure of director to act with due diligence.
Section 124(2) — misuse of inside information.
Section 343 —- failure to comply with the provisions about investment
companies.
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 Offences in which directors are speciﬁcally mentioned are to be found
in sections 3‘). 44 (N). tt7. I33. I33.'1~34, I37. l3l. tom. ”)3, 334.257
and 37h. hilt as already stated they are included within the term “officer”.
The cases in which they are specifically mentioned appear to be of tWo
kinds. namely. those in which the obligation is not placed in officers as
such (though in section 3‘). for example. the obligation is imposed on “each -
director of the corporation and other person responsible for the
prospectus”): and those in which the obligation is placed on officers in
default and directors who fail to take reasonable steps to comply or to
secure compliance. Where the obligation is placed on directors only. it is
sometimes an obligation to comply with the requirement, but in other cases
it falls into the class already described, namely, an obligation to take all
reasonable steps. There are therefore three ways in which a director’s
liability may arise:
(a) as an officer in default;
(b) as a person committing the substantive offence (including failure
to perform a duty laid directly on him);
'(c) as a person who has failed to take reasonable steps to secure
compliance by someone else with an obligation laid on that
other person. ‘
Depending on the form of the section, liability may be on one basis
only, or on a combination of one or more of the three.
I shall postpone consideration of the meaning of the expressions used
until I have dealt with indictable offences. This is the last category,
considered from the point of view of penalty. No offence gets into this
category unless either a term of imprisonment exceeding six months can be
imposed, or the offence is declared to be indictable. But in fact the only
offence‘declared to be indictable is that created by section 64’, which would
have been indictable anyway, as the penalty allotted is imprisonment for
[three years. Incidentally, the legislature seems to have had a special regard
for the possible victims of a fraudulent reduction of capital. Under section
()4, concealing the name of a creditor who would have been entitled to
object to the reduction can bring a three year-term. but the maximum
penalty for destroying, mutilating. altering or falsifying books or documents
of a company with intent to defraud or deceive is $5,000 or imprisonment
for two years (section 374F).'Thc indictable offences in’ order of
appearance are: - V
Untrue statements or wilful non-disclosure in a prOSpectus (section 47)
— one year or $2,000 or both.
Untrue statement or wilful non-disclosure in statement in lieu of
prospectus (section 5|) one year or $1,000 or both.
Concealing names of creditors (see above) (section 64) - three years.
I}
Failing to take reasonable steps to secure compliance witlt the
provisions as to accounts. directors“ reports. etc" if committed
' with intent to deceive or defraud (section H13) $1.000 or one
year or both. .
Concealing, destroying etc.., books of a cotnpany under investigation,
sending them out of the State, etc. ,(section l79A) — $4,000 or
two years.
Inclusion in Part A Statement of false or misleading matter or
omission of material matter (section 180.1) — $2,000 or one year
or both.
[Now A director is liable unless he was not present when the
resolution adopting the statement was adopted, or voted
against it, or abstained from voting, but defences are
available similar to those available on a charge relating to a
prospectus.]
Share hawking, second or subsequent offence (section 374) — twelve
months or $1,000 or both.
Being an ofﬁcer or former ofﬁcer. of a company to which the section
applies, failing to discover property, to deliver up property or
papers, or, within five years before the relevant date concealing
property, destroying of falsifying papers, obtaining property on
credit by means of fraud, etc., (section 374A) - $5,000 or two
years.
Being an officer in default where proper accounts have not been kept
in the case of a company to which the section applies. unless he
shows that he acted honestly and that in the circumstances the
default was excusable (3.3748) — $2,500 or one year.
Being knowingly a party to the carrying on of business by a company
to which the section applies with intent to defraud creditors or
for any fraudulent purpose (section 374C) — $2,500 or one
year.
Destroying, mutilating etc., books with intent to defraud (section
‘ 374F) — $5 ,000 or two years.
Having while an ofﬁcer obtained credit for the company by fraud, or
transferred or concealed property of the company (section
3746)— $5,000 or two years.
In any return or other document required for the purposes of the
Act, wilfully making or authorizing a false or misleading
statement, or wilfully omitting or authorizing the omission of
matter without which the statement is misleading (section 375).
Two years or $5,000 or both.
(Note: The penalty for this offence on summary conviction is
six months or $1,000 or both.]
14
 With intent to deceive, making or furnishing or knowingly and wilfully
authorizing or permitting the making etc., of any false or
misleading statement or report to directors. auditors, members,
the Stock Exchange, ctc., (section 375A) — $5,000 or tWo years
on indictment (SLOOO or six months on summary conviction.)
The descriptions of the offences in the above summary are not
intended to be accurate, but merely to give a thumbnail sketch of the
general matters comprehended in the.various sections.
The Mental Element.
Where liability for offences is imposed directly on ofﬁcers or
directors, the usual rules about'the mental element in crime apply. Where
the liability is that of an ofﬁcer in default, the officer, in order to be
guilty, must either knowingly and wilfully commit the offence himself, or
he must knowingly and wilfully authorize or permit the commission of the
offence (section 380). Even without the words “knowingly and wilfully",
the courts have tended to hold that a defendant cannot be found guilty of
having authorized or permitted the commission of the offence unless he was
aware than an offence was being committed (Tennam v. Harris (1916)
V.l...R. 557) but in some cases a defendant has been convicted of
permitting something to happen merely because he failed to take reasonable
steps to ensure that it did not happen (Mitchell v. Gasvoigne (1906) 6 SR.
~(N.S.W.) 7|7). The formula used in section 380* makes it clear that a
guilty mind is an essential element in the offence of being an “ofﬁcer in
default“. A
Obligations of Directors in relation to Reports and Accounts. -
The provisions of the Act that have attracted most public discussion
are those dealing with the obligations of directors to present reports and
accounts. As one of the progenitors of the provisions in their present form,
I may perhaps be permitted to say something about this part of the Act.
Complaints have been made that these provisions require the director to
leave the boardroom and venture into the factory, that our legislators
require every director to be superhuman, that a director is expected to
know the value of every asset of a company, and that he must be a v
aluer,
accountant, and lawyer, capable of producing accounts and reports so as to
give a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the company.
Before the recent amendments, there were in fact several provisions
which by implication, if not expressly, required directors to form and
express opinions about such matters as whether “substantial” amounts of
bad debts had been written off, and whether this was abnormal; “the
amount that current assets might be expected to realize in the
ordinary course of business of the company”; and “whether or not
circumstances have arisen which render adherence to the existing method of
 
‘ Some difficulties to which section 380 gives rise were dis
cussed in Welsh v. Cornfoor
(I973) V.R. 2|.
lS
valuation of assets or liabilities of the company misleading or
inappropriate." Under these provisions, directors were required in
appropriate circumstances to fortn and express their own opinion as to
value, but the provisions were deficient in several respects. First, although
the directors were required to report if substantial amounts of bad debts
were written off. they were not required to report on the adequacy of_the
amount written off, and one difficulty which had emerged from actual
experience was that although directors had obviously been reluctant to write
off debts which they knew to be had, it was very difficult to pin the
responsibility for this on anyone. Secondly the sections did not expressly
require the directors to form an opinion as to the.value of current assets.
although such a duty might have been implied from the phrase “where the
directors are of opinion that any current assets would not at least realize
the value at which they are shown in the accounts of the company".
Similarly, the provision about existing methods of valuation, quoted above.
which was inserted after the Reid Murray collapse in 1963, did not
expressly require the directors to make any enquiries, though such a duty
would probably have been implied. Thirdly, the provisions, where applicable
required the directors to express their own opinions as to the value, which
was unsatisfactory from two points of view. both because it might require
unskilled people to express an expert opinion, and because it would be very
difﬁcult to impose responsibility for an incorrect valuation on a person who
had not held himself out as possessing the necessary expertise.
In our First Interim Report, the Company. Law Advisory Committee
dealt with these matters in two ways: first, by spelling out expressly the
duty to make enquiries as to bad debts and current assets, to which we
added a further duty in relation to non-current assets. Secondly, by
absolving the directors from the duty to express their own opinions,
confining their duty to a duty to take reasonable steps.
 
We also recommended alterations in the form of.section 163. This
section, as it stood before the adoption of our recommendations, referred
only to failure to take all reasonable steps to secure compliance “by the
company” with the provisions of the Division. As the only obligation
imposed on the company by the Division was to keep proper accounts,
there was no effective provision imposing on individual directors any
obligation with regard to the directors’ report. As the sections dealing with
the preparation of the report were in the form “the directors shall ....” it
would be difﬁcult to fasten responsibility on an individual director, in the
absence of a provision defining his responsibility. At the same time, it
would be impossible to impose an absolute liability on every director for
failure to report or to report correctly. Hence we recommended a form of
section 163 that would confine the responsibility of an individual director
to taking reasonable steps to see that the board carried out its collective
responsibility. As the obligations in respect of debts and values of assets
had already been expressed in terms of taking reasonable steps to ensure
that these matters had been properly dealt with in the accounts (see section
~162 (7)), it did not seem to us that the duties of directors in this respect
were being made too onerous. In fact, the draft Bill submitted to us
|()
 proposed that each director should be liable for “failure to comply” with
the provisions. This part of the draft had not been criticized by any of the
bodies to whom it .was submitted, but we felt that it was too absolute a
liability. Despite the double protection involved in the concept of each
director taking reasonable steps to secure compliance with the obligation of
the directors collectively to take reasonable steps, great alarm was felt by
some at the use of the word “ensure” in our proposed draft. This was
ﬁnally changed to “cause”. I do not think it altered the substance of the
obligation, but it made a lot of people happier.
Another change made was to remove section mm from the operation
of section 163. The penal provisions relating to section 161A is now to be
found in sub-section (10) of that section, and it is subject to the exemption
contained in sub-section (11). This sub-section provides that in a
prosecution under sub-section (10) it is a defence to prove that the
defendant had reasonable grounds to believe, and did believe, that a
competent and reliable person was charged with the duty seeing that that
provision was complied with, and was in a position to discharge that duty.
During the discussions that preceded the passing of the new provisions of
section 163, it was suggested that a similar exemption should be contained
in that section. This suggestion we resisted, mainly on the ground that we
had taken pains to confine the duty of an individual director to one which
he could perform personally, and it would be anomalous to allow him to
delegate even that duty.
Responsibility for Prospectuses and Part A Statements.
Section 47 provides that where in a prospectus there is an untrue
statement or wilful nondisclosure any person who authorized or caused the
issue of the prospectus shall be guilty of an offence against the Act unless
he proves either that the statement or non-disclosure was immaterial or that
he had reasonable grounds to believe and did up to the time of the issue of
the prOSpectus believe the statement was true or the non-disclosure
immaterial. Section 180] contains a much more elaborate provision in
respect of Part A statements given in relation to takeover offers under
section 180C. in substance the two sets of provisions are the same, except
that section 180] provides for a defence in the case of omissions which the
defendant proves he did not know about, or which he did not know were
material, whereas section 47 makes “wilful non-disclosure” an ingredient of
the offence. Also, undersection 47 the defendant’s innocence need only last
until the issue of the prospectus. In the case of a Part A statement, if the
untruth or omission is discovered before the date of the prosecution, the
defendant must give reasonable public notice correcting the false or misleading
statement or the omission. It is of interest to note that in civil proceedings
under section 46, a defendant may prove that an untrue statement was a
fair representation of the contents of an expert’s report or an ofﬁcial
report. without having to prove that he believed it to be true — in fact he
may have salted the mine himself. Under sections 47 and 180], however, he
must prove that he believed in the truth of the statement. In fact, neither
section makes reference to experts or official reports in this context,
treating (rightly, in my view) the belief of the defendant as the critical
element.
Section 124.
Section 124 provides that “A director shall at all times act honestly
and use reasonable diligence in the discharge of the duties of his ofﬁce."
This provision.,which ﬁrst appeared in the Victorian Act of 1958, was
suggested by a member of a committee of the Law Institute of Victoria,
himself an eminent company director. Two questions seem to arise on the
words of the section. The ﬁrst is whether the expression “honestly"
involves a higher standard of conduct than is already imposed by the
criminal law and the civil rules relating to fraud. So far this question does
not seem to have received judicial attention. I do not think it is likely to
give rise to much litigation, since there are so many provisions imposing
liability for false and misleading statements and other dishonest conduct
that an appropriate provision will usually be found to cover any speciﬁc
case.
With regard to the expression “use reasonable diligence” an interesting
question arises. Prior to the enactment of the section, the classical
statement of the obligations of directors with regard to the exercise of care
and skill was that of Romer J. in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co.
(1925) Ch. 407. He laid down three propositions:
1. A ‘director need not exhibit in the performance of his duties a
greater degree of skill than may reasonably be expected from a
person of his knowledge and experience.
2. A director is not bound to give continuous attention to the
affairs of his company. His duties are of an intermittent nature
to be performed at periodical board meetings, and at meetings
of any committee of the board on which he happens to be
placed. He is not, however, bound to attend all such meetings,
though he ought to attend whenever in the circumstances he is
reasonably able to do so.
3. In respect of all duties that, having regard to the exigencies of
business and the articles of association, may properly be left to
some other ofﬁcial, a director is, in the absence of grounds for
suspicion, justiﬁed in trusting that ofﬁcial to perform such
duties honestly.
Even these modest requirements might be said to have been an
advance on what had been laid down in the earlier cases. Thus in Overend
Gurney & Co. v. Gibb (1872) L.R.5 H.L. 480 at p. 487, Lord Hatherley
had said that if directors were to be liable they must be “cognisant of such
circumstances of such a character, so plain, so manifest, and so simple of
appreciation, that no men with any ordinary degree of prudence acting on
their own behalf would have entered into such a transaction as they
entered into.” In Re Denham and Co. (1883) 25 Ch. D.,752 a director had
not attended any meetings for four years, having trusted the other directors.
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llc escaped liability, though the judge did not give him his costs. In The
illurquis of Bun-"s Case (I803) 1 ('li. IOU, the president of a savings bank
had not attended any meetings during the nineteen years prior to the date
on which it. suspended payment, but again he was held not liable. As
Professor Gower points out (Modern Company Law, 3rd Edn. p. 549) “until
recently the possession of a title was often regarded as a greater
qualification for ofﬁce than any amount of business acumen and drive. . . .”
and judges had to adjust the standards expected of directors to their
capabilities. But does the section, with its reference to “reasonable
diligence” substitute an objective (and stricter) standard for the somewhat
lenient standards formerly laid down by the courts?
There is only one reported case in which a director has been charged
under the section. In that case, Byme v. Baker (I964) V.R. 443, particulars
were given of some 61 instances of failure to use reasonable diligence, and
when asked, the prosecutor refused to proceed in respect of any one
instance, claiming that there was only one offence of failing at all times to
use reasonable diligence, of ‘which the various instances given in the
particulars constituted the proof. This argument was rejected, the Court
holding that each instance constituted a separate offence, and that the
information was accordingly bad for duplicity. In the course of its
judgment, however, the Victorian Full Court made some observations about
the meaning of the term “use reasonable diligence”. Their Honours referred
to the passage in the judgment of Romer J., and said that “a comparison
of the language he used with the language of section 107 (1)” [present
section 124(1)] “would suggest that the latter was inspired by the former."
Having pointed out that Romer 1. had referred to the question of skill as
well as diligence, they drew attention to the fact that the present section
refers only to diligence, and continued (at p. 450), “it is clear from what
Router 1. said that his conception of the diligence required of a director
was something quite different from the diligence of a man who might aptly
be described as a diligent person, in the sense that he could always be
relied upon to give close attention to all business affairs in his hands. For
Romer J. the test of an honest director’s liability was whether or not it
could be said of him that he had been negligent, that is to say, that he had
failed to exercise such skill and diligence as it was reasonable to expect of
him in the circumstances. And the legislature. in the sub-section, though it
has omitted the requirement of skill which forms part of the concept of
‘reasonable care', has clearly enough followed Romer J. by limiting the
requirement of diligence which it imposes to what may reasonably be
expected of the director in the circumstances."
Although the decision was that the information was bad for duplicity.
the foregoing discussion of the construction of the section was part of the
Court‘s reasoning on which it based its decision, and there is therefore
authority for the view that the section does not impose any higher duty of
diligence than the existing law. As a matter of fact, this conclusion appears
to be right for the wrong reasons, as my discussions with the author of the
section indicate that he did not base his draft on what Romer J. had said,
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but on a passage in Palmer’s Company Law, probably the quotation from
Jessel M. R. which appears at p. 187 of the nineteenth edition. The parallel
between this passage and the words of the section is much closer than with
the judgment of Romer J. But of course what the draftsman meant is
irrelevant, and in any case, it remains true that the section was not
intended, either in fact, or on the Court’s construction of its intention, to
raise the standard of diligence required.
Sections 374A to 3746.
Sections 374A, 3748 and 374C create a number of offences which
can be committed by ofﬁcers or former ofﬁcers of a “company to which
the section applies.” Some of these offences relate to the conduct of the
ofﬁcer while the company was a going concern (e.g., incurring debts
without a reasonable expectation of the company being able to pay) others
relate to the conduct of the ofﬁcer after the crash (e.g., failing to deliver
up property of the company, or books and documents in his possession).
“Company to which the section applies" includes companies in liquidation,
under ofﬁcial management, being investigated under Part VIA, those in
respect of which a receiver or manager has been appointed, or companies
which have ceased to carry on business or are unable to pay their debts.
Originally, these offences were conﬁned to companies that had gone
into liquidation and were contained in sections 300 to 305. They were
presumably included by analogy with offences that had for many years
been included in the Bankruptcy Acts. When it was found that there were
cases. in which charges could not be laid because. although the company
was bankrupt, it was not worth the expense of liquidation, the sections
were repealed and replaced by the present provisions. At the same time,
some new sections were added (374F, 3740, and 374H) which add some
further offences. There is some overlapping between the two (e.g., between
section 374F (2) and 374A(l) (c) (iii), and between 3740 (a) and 374A (1)
(vi) and (vii)). It is not easy to see why some of these offences should be
confined to companies that have failed, though some of them are framed in
terms that necessarily conﬁne them to such companies (e.g., failing to
deliver up property to “the appropriate ofﬁcer”).
The Crimes Act and the Common law.
I have entitled this section “The Crimes Act and the Common law”
because some of the offences with which I have been asked to deal are not
statutory, but depend on judge-made law. The Crimes Act offences are of
two kinds, those dealing speciﬁcally with ofﬁcers or companies, and those
which apply to all members of the community. ‘
Those which deal speciﬁcally with ofﬁcers of companies are to be
found in sections 173, 174, 175 and 176 of the Crimes Act 1900—1968.
Section 177 provides that a person shall not be convicted of an offence
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 IIIItleI those sections if before being charged with the offence he first
dIsI'Iosed the act or omission. on oath. under compulsory process. in a
proceeding instituted by a party aggrieved. or under compulsory
exaInination “in some matter iII' bankruptcy. or insolvency". Whether this
section would prevent a conviction where the act or otnission was first
disclosed in an examination under the (ompanies Act may be doubtful. In
the case ol a special investigation tIIIIde Part VIA. a person being examined
is not excused lrom answering incriminating questions, but if he claims
before answering that the answer may incriminate him the question and
answer will be inadmissible in subsequent critninal proceedings.
Where the company is in liquidation,sections 249 and 350 provide for
examination of officers and other persons. Under section 249, the
examination is held in private. and the person examined can claim privilege
against incriIIIinatimI. Under section 250, there is. it would seem. no right
to claim privilege against self-incrimination. This examination is public, and
can only be undertaken if the liquidator has made a report stating that in
his opinion a fraud has been committed or that material facts have been
concealed. ~
Section I78 provides that nothing in the earlier sections shall relieve
any person froIn making discovery or answering any question in a civil
proceeding, nor atlect any remedy which any party would have if the Act
had not been passed.
The offences created by sections I73—176 again exhibit some
overlapping with other offences. Section I73 provides that a person, being a
director. officer. or member, of any body corporate or public company who
fraudulently takes or applies. for his own use or beneﬁt, or any use or
purpose othCI than that of the body corporate or company“, or
fraudulently destroys any of the body corporate or company, shall be liable
to penal servitude tor ten years. Section I74 provides that any such person
who receives or possesses himself of any of the property of the corporation.
otherwise than in payment of a just debt. and with intent to defraud, omits
to make or direct to be made. a true and sufficient entry in the books,-
shall also be liable to ten years penal servitude.
Section I75 provides a similar penalty for similar persons who
destroy. alter, mutilate or falsity documents. or make or concur in making
false entries. or omit or concur in omitting material particulars in any book
of account or other document. with intent to defraud. Section 176 provides
a like penalty for persons similarly described who make circulate or publish
or concur in making circulating or publishing any written statement or
account which they know to be false in any material particular, with intent
to deceive or defraud any member shareholder or creditor of such body
 
" As to these words. see Reg. v. ,lrmxlrmtg '(1972) l N.S.W.L.R. 559.
corporate or company, or with intent to induce any person to become a
shareholder or to entrust or advance any property to it, or to enter into any
security for its beneﬁt. It was under the corresponding English enactment
that Lord Kylsant was convicted for the fraudulent prospectus of the Royal ‘
Mail Steam Packet Company. The prospectus had accurately stated that
dividends had been paid regularly over the last several years, but omitted to
state that it had only been possible to do so by bringing in abnormal items
representingproﬁts earned during 'the period of the First World War. The
court held that although the section is not available to punish a mere
omission, where the omission rendered that which was stated actually
misleading the accused could be convicted under the section (R. v. Kylsanr
(1932) 1 KB. 442).
It will be seen that there is substantial overlapping between these
provisions and those of the Companies Act, in particular with section 375A.
That section has the advantage that it is less limited in its operation, and
also that the prosecutor has a choice between summary proceedings and
indictment. '
Offences created by the Crimes Act which apply to all members of
the community, but which may have a special relevance for ofﬁcers of
companies include larceny (strictly speaking not created by the Crimes Act
but now largely regulated by it); embezzlement; destruction or falsiﬁcation
of accounts by a clerk or servant, or making false entries or omitting
material particulars from a book etc., (by a clerk or servant); various
offences by agents, such as misappropriation, fraudulent sales of property,
and obtaining advances on the property of the principal; fraudulent
misappropriatitm (section l78A, originally introduced to fill the gap
disclosed by Slattery v. the King (1905) 2 C.L.R. 546); false pretences; and
inducing a person to enter into certain arrangements by means of a
misleading statement, by dishonest concealment of material facts, or by the
reckless making, dishonestly or otherwise, of any statement, promise or
forecast which is misleading, false or deceptive (section 185A). This last
section, which is based on the English Prevention of Frauds (Investments)
Act 1958, contains a provision that where a body corporate is convicted
any director of the body corporate, or any manager, secretary or other
similar ofﬁcer or any person who was purporting to act in any such
capacity shall, if he consented to or connived at the commission of the
offence, be guilty of that offence.
Some of the offences created by the Crimes Act, including sections
178A and 185A, can be dealt with summarily under the provisions of
section 476, if the accused consents, and the value of the property involved
does not exceed ﬁve hundred dollars. The maximum penalty in such an
event is twelve months or one hundred dollars. The offences created by
sections 173 to 176 are not included among those that can be so dealt
with.
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 l have not attempted to deal with any of the learning that exists on
the elements of the offences created or dealt with by the Crimes Act.
unless they have some special features, since it seems to me that the
criminological aspects of such offences are the same whether they are
committed by directors or officers of companies or by someone else. What
is of interest here is the overlapping to which l have referred.
- With regard to common law crimes much the same considerations
apply. There is, however, one common law offence that deserves special
mention, namely. the crime of conspiracy.
éonspiracy.
An agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime is
itself a crime, that of conspiracy. If the law stopped there, there would be
no difﬁculty, since the ingredients of the offence of conspiracy would be
merely those of the substantive crime. But the law goes further, antd
punishes as a criminal conspiracy an agreement to do an “unlawful”a t,
either as an end in itself, or as a means to attaining an end which maycor
may not be unlawful There has been much discussion as to what
constitutes an unlawful act for this purpose, and whether acts promoting
immorality come within the scope of the crime. But for our purposes it is,
I think. sufﬁcient to accept the view of Professor Howard (Australian
Criminal Law, 2nd Edn. p. 375) that “Conduct can reasonably be regarded
as unlawful if it constitutes an offence against the criminal law, if it would
support a civil action tor damages or any other kind of proceedings for the
enforcement of a civil right, or if it is contrary to a statutory rule which
declares a law but is not enforceable.”*
In The King v. Weaver (I931) 45 C.L.R. 321, the accused were
charged with conspiracy to cheat and defraud, their method of operation
being to .go together to country districts and tell the local inhabitants that
having been born in the country, they wanted to let country people in on
the great profits being made from suburban land sales. They then sold them
land represented as being worth what was then a substantial sum (£150 to
£200 a block) but in fact practically worthless. The Supreme Court of’New
South Wales held that in order to sustain a conviction it was necessary to
prove that the accused had commited the crime of obtaining money by
false pretences, but the High Court disagreed. III the judgment of'Evatt J.
there is an interesting review of the history of the crime of conspiracy to
cheat. from which it emerges that conspiracy to cheat was established as a
crime before the crime of obtaining money by false pretences had been
created by statute. In R. v. Hudson (l860) Bell 263 it was expressly laid
down that to establish conspiracy to cheat it was not necessary to give such
evidence as woiIld sustain a charge of false pretenees. Reference may also
 
‘Rccent cases on this oint‘include Kamara v. D.P.P. (1973) 3 W. LR. 198; Reg. v.
Williams (I974) 2 .LR. 26; Reg. v. ﬂower (l97l) 2 S....ASR 293; and R. v.
Murray 'l973) A.L.M.D. Case No. 1220.
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 be made to R. V. De Bcrcngc'r (IHH) 7‘ M. & 5.07. ltlﬁ l{.R. 53h. In that
case a number of defendants were held rightly convicted of a conspiracy to
spread false rumours of the death of Napoleon. in order to raise the price
of the public funds. Lord Ellenlmrough said that to give a commodity a
fictitious price by means of false rumours was "a fraud levelled against all
the public."
There has been much criticism of the crime of conspiracy on various
grounds. One is that in a trial for conspiracy the’ ordinary rttles of evidence
are relaxed so as to permit the acts of one conspirator to be used against
other conspirators. as overt acts done to carry the conspiracy into effect.
Although logically the existence of the conspiracy should first be proved, in
practice it is rarely possible to call all evidence in its logical order. so that
defendant tend to be prejudiced by the admission of evidence that would
not be admissible if the charge were not one of conspiracy. The idea that
what is lawful if done by one can become unlawful if done by many has
been criticized as illogical, but judges have shown a great affection for it.
As Evatt, J. pointed out “We find the law in some approximation to the
dictum of Hobbes that ‘all uniting of strength by private men is if for evil
intent unjust; if for intent unknown, dangerous to the Publique. and
unjustly concealed.” (45 (‘.L.R. at p. 330).
Of course the crime of conspiracy is popular with prosecutors for the
very reasons that lead to criticism of it. But it also has real advantages. As
was pointed out in Reg. v. Simmonds (l969) 1 0.3. 685 at p. 689 “the
ever mounting intricacy of the legislation imposing taxes has been followed
by ever increasing ingenuity on the part of numbers of persons conspiring
together fraudulently to evade the taxation. Such are the complexities of
these fraudulent schemes and the devices used in them that only too often
the only way that the interests ofjustice can be served is by presenting to
a jury with the aid of schedules an overall picture of the scheme and
charging a conspiracy to cheat and defraud." Similar considerations apply
to complicated company frauds. or frauds of the type disclosed in R. v.
Mitchell (I971) V.R. 46, which concerned a complex kite-flying operation.
and the hearing of which occupied 133 days.
Moreover, the fact that a charge of conspiracy will lie where the
unlawful conduct is not of itself criminal means that there is a criminal
liability in cases in which an individual acting alone would not be liable.
but in which a remedy is clearly desirable. Thus where the directors of a
group of companies conspire to rearrange the liabilities of the group in
such a way that on liquidation the heaviest burdens will fall on the
companies in which they are least interested, it may well be that the
individual breaches of duty by the directors would not attract any criminal
liability (unless section 124 would cover the case) but that they could be
indicted for a conspiracy to cheat and defraud the shareholders of the
companies adversely affected. ’
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 The Securities Industry Acts.
()11 a strict view the .S't't'm'ilics Indus/[1' girls are not ' directly
concerned witlt the conduct of corporate ofﬁcers. and apart from provisions
such as section 78 (3). the Act of N70 does not impose obligations 011
company directors or officers as such. Section 78 (3) provides that where a
corporation is guilty of an offence against the Act any director. manager,
sectctaty or other olttcer ol tlte corporation who was knowingly a party to
the otlence shall also be guilty. llowcver. insolar as tlte subject matter of
t|1L Act is trading in securities. and tlte securities in question will often be
shares in companies. it is obvious that officers of companies may ﬁnd
themselves indirectly concerned in the provisions.
l
‘s .
In particular. section 70 to 73 create offences, punishable on
indictment. designed to discourage dishonest practices in securities trading.
Section .70 deals with conduct calculated to create a false appearance of
active trading, or a false oranisleading appearance with respect to the
market for or the price of securities. Section 71 makes it an offence
(subsection (1)) to be concerned in transactions which have the effect of
raising or lowering the price of securities for the purpose of inducing their
purchase or sale by others (it is a defence if the defendant proves that he
acted ‘without malice and solely to further or protect his own lawful
interests) or (sub-section (2)) for reward or beneﬁt, to be concerned in the
dissemination of information to the effect that the price is likely to rise or
fall because of any act that to his knowledge would be a contravention of
sub-section (1). Section 72 deals with ﬁctitious transactions, involving no
change in the beneﬁcial interest in the securities, which inﬂate. depress or
cause ﬂuctations in the market price. Section 73 makes it an offence to
disseminate infor111ation,, if the person disseminating it knows or has
reasonable grounds for knowing that it is false or misleading in a material
particular.
The penalty for these offences can be a ﬁne of SIOHOOO or
i111prisonment for ltve years or both. Section 75 also creates a civil liability
to pay compensation.
Insider Trading.
Although, as stated above. the Securities Industry Acts are not
directly concerned with the conduct ot corporate ofﬁcers, the amending
Act ol I971 introduced a new provision aimed directly at ofﬁcers of the
company whose securities were involved and other persons so connected
with the company that they might be said to be in a special relationship to
it. Prior to l97l, there had been provision in the Companies Acts with
respect to insider trading. This was contained in section I24, which
provided that an officer of a company should not make use of any
information acquired by virtue of his position as an ofﬁcer to gain directly
 or indirectly an improper advantage for himself or to cause detriment to
the company. In consequence of the Fourth Interim Report of the
Company Law Advisory Committee, this section was amended in l97l by
altering “company” to “corporation”, by transferring the word “improper”
so that .it qualiﬁed “use” instead ot“‘advantage“ and by adding the words
“or for any other person” after “advantage for himself”. This last alteration
extended the reach of the section to cases in which the ofﬁcer himself
engaged in the transaction, but did so for the beneﬁt of another person,
e.g., as trustee for a member of his family. It was doubtful, however,
whether it covered the case of an ofﬁcer who divulged information to
another who was thereby enabled to make use of it. I should have thought
that such a case was covered, at least where the ofﬁcer intended to beneﬁt
the “tippee”. However, in the same year as the amendment to the
Companies Act,the Securities Industry Act was amended by adding a new
section 75A. This section omits reference to “improper” use (which left a
gOOd deal to the courts) and deﬁnes the information involved as “speciﬁc
information relating to the corporation or body or to securities issued or
made available by the corporation or body", which is “not generally
known, but if known might reasonably be expected to affect materially the
market price of those securities”. The liability is not conﬁned to ofﬁcers,
but extends to a person who gains such information “through his
association with a corporation or body”.
Sub-section (6) provides that for the purposes of sub-section (1), a
person is associated with a corporation or other body if he is an ofﬁcer of
the corporation or of a related corporation; if, in the case of a body other
than a corporation, he stands in a relationship analogous to that of an
ofﬁcer; if he acts or has acted as “banker, solicitor, auditor or professional
adviser, or in any other capacity, for the corporation or body”; or if he is
a ten per cent shareholder or the director manager or secretary of a
corporation that is a ten per cent shareholder. It is not clear that
subsection (6) is an exhaustive enumeration of all the relationships
intended to be covered by sub-section (1), though it is probable that it
would be so construed, because of the very wide scope the section would
otherwise have.
There is no deﬁnition, so far as I can see, of what constitutes a
“body” for the purposes of this legislation, but as the definition of
“securities” refers to debentures funds stocks shares or bonds “. . .. of any
body incorporate or unincorporate” I suppose the answer is that a body is
any entity that can issue or make available securities of the kinds
mentioned.
Other questions that may give rise to debate under the section include
the meaning of the words “in any other capacity” in sub-section (6).
Presumably this term will be construed as only applying to persons acting
in a capacity similar to those mentioned, but in view of the general words
“professional adviser” how do you apply the rule? Does it cover
professional men who do not advise or advisers who are not professional?
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 Difficulties may also arise about the words “not generally known”. and. if
sub-section (oi is not exhaustive, the words “through his association with".
But in the absence of actual cases. it is probably profitless to speculate.
It should be pointed out that whereas section 124 of the Companies
Act as amended deals with the ease of an officer who makes use of
confidential information for the benefitof another person, but does not,
deal with the case of a person who divulges the information to another
without himself making use of it, section 75A of the Securities Industries
Act deals with the case of an officer who divulges information, but not
with the case of a person who uses the information, not for his own
bcnelit but for the benefit of another (e ..,g by buying shares as trustee for
a :memher of his family).
General Observations.
A general review of so wide a subject as this tends, I am afraid, to
become rather a dull catalogue of offences. .Some of the interesting
questions that arise are scheduled for discussion in subsequent papers. I
have conceived it to be my task to present a eonspectus of the offences
with which the seminar is concerned, with some reference to the magnitude
of the punishment that may be awarded and the kind of guilty mind that
must be found to be present if the defendant is to be convicted. Some
general observations, however, remain to be made. '
Censistency of Penalties.
It is obvious from the information contained in this paper that a
particular term of imprisonment is not necessarily equated with a ﬁne of a
particular amount. The differences presumably reflect differences in the
value of money between the different times at which the penalties were
ﬁxed. Thus in sections 374A and 3748 a year’s imprisonment seems to be
equated to a fine of $2,500, whereas in older sections it may be equated
to $1,000 or even $800 (section I25). On the other hand, there are
offences dating back to 1961 in'which $1,000 is equated to three months’
imprisonment (section 44. (8)). These differences are perhaps not very
important. What is more important is that they reveal the failure-of the
legislature to make any adequate general provision to deal with the effect
of inﬂation on pecuniary penalities. The severity of a gaol sentence of a
given length presumably remains unchanged (apart from changes in the
attitude of the custodians), but the severity of a fine of a given amount
depends on the ﬂuctuating value of the dollar. One of my former
colleagues of the Company Law Advisory Committee favoured a system
under which lines would be expressed in terms of “standard dollars” the
value of which would be fixed in terms of current dollars from time to ‘
time. Whatever they might be called. whether “standard dollars” or “penal
units". or some other term, it is difﬁcult to think of any other way in
' whichthe situation can be dealt with by a general provision.
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Overlapping Provisions.
l have referred earlier to the existence of overlapping provisions in
the legislation. I do not suppose this does any harm. but it does make it
harder to be sure that all the relevant territory has been covered. and it
sometimes offers the prosecution a choice of offences with a different
range of maximum penalties. In addition, a good deal of paper would be
saved if all the penal provisions were included in one group of sections in
place of the constant repetition of words imposing liability at the end of
each section. Whether it would be a good thing to do this would depend
on whether it is thought to be desirable that a person who reads (say)
Section 67 should be reminded when he reads it that failure to comply
with it may cost him up to $1,000 or a term of three months in gaol.
Procedural Problems.
One of the most acute problems of the enforcement of the criminal
law, especially in these days of legal aid, is the length of time that may be
occupied in a criminal trial if the facts are complex, as they frequently are
in company cases. The two conspiracy trials already referred to (neither of
them strictly classifiable as a company case. but the general considerations
ar similar) lasted 81 days for Reg. v. Simmonds. said to have been the
longest criminal trial in England since the Tichborne case. which lasted for
188 days) and 133 days (for R. v. Mitchell.) In the latter case the
Victorian Full Court said (at p. 64) “whilst a community, such as ours,
which is regulated by the principles of the common law, cannot concede
that any case is too complex or too extensive to be heard and determined
in due process of law, there is a real danger that the system will be
frustrated and brought into public disrepute, unless those concerned with
the conduct of the trial have the courage and a sense of responsibility to
take advantage of the means provided for delimiting the issues, such as
Section 6 of the Evidence (Amendment) Act 1965* In the present case it
is plain beyond doubt that, in the result. proof according to the ordinary
rules of evidence, and a vast amount of public time and expense, could
have been avoided, by use of that section. Likewise it is plain that the
expense of the preparation of thousands of pages of transcript for the
purposes of this appeal could have been avoided by reasonable co-operation
.between the parties. No responsible person would suggest that where in
criminal proceedings facts are open to dispute the Crown should not be put
to‘strict proof, but where they are incontravertible and known to be so
upon reasonable inquiry, a failure to face the facts in the hope that by
some chance a failure in proof may occur can go far to place the mle of
law in jeopardy.” ’
The danger is undoubtedly a real one, but I have some doubt
whether anything an be achieved by appealing to those who appear for
accused persons to make admissions and thereby to forego the possibility
 
‘See Appendix A
28
that a trial may ntiscarry it‘ the Crown is put to strict proof. The solution
is, I think. more likely to be t‘ound ‘in a modiﬁcation of the rules of
evidence to enable expert witnesses to give evidence of the results of their
investigations of documentary material. In a civil conspiracy trial with
which I was concerned some years ago the plaintiff’s case was almost
entirely established by the production of schedules of ﬁgures derived from
documents, the documents themselves (cheques and deposit slips) being in
court and available for inspection, but not separately tendered in evidence.
No doubt this course could have been objected to, and in a criminal trial it
probably would have been. But there is no reason why it should not be
made possible for a judge to permit evidence to be given in this way
despite objection so long as the defence is given a reasonable opportunity
of checking the material.
The difficulties which are encountered in a trial of this kind are of
course accentuated if the trial has‘to be on indictment, because of the
presence of a jury. There is, I think, a temptation to opt for a less serious
charge which can be pursued before a magistrate, partly from consciousness
of the hardship that may be inflicted on .a‘ jury required toattend a trial
of such length, partly because of the feeling that, jury trials being what
they are. it is more difﬁcult to present a complex case successfully than it
would be before a magistrate. The need to reform our procedures to cope
with the increasing complexity of modern society is, however, one that
does not only apply to criminal cases. The rule of law is in jeopardy also
because the inordinate length of some civil cases generates increasing
distrust of the courts. It is to be hoped that somehow a solution of the
kind of problem I have been discussing can be found, capable of being
applied in both jurisdictions.
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APPENDIX A
Section 6 of the Victorian Evidence (Amendment) Act I965 is in the
following terms: ' -
6. For Section 150 of the Principal Act there shall be substituted
the following sections:
“149A. Subject to the express provisions of .any Act but
notwithstanding any rule of law or procedure or any practice to the
contrary the accused person in any criminal proceedings may make
'admis'sion of any fact or matter that is relevant in the proceedings
and any person acting judicially may accept the admission as
sufficient evidence of that fact or matter without further proof unless
he is of opinion that it would be contrary to the interests ofjustice
so to do having'regard to all the circumstances of the case.
150. Where a subpoena ad testiﬁcandum or duces tecum has been
‘ issued for the attendance of a person on the hearing of a cause or
matter in the Supreme Court and—
(a), a copy thereof has been served upon him and a reasonable sum
of money paid or tendered to him for his costs and expenses in
. that behalf but he neglects or refuses to attend; or
(b) he is proved to be keeping out of the way to avoid service
thereof— '
the Court or Judge may issue a warrant to apprehend him and to
bring him before the Court or Judge and may also order him to pay
a fine of not more than Twenty pounds, but no such fine shall
exempt him from any 'other proceedings for disobeying the
subpoena.” ' .
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THE CORPORATE AFFAIRS COMMISSION
INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION DIVISION
_ , P. Olson.
, Acting Chief Inspector. N.S. W. Corporate Affairs Commission
I should begin by saying that when I was asked to prepare this paper
for presentation to this gathering this evening I immediately became more
aware of the term “Ofﬁcer who is in default” which is so well known to
many of you. '
Subsection (3) of Section 380 of the Companies Act deﬁnes an
ofﬁcer who is in default as any ofﬁcer who knowingly and wilfully is
guilty of an offence or authorizes or permits the commission of an offence.
ln appearing before you this evening I plead guilty to the elements of an
ofﬁcer who is in default in that much of the material contained in the
paper before you was taken from the personal notes and papers of Mr
Brian Smith, Chief Inspector of the Investigation and Prosecution Division
and I should like to record my appreciation for the material contained in
those papers. For those of you who have had the opportunity of meeting
Brian in a personal or ofﬁcial capacity I am happy to report that he is
making progress from the health set-back which he suffered towards the
end of last year. -
The contents of this paper are presented to you under four headings
namely, Legislative Authority, The Basic Functions of the Investigation
Section. Sources of Matters Requiring Investigation and Results of
Operations.
I. Legislative Authority.
The Investigation and Prosecution Division of the Companies Ofﬁce,
as the Corporate Affairs Commission was formerly known, was formed in
1963, about l2 months after the introductiOn of the Uniform Company
Legislation. It will be recalled that this was the time when the effects of the
credit squeeze, which followed the boom years of the 1950’s, were being
reflected in some spectacular company crashes._l refer here to the likes of
such failures as the Korman Empire, that is, Chevron Sydney, Stanhill
Developments and other companies, the Reid Murray Group, Iatec
Investments. Sydney Guarantee Corporation, I.V.M., and many others. The
legislation introduced in 1962 not only widened the responsibilities of
directors and ofﬁcers in the administrationof companies‘ affairs but also
brought clearly into focus the need for a higher degree of policing of the
provisions than was then operating if the legislation was to be effective, and
so the Investigation Branch came into existence.
I
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In 1970 legislation was passed in the form of the Securities Industry
Act, 1970 which contained provisions with respect to Stock Exchanges and
Stockbrokers and other persons dealing in securities; to create certain
offences relating to trading in securities and to constitute a Corporate
Affairs Commission. By way of amendments to that Act in 1971 the
responsibility for the general administration of the Companies Act, I961,
the Business Names Act, 1962, and the Companies (Transfer of Domicile)
Act, 1968 became vested in the Corporate Affairs Commission on and from
1st June, 1971. The Ofﬁce of the Registrar of Companies and the
Companies Ofﬁce was abolished from that date and Mr F. J. 0. Ryan was
appointed to the position of Commissioner for Corporate Affairs pursuant
to Section 5 of that Act. Certain administrative discretions and powers
which formerly~ vested in the Minister or the Governor were transferred to
the Commission.
The Commissioner for Corporate Affairs is given extensive powers in
Sections 7(6) .and 370(2) of the Companies Act, 196], which enable him
to authorize Inspectors or other persons to inspect and to make a copy of,
or take extracts from any books, minute book, register or record required
by or under the Companies Act to be kept by a corporation for the
purpose of ascertaining whether the corporation is complying or has
complied with the provisions of the Act. Further powers of inspection and
of investigation are also conferred upon the Commissioner under Sections
5C and SD of the Securities Industry Act, I970.
The Companies Act empowers the Minister to appoint Inspectors to
investigate the affairs of companies or corporations and the authority for
such appointments and the duties and powers of Inspectors are laid down
in Part VIA of that Act. The Securities Industry Act contains similar
provisions for the appointment of Inspectors. by the Minister to investigate
any matters concerning trading or dealing in securities.
The importance of the powers vested in the Commissioner and his
Ofﬁcers is reflected in the provisions of Section 58 of the Securities
Industry Act. This section provides a penalty of $2,000 or imprisonment
for six months, or both, should any person who is authorized to discharge
any function of the Commission divulge or communicate to any person,
except to the extent necessary to perform his ofﬁcial duties, any
confidential non-public or ofﬁcial information that is gained by or conveyed
to him through his connection with the Commission.
2. Basic Functions of the Investigation Section.
The Investigation and Prosecution Division is divided into two
Sections, namely, the Investigation Section and the Inspection and
Prosecution Section. The following material deals primarily with the
activities of the ﬁrstmentioned Section which is divided into four
subsections each supervised by a Senior Inspector (Investigations) responsible
through the Deputy Chief Inspector to the Chief Inspector for the proper
functioning of his subsection.
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 Ihc establisluncnt of the Division comprises ()3 positions‘following
approval by the Public Service Board. during the I‘)73/4 ﬁnancial year. for
the creation of I‘ive additional positions of Inspector (Investigations) and‘a
position of Stcnographer.
The establishment of the Investigation Section of the Division now
stands at .18 Inspectors each of whom is required to possess an accountancy
qualification recognized. for registration purposes, by the Public Accountants
Registration Board of this State. These positions are - Chief Inspector,
Deputy Chief Inspector, five Senior Inspectors, four Assistant Senior
Inspectors, 20 Inspectors and one Inspector (Accounts). In addition, the
services of 12 Audit Clerks are utilized within the Investigation Section to
rassist Inspectors in investigations undertaken by those Ofﬁcers.
The Inspection and Prosecution Section of the Division comprises
three Inspectors (General) who are responsible to a Senior Inspector
(General) for carrying out inspections to determine defaults which have
been made in complying with requirements in respect of both the
(‘ompanies Act. WM, and the Business Names Act. I962 and for instituting
and conducting prosecutions for certain infringements in particular,
prosecutions for failure by corporations and their ofﬁcers to lodge Annual
Returns as required by Sections l58 and 159 of the Act. In these matters
the Inspectors conduct the case and give evidence at Court.
The functions of the Investigation Section are. as the name implies.
the investigation of companies towards determining whether the provisions
of the Companies and Security Industry Acts are being observed, and the
prosecution of those companies and officers who contravene their
provisions.‘|n the pursuit of the investigation function there may be
discovered not only offences against these Acts but also breaches of those
provisions generally referred to as the “company” offences provisions of the
Crimes Act (5. I73 to I78).
Inspectors (Investigation) are required to undertake the investigation of
matters directed to them for attention, to properly record all matters arising
during the course of an investigation and to report the facts, together with
any recommendations. They must make themselves familiar with the basic
rules of evidence. particularly concerning the production of documents.
hearsay, procedure for interrogation of persons concerned and the
admissibility of evidence. They are also required to be familiar with the
basic “company” offences as set out in the Crimes Act and the problems
connected therewith.
The briefs for suspected breaches of the Companies Act (apart from
Sections l03 and 234' offences) or other Acts administered by the
Commission are prepared by Inspectors and submitted to the Legal Division
of the ("onuuission for consideration by a Legal Ofﬁcer of the sufﬁciency
of the available evidence, who. when satisﬁed with all the evidence that has
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been assembled by the Inspector. then has the conduct of the matter
through the Court. All prosecution proceedings conducted by Ofﬁcers of
the Legal Division are of a summary nature, that is. the penalty involved on
conviction is a ﬁne or a period of imprisonment not exceeding six months
or both.
Inspectors (Investigations) undertake a daily review of company news
and company informationfso as to keep abreast of current company
activity and also to bring to notice matters in respect of which enquiry
appears warranted. Company advertisements are also reviewed towards
ensuring that the provisions of. the Act (for example 5. 27(7). 5. 40, s. 374)
are not contravened.
Senior Inspectors (Investigations) are available for appointment as
Inspectors to conduct special investigations pursuant to Part VIA of the
Act. Such assistance as may be necessary to carry out a special investigation
may be provided from the staff of the Section. Six Inspectors are engaged
at the present time on the investigation of affairs of companies under
appointments made under the special investigation provisions of the Act.
Two other Inspectors are engaged on another major investigation which
commenced in September, 1973.
Attached to the Division are four. Police Ofﬁcers seconded from the
Fraud Squad of the Criminal Investigation Branch who work closely with
Inspectors. The secondment of. these Police Ofﬁcers has been of
considerable assistance to the Inspectors in the course of their investigations.
The Detectives have brought to the Commission the experience gained by
them 'over the years in all areas of detective work, but more particularly in
investigation matters involving fraud, which is acknowledged not only by
myself as Acting Chief Inspector but by the majority of the Legal
Profession as the most difﬁcult type of crime to bring to successful
prosecution.
The Investigation Section works in close liaison with those Ofﬁcers of
the Crown Solicitor’s Ofﬁce who comprise the Companies Prosecution
Section, in respect of indictable offences. .
Three Crown Prosecutors, one of whom has the status of a Queen's
Counsel, have been appointed speciﬁcally for the prosecution of matters
which ﬂow from the activities of the Investigation and Prosecution Division.
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 3. Sources of Matters Recuiring Investigation.
These may be categorized as follows:
(a)
(b)
(cl
(d)
(e)
('omplaims to thc ('ommission by members of the public:
Members of the public who visit the Ofﬁce of the
(‘ommissiou to complain about the activities of a company or its
officers are interviewed by an Inspector. Any person having a
complaint requiring investigation is required to reduce the terms
of his complaint to writing preferably in the form of a statutory
declaratitm. If. however. the complaint is in connection With a
company already under investigation a statement may be taken
from the person at that time if the information is relevant.
Complaints received in writing are dealt with in the same
manner as those complaints taken from visiting members of the
public. ‘ '
Representations to Members of Parliament.
Representations to Members of Parliament concerning the
activities of companies or ofﬁcers which are placed before the
Attorney-General for his attention may be subsequently referred
to the Commission for review.
Newspaper Articles.
The Sydney daily newspapers and certain periodicals are
perused by the Inspectors who extract items of ﬁnancial or
company news which appear to be of interest. The lnspectors
also examine all advertisements offering investment opportunities
in companies to ensure that the provisions of the Companies Act
are complied with.
Review of Lodged Documents.
All Lists of Directors. Managers and Secretaries lodged with
the Commission showing appointments and changes are
forwarded to the Investigation Section where. the names
appearing thereon are reviewed to determine whether inspection
action is desirable.
In addition. reports by Liquidators and Ofﬁcial Managers
and other documents which are required by the Act to be ﬁled
with the Commission such as financial statements lodged with
Annual Returns and six monthly accounts of Receivers and
Managers, Ofﬁcial Managers and Liquidators are also reviewed.
Section 306 (3) Reports.
Liquidators and Ofﬁcial Managers are required by the Act
to report to the Coimnission if it appears to them that any
company which is being wound up or is under ofﬁcial
0
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management will be unable to pay its unsecured creditors more
than fifty cents in the dollar. The Section states that Liquidators
so reporting will furnish the Commission with such information
as it- may require. These reports are considered and
determinations made as to whether or not investigation action
‘ should be taken.
Stock Watching Activities.
Dealings in company shares on the Stock Exchange are
kept under review by the Investigation Section to police the
provisions of the Companies and Securities Industry Acts
involving directors’ or other ofﬁcers’ use of information acquired
by virtue of their ofﬁce and 'for the discovery of false trading
and the creating of false markets, market rigging transactions and
the making of false or misleading statements about marketable
securities. By arrangement, The Sydney Stock Exchange forwards
to. the Commission copies of all announcements made to the'
Trading Floor of the Exchange _to assist in determining the
signiﬁcance of share movements and company announcements.
Reports pursuant to Section 167 (8) and (9) Companies Act. .-
Section l67(8) of the Act requires an auditor to
immediately inform the Commission by notice in writing if he
becomes aware that the company or the directors have made
' default in complying with Sections I36 or 162 of the Act in
relation to the laying of accounts or group of accounts before
the Annual General Meeting. If an auditor is satisfied that in the
course of the performance of his duties as auditor there has
been a breach or non-observance of any of the provisions of the
Act and the circumstances are such that the matter has not been
or will not be adequately dealt with by comment in his report
on the accounts he is required to forthwith report the matter in
writing to the Commission under the provisions of Section
167 (9).
Licences — Securities Industry Act.
The Securities Industry Act provides for the licensing of
persons who carry on a business of dealing in securities. Licences
may be granted to Dealers, their Representatives (which term
includes Stockbrokers), Investment Advisers and their
Representatives. '
These provisions became operative from Ist September,
1971 and all applications for licenses are processed and reported
upon by Officers of the Investigation Section of the Division.
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 4. Results of Operations.
I would point out that the (’ommission has always sought to achieve
the best possible results within the limits of the establishment of the-
Investigation and Prosecution Division. In selecting matters for investigation
emphasis has always been placed upon ‘those which would achieve the
greatest impact. It should be pointed out that in the past, primarily due to
insufficient staff coupled with the increasing munber of matters. it has not
been possible for the (‘ommission to investigate every matter brought to its
attention. When the need has arisen in the past to seek an increase in the
establishment with a view -to meeting the increasing demands the
(.iovernment has not refused to act upon a recommendation from the
(‘ommission for additional staff and there is no reason to believe that the
same attitude will not continue to apply. Nonetheless it must be realized
that an increase in the establishment of the Division does not, for obvious
reasons. bring about an immediate increase in the number of matters
brought before the Courts.
The results of operations of the Division can be categorized under the
following headings:
(:1) Matters currently under investigation.
(b) Summary matter proceedings completed and pending at 3lst
December. l073.
tc) Indictable matter proceedings completed and pending at 3lst
December, 1073.
tdl Stock Market Surveillance.
tc) Licences .7 Securities Industry Act. ,
(f) Summary of prosecution proceedings (summary and indictable)
during the five years ended Slst December, 1973.
(3..) Other operations.
ta) Manors Currently tun/er Imrcstigurion.
At the close of last year 45 companies or groups Of companies
i were under investigation and advice as to the
sufﬁciency of
evidentiary material was awaited in respect of two matters from the
l (‘ommission‘s Legal Division. In addition, advice w
as awaited from the
l (‘rown Solicitor as to the sufﬁciency of evidentiary materia
l in respect
of a further 18 companies or groups of companies relating to matters
which are summarized in Appendix A attached to this paper.
Investigations into the affairs of H companies have been
recommended following 66 preliminary reviews which were undertaken
subsequent to the receipt of reports front Liquidators pursuant to
Section 306(3) of the Act that unsecured creditors would not receive
more than 50 cents in the dollar. These preliminary reviews, together
with ll preliminary reviews conducted during 1973 involving alleged
offences under the CompaniesAct, are listed for further investigation.
Preliminary reviews are yet to be conducted or completed in respect
of a further 111 companies which are in liquidation and for which
reports under Section 306 (3) have been received.
In addition to these investigations 84 inspections under Section
7(6) of the Companies Act were carried out by Officers of the
Division to ascertain whether companies are complying with the
provisions of the Act. '
(b) Summary Proceedings Completed and Pending at 31st December,
1973.
During the year ended 3lst December, I973, 3936 forms
of Information alleging breaches of the Companies Act and
Business Names Act were laid of which 1736 (exclusive‘of
matters for which service of summons was awaited) were listed
for hearing in 1974. Fines of $35,367 and costs of Sll,l49
were imposed in the 889 cases successfully prosecuted.
lnformations were dismissed in four matters and in another
I 048 matters the lnformations were withdrawn and no evidence
offered. '
An analysis of the summary prosecution proceedings
completed during the year 1973 and those pending at 31st
December, 1973 is set out in Appendix B attached to this
paper.
(c) lndt'ctable Proceedings Completed and Pending'at 31st December,
1973. . '
During the year ended 3lst December, 1973, l0
- proceedings alleging indictable offences (90 charges.) were
instituted against 17 persons. Of these matters and those
part-heard or awaiting trial at 3Ist December, 1972, three
preliminary hearings were completed and the trials of ll persons
(13 charges) were brought to ﬁnality.
An analysis .of the matters for which either committal
proceedings or trials were completed during the year is set out
in Appendix C attached to this paper.
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ld)
(e)
(D
An analysis of the matters pending before the Courts at
31st December I973. is set out in Appendix D attached to this
paper. '
Slack Mar/(cl Surveillance.
During the last year a number of enquiries were
undertaken into the possibility of offences arising from stock
market activities and securities’ transactions. Following a
review of stock announcements made to The Sydney Stock
Exchange and other available information the share trading
transactions of' 327 companieswere reviewed and as a result of
these reviews further enquiries were undertaken in 34 instances
to determine whether offences had been committed against the
provisions of the Acts administered by the Commission or the
general law. Fifty-one matters involving possible offences under
Section 75A of the Securities Industry Act and 12 matters
involving possible offences under Sections 70 to 72 (inclusive) of
that Act were listed for enquiry at 3lst December, 1973.
Licences — Securities Indus!ry.Ac-t.
During last year 678 licences were issued in respect of
applications received under the licensing provisions of the
Securities Industry Act during the period ended 3lst December,
1972. In addition, during the year a further 1586 applications
for licences were received and these were dealt with as follows
-— Licences issued lSOl, Applications Withdrawn 26,
Applications Refused l, Applications Approved Awaiting the
Issue of the Principal’s Licence 3, Applications Under
Consideration 55.
Notices pursuant to Section 15(3) of the Act which
provides that the Commission shall not refuse to grant or renew
a licence without ﬁrst giving the applicant for the licence or
renewal an opportunity of being heard were forwarded to ﬁve
applicants for Dealer’s Licences and one applicant for a Dealer‘s
Representative's Licence. All applicants made representations and
after hearings before the Commission the ﬁve applicants for
Dealer‘s Licences were granted licenses subject to certain restrictions
whilst the applicant for a Dealer’s Representative’s Licence was
refused the licence applied for.
Summary of Prosecution Proceedings (Summary and Indictable/
During the Five Years Ended 31st December, 1973.
During the ﬁve year period ended 3lst December. 1973,
prosecutions have been instituted in respect of 1261 offences
under the Companies Act": Securities Industry Act, Business
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Names Act. Crimes Act and the Common Law. This ﬁgure does
not include prosecutions against companies and their ofﬁcers in
- respect of failure to lodge Annual Returns under Sections 158
* and 159 of the Act. During the five .years under review these
numbered 4274. Prosecutions have been approved and are
pending in respect of a further 413 offences whilst legal advice
,was awaited in respect of 30 other matters. A summary of the
completed and pending prosecution proceedings during this five
year period is set out in Appendix E attached to this paper.
Other Operations.
Under heading 2 of this paper I referred briefly to the
main function of the Inspection and Prosecution Section of the
Division which is the institution and conduct of prosecutions for
failure by .corporations and their ofﬁcers to lodge Annual
Returns as required by Sections 158 and 15*) of the Companies
Act. The Ofﬁcers in this Section of the Division also undertake
inspections for the purpose of pursuing speciﬁc matters relating to
company and business name registrations: for example. failure to
lodge notification of change of ofﬁce: changes in Directors,
Managers and Secretaries, failure by Liquidators to lodge six
monthly accounts and changes in proprietorship. etc. Inspections
are also undertaken under a programme designed to cover,
progressively, the city and suburban areas and .major country
centres, with the objective of ensuring that all companies
and business names carrying on business are registered under the
relevant legislation.
Country centres visited during the last year were located in
the south and south-west areas of the State. At centres within
these areas Inspectors carried out a total of 826 inspections and
interviewed Solicitors and Accountants for the purpose of
ascertaining whether any difﬁculties were being experienced in
connection with either the Companies or Business Names Acts.
In addition, 271] metropolitan inspections were conducted for
enquiry into specific matters relating to company and business
names registrations (2 240 companies, 471 business names).
A special prosecution programme was put into effect
within that Section during September of last year due to the
unusually large number of companies which had failed to lodge
Annual Returns for the calendar year ended 3lst December,
1972. As at 3lst March of this year, 3912 forms of
Information alleging breaches of the Act for failure to lodge
these Annual Returns and other documents had been laid by the
1Commission and fines totalling $43,305 had been imposed in
trespect of those matters dealt with by the Court to that date.
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Wilhtlrawal costs lotalling $7.804 were received by the
(‘unnnission in relation to those matters in which the
Informations were withdrawn and no evidence offered. The
programme is expected to be completed in about four weeks
from now. i
The final act of operations of the Investigation Division
comes within the confines of‘Section 374H of, the Companies
Act which provides that the Supreme Court may, on the
Commission‘s application, make an order prohibiting certain
persons from taking part in any way' in the management of a
company. An order may be made in respect of a person who
has been a director of. or otherwise concerned in the
management of two or more companies which have failed
ﬁnancially within the period of seven years before the making of
the application to the Court. The Commission takes the view
that the Section is protective not punitive and designed to
protect creditors of limited liability companies from persons who
have a history of financial incompetence. ’
During I973 the Commission reviewed the case of every
person known to have been. associated with two or more
companies which have gone into liquidation failing to pay
creditors 50 cents in the dollar and the financial history of each,
such person associated with a company of that kind which failed
in l97l~—73 was isolated fer: careful scrutiny.
As a result of this scrutiny inspections have been
undertaken of operating companies with which such persons are
currently associated. Also arising out of the general review other
persons are to be called upon by the Commission to show cause
why it should not apply to the Court for an Order against
them. '
I feel that it has been demonstrated from an examination
of the details set out in the Annexures attached to this paper
that the Corporate Affairs Commission is making a signiﬁcant
contribution towards the enforcement of the Corporate Law in
the interests of the investing public and creditors.
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SUMMARY OF MATTERS UNDER REFERENCE TO CROWN SOLICITOR AT 3151‘ DECEMBER, I973
companies A cl. I 96/
8.67
5.36 ’
S.| I7
S.l22
5. I24
5.303(1)
5.303(3)
$.374At I)
5.374”
8.375(2)
Securities Industry A CI, I9 70
S. 7 3
Crimes A cl, I900
S.l68
5.173
S.l75
8.176
S. I 79-
SJXSA
(Summon Law
APPENDIX A
Dealing by a company in its own shares, etc.
Offer of an interest without approved Deed.
Undischarged bankrupt acting as director.
Disqualified person acting as director.
As director fail to act honestly.
Failure to keep proper books .
(‘ontrac‘t dehts without reasonable probability of payment. ,
Director refusing to deliver up property to Liquidator,
Failure to keep proper hooks.
Makc false statement in document.
Make false or misleading statement about marketable securities.
Fraudulent sale of property by agent.
Take and apply property.
Director falsifying records in books.
Publish false statement.
False pretenccs. 4
Inducing personsfto enter into fraudulent arrangements.
Conspiracy to cheat and defraud
No. of Matter: .
—
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IAPPENDIX B
ANALYSIS OF SUMMARY PROSECUTION PROCEEDINGS COMPLETED DURING
THE YEAR I973 AND THE PROSECUTIONS PENDING AT JIST DECEMBER, 1973
I Companies A (I, [96/
S. 719)
5.371“
5.40
S.4(l/\_
S.|l3
SJIS
S.ll7
S.|Il
S.II4
S.l34
.ISH
.li‘l
.lol:\
.lhl‘
l~‘ail to produce book, register or record
Issue application for shares contrary to the provisions of
the Act.
Publication of advertisement contrary to the provisions
of the Act. " '
(‘irculation of prospectus contrary to the provisions of ’
the Act. .
l‘ail to notify change in registered office
Fail to exhibit name
Undischarged bankrupt acting as director
Disqualified person acting as director
As director fail to act honestly
fail to lodge return of Directors. Manager and Secretary
Fail to lodge annual return
Fail to lodge annual return company not having share capital
l-ail to keep proper accounting records
|~‘ail to present profit and loss account. balance sheet and
."dircctors' report at annual general meeting
l-ailto submit statement of affairs to liquidator
Lodge declaration of solvency without reasonable grounds .
l-‘ail to call creditors” meeting by liquidator in case of
insolvency
Completed Pending
'4
4
o
t
q
—
—
O
‘
U
2l2
1.426
Total
w \
O
l
u
-
l
l
v
—
¢
°
O
‘
\
I
M
O
‘
w
—
9
L
N
—
€
X
J
4
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Companicx A ('l. l 96]
$.23!
5.303(3)
5.3741 | )‘
5.377
53’“)
l’ailure by liquidator to lodge liquidator's 'accounts
‘( ‘ontruct debts without reasonable probability of payment
Offering shares contrary to provisions of Act
Improper use of word limited ,
Default pcnulty‘ fail to comply with Act after conviction
8.3 lb ll‘)36 Act) Liquidator fail to lodge six monthly report ‘
liuxint'xx Names AU
5.5 (lllhl Operating unrcgistcrcd business name
Comp/cred
I 5
6
30
Pending Total
» - l5
1 2 I8
I l
’ - I
5 7
3 0
I ,
APPENDIX C
ANALYSIS OF MATTERS FOR WHICH EITHER COMMI
'ITAL PROCEEDINGS 0R TRIALS WERE
COMPLETED DURING I973
()‘I’li'm'r' I’urxm‘d
Director charged with making false statement in document (2 charges).
Director charged with making false statements in Return, Report, etc.,
to company (2 charges)
Dircctur charged with l‘alxifying records in books (I charge)
Director charged with conspiracy to cheat and defraud
ItIIIIIIlIIIIUI charged with fraudulent misappropriation t3 charges)
ercctur charged with failing to keep proper books
Director charged with fake pretences (I charge)
I\\it t'nrtncr ul‘l‘iccrx charged with conspiracy
lunncr ol'l‘icer charged with fraudulent misappropriation
It‘ltllL'I office! charged with 'common law misdemeanour (attempted
Izaudulent misappropriation)
Result
Committed for trial.
Committed for trial.
(‘ommittcd for trial.
Committed for trial.
(‘ommitted for trial. Convicted —
xentenced to 9 months hard labour
on each of 3 charges by periodic
detention. Sentence; to be served
concurrently.  Nolle prosequi entered.
Convicted. Accused ordered to
enter into recognizance for the
sum of $500 to be of good behaviour
for 3 years.
Nolle prosequi entered.
Nolle prosequie entered.
Nolle prosequi entered
Asxmiulc oI Iormer olﬁcer charged with aid and abet common law
misdemeanour I I charge)
l-‘ormer employee; ol~ stockbroker charged with fraudulent
misappropriation
'lwo former clients charged with conspiracy to cheat and defraud
 
to;
Nollc prosequi entered
Convicted. Sentenced to 2 years
imprisonment. Non-parole period 6 months.
Appeal lodged. Conviction upheld and
modiﬁed. Accused ordered to enter '
into recoyIizanee to be of -
good behaviour for 2‘years and to
receive compulsory psychiatric
treatment. '
Convicted. latch ordered to enter into
a recognizance for the sum of $100 to be
of good behaviour for l2 months.
Charge
('mnpanies A r!“ l 96’]
5.300 (I) (c) (ii)
5.300 (I) (c) (iii)
5.3020!)
5.303 (I)
5.304 (4)
5.375 (ll
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'S.l73
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5.! 79/480
‘ ('mlmum Law
Securities Induxlry .4 ('I
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APPENDIX D ' , .
ANALYSIS or INDICI'ABLE PROSECTUIONS PROCEEDINGS PENDING AT 3151 DECEMBER. I973
Director fraudulently removing company property
Director falsifying entries in minute hook
l-‘raudulent transfer of company property
.l-"ail to keep proper books
l-‘raudulent trading
Make false statement in document . .
Make false statement in return. report. etc. to company
Stealing
lake and apply'property
Director falsifying records in hooks
Publish false document
l~alse pretences
Wilful false promise
('onspiracy to cheat and defraud
Attempted false pretence (short selling of shares)
Intimidation of witness .
False statement re marketable securities
No. ofPersons
CIiarxed
—
~
w
—
N
-
—
‘
s
t
w
w
s
'
o
é
I
9
No. ofCharges
2
2
2
l
3
3
2
l9
I7
20
10
4
7
  
Ac! &‘ St'clinn
(‘mnmnies Ar!
I‘IJ'II
('mnpuuios Act
/ WI]
5.7 (9)
S.IIH|I
5.37 (I)
3.38
5.40
$.40A
$.42
SUMMARY OF PROSECUTION PROCEEDINGS (SUMMARY AND INDICI'ABLE) DURING THE
APPENDIX E
FIVE YEARS ENDED 3IST DECEMBER,‘ I973
Offence
Failure by LiquidzItor to lodge
change _ ot‘oddress.
I‘uilorc'by‘tjciinidutor to lodge
accounts '
.I’aiI to comply with notice
Disquatiﬁiution or manna» ‘
Issue Implication for sharesﬁcontrary
to the provisions of the Act
Fail to correctly describe docum'ent
Publication of advertisement contrary
to section I
Circulation of prospectus contary to
Scction ‘
Fail to register prospectus
.‘v
[969 . I970
I l
3 I
— 2
| ._
2‘ -
I97! I972
26
20
I973
30
Tom!
26
20
Pending
4
8
$.47
S.l()7
S.|l3
S.l|3
s.l l7
5.1.1:;
5.12:
5.13441;
S.l36tl)
S.l26(6)
S.|33
S. | 34
5J3!)
5.143
SJSI
Untrue statement in prospectus
Fail to’keeptopy of charge/register
ot'pcharges
Fail to lodge notice of registered
ofﬁce
. Fajl to exhibit name
Undischarged bankrupt acting as
director
Fail to vote on directors’
appointment individually
Disqualiﬁed person acting as director
Director acting dishonestly
l‘ail to keep register of directors'
shareholdings
Fail to keep register of directors'
shareholdings at registered ofﬁce
Fail to appoint secretary
Fail to keep register of directors,
etc.. lodge return of directors, etc.
Fail to hold annual meeting
Fail to keep minutes
Fail to keep registervof members
I»
)
IO
22
80
IO
4
9  
 S.l52
SI6IA
S.|(Ilt2)
5.”)3
S.|64
S.l65
S.|93
S.l95
. 5.234
- - 8257
5.259
$.28l
5.343 m
’ $374
8.374A (l) (6) (ii)
tail to keep register of members at
registered office
lail to keep accounting records
Fail to retain accounting records
Fail to submit 'ﬁnal accounts to
members
Fail to send accounts to members
Failure to appoint an auditor
tail to submit statementof attairs
to receiver -ttl
Failure by receiver to lodge accounts
Fail to submit Statement of Affairs to '
Liquidator
Lodge Declaration of Solvency without
reasonable grounds
Fail to call~ creditors :meeting by
Liquidator
Failure by Liquidator to lodge, accounts
Failure ”foreign eompany to lodge
balance sheet
Offering shares contrary to_ the.._
provisions of the Act
After winding up removedcompany
"0le ‘
37'
l0
I3
39
27 I2
I5
"~3 u
37 —~
'5
0
saggy-a ._ . V w
I
S
.
5.37.“ (r) («5) (m)
5.375A (l)’(c) (iv)
$.374A (l) (I) ,
3.3740 (b)
8.3743
8.37“: (l)
s.374c (2’,
5.375(2)-
S.375A
8.377
3.580
Before winding up falsify Iminute book
- .
False entry 2
False statement I '
Transfer company property with
intent to defraud creditors -
Fail to keep proper books i 2
Contracting debts without
reasonable probability of payment l0
Fraudulent trading ‘ ~
False statement ‘ ‘ 2
’ l-‘alse statement in report to _
Stock [Exchange
_
Improper use ol‘ word “limited"
Default Penalty -— fail to comply with
the provisions of the Act after
conviction . - '
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I
d
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Business Names
Art >
5.5 (1") (b)
Crimes Act
S.l l7
‘5. I 34
S.l73
S.l75
S.l76
S.I78A
S.I7XB
S.l79
S.l79ll80
5.185A
0;.
False statement re marketable
Securities
Unregistered Business Name
Stealing
Larceny
Take property of company
l-‘alsc entry '
False statement
Fraudulent misappropriation
Valueless cheque
False pretenees
False pretences
Fraudulent arrangement
35
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to
52
Secret Commissions
Huhibin‘on Ac!
5.3
Cmnmon Law
Gnnmnicx Ac!
5.158
5.159
Corruptly receive Secret Commission
Conspiracy
Attempted fraudulent taking
Attempted false pretence
Aid and Ahct‘conspirucy
Intimidation
Aid and Ahct l-‘mudulentTnking
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TREATMENT OF PERSONS OFFENDING AGAINST THE PROVISIONS
OF THE REE“ LEGISLATION:
THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN REGARD TO CORPORATE OII‘FENDERS
.J. B. Goldrick
Stipendian' .llagislrate and Barrister-at-l.aw
The suggested title of this paper was originallyTreatment of Persons
offending against the Provisions of the Relevant Legislation” i..e the
Crimes Act the Companies Act and the Securities Industries Act.
I have’expanded the, original title, as I felt that otherwise it might
have limited me to an analysis or description of the way in which such
offenders are dealt with once they have come before the judicial arm ‘and
then, as offenders and not acquitted persons were predicated of the way in
which the various social and governmental agencies which may come to the
aid of the judicial arm once an offence has been found proved might, or
do, play their part.
It seems to me desirable‘that white collar crime should also be looked
at as to the way in which its existence and the attempts on the part of the
appropriate authorities to legally prove its existence in individual cases
affect the courts and their function. It may well be thought that the extent,
to which many corporate ofﬁcers fail to honour the obligations which lie
upon them, as expounded this evening by Sir Richard Eggleston, and that
the extent to which the Investigation and Prosecution Division of the '
Corporate Affairs Commission, the functions of which Mr Olson has dealt
with, is ever more successful in its exertions, could have an increasingly
serious effect on the workings of the courts, in which time and cost will by
‘ no means be the only factors to be considered.
In' considering corporate crime and corporate offenders the deﬁnition
section (i.e., section 5) of the Companies Act is relevant. “‘Corporation'
means any body corporate formed or incorporated whether in the State or
outside the State and includes any foreign company” (as to the latter with
certain minor exception) “but does not include -
(a) any body corporate that , is incorporated within the
Commonwealth and is a public authority or an instrumentality
or agency ofthe Crown;
(b) any corporation sole;”
(and certain other societies and associations).
I“Officer‘, in relation to a corporation, includes -
$2:
 l _
tat any director. secretary or employee of the corporation" ~ this
being the niost important for the purposes of this paper.
It may he that many of our fellow citizens regard some bodies
coming within exclusion (a) iii the definition of corporation as far greater
villians than they do some notorious defaulting “officers" or promoters.
However. we are concerned with “private“ corporations and their “officers".
Who are the offenders with which we are concerned and what offences have
they committed? '
The offenders are not only “officers" -- directors and employees —
but also corporations themselves and other individuals.
It is clear that corporations cati incur criminal liability, as natural
persons can be treated, in law as being the corporation for the purpose of
attributing criminal acts or omissions to it. However, it is not every
responsible agent, or high executive. or manager, or agent acting on behalf
of a corporation who can by his actions make the corporation criminally
responsible. It is necessary to. establish whether the natural person or
persons in question have the status and authority which in law makes their
acts in the matter under consideration the acts of the corporation so that
the natural person is to be treated as the corporation itself. See Tesco
Supernmrkcrs Ltd v. Narlrass. W72 A.C. IS3 (House of Lords) and Reg v.
Andrews-Wealherjbi! Ltd 1972 I W.L.R. IIX: NH 1 All. ER. 65 (C.A.).
Also, corporations are subject. as are natural persons, to a huge range
of obligations, accompanied by penal sanctions by way of tine, under such
environmental and other legislation as the Clean Waters Act, [970.
Reference should also be made to Sec. 360A of the Oimes Act (a
new section added in 195] and amended in 1955) which removes certain
procedural impediments to the indictment of corporations. ln sub-section
(I) it is declared that “Every provision of an Act relating to offences
punishable upon indictment or upon summary conviction may, unlessa
contrary intention appears, be construed to apply to bodies corporate as
well as to individuals". Sub-section (6) provides that “Where the penalty in
respect of any offence is a term of imprisonment only, the court before
which the offence is tried may. if it thinks ﬁt, in the case of a body
corporate. impose a pecuniary penalty" ranging from $200 to,32,000
; depending upon the length of the term of imprisonment. '
The provisions of the N.S.W. C‘mnpanies Act, 1961—l973, extend
from Sections I to 385. On at least 2l2 occasions in those sections
offences and penalties are prescribed or non-compliance is declared to be an
offence and this number of 2|) is minimal as on many of these occasions
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the prescription of an offence refers to non-compliance with any (of many)
provisions of a section. In addition, there is the general penalty provision of
Sec. 379 (I) which declares that “a person who — (a) does that which by
or under this Act he is forbidden to do; or (b) does not do that which by
or under this Act he is required or directed to do; or (c) otherwise
contravenes or fails to comply with any provision of this Act, shall be
guilty of an offence against this Act." Under Sec. 379 (2)'an offender is
liable to the specified penalty or a penalty of $100 if one is not speciﬁed.
Further, in regard to the Take-over Code contained in Part VIB, Section
180W declares that contravention or failure to comply with a provision of
that Part‘is an offence — and that Part consists of 23 sections — and‘
prescribes a penalty of .Sl,000 or 6 months' imprisonment, or both.
It is not the purpose of this paper merely to catalogue the nature of
the offences under the relevant legislation and the persons by whom such
offences may be committed. However, it has been said, and I think
correctly, that often an ofﬁcer or employee of a company does not know
that in committing a particular act he is in breach either of the general
criminal law or of a provision of particular company legislation and that
many ofﬁcers are not familiar with the provisions of the legislation. It is
suggested that it is a matter for some concern in our society that company
ofﬁcers are not required by law to be familiar with the legislation under
which they operate and which may well govern their very liberty. See “The
Corporation and Crime" by R. N. J. Purvis — included in the recently,
published “The Corporation andAustralian Society", edited and contributed
by L. E. Lindgren, H. H. Mason and B. L. J. Gordon.
It might be further suggested, however, that the honest and
reasonably careful man concerned with corporate matters is not likely to
ﬁnd himself charged with an offence and brought before a court. Perhaps
compulsion, by insisting on proper qualiﬁcations or by imposing penalties,
can achieve reasonable care by the vast majority. Can compulsion make the
dishonest man honest, particularly when the rewards for dishonesty may in
fact be very great?
One must not lose sight of the wood for the trees. On the other
hand, when considering the treatment of offenders (and the role of the
courts) it is important to keep constantly in mind the breadth and scope of
the legislative provisions and not to think that we are concerned only with
the major perpetrator of company frauds.
Appendix “A" to this paper is a summary of the penalty provisions in
the ﬁrst 361 sections of the Companies Act, setting out the number of
speciﬁed offences, a reference to the division of the Act in which they are
speciﬁed, a general description of the range of such offences or examples
thereof, those who may be offenders and instances of the penalties which
may be imposed.
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 However. whilst Appendix “A" nuntbcrs some I76 specified offences
and contraventions of this Act and gives examples of approximately
one-third of these. the consideration of offences and potential offenders
under this Act does not end there. Sections 374 to 3M relate speciﬁcally
to oflences under ilte Act.
In Appendix "B" are set out tlte provisions of Secs 374 (l), (3), (8)
("l and (IQ): 374All). (2) and (3): 374B; 374C(l) and (3): 3740(1);
374F; 3746: 374” (I) and (3): 375 (I) and (2); 375A; 376(l) and (2) and
378(l). These sections comprise a code of obligations with strong penal
sanctions. the penalty range being up to 85,000 plus two years'
imprisonment.
Under Section 380“). “default penalty” signifies that any person
convicted of an offence in relation to a particular section is guilty of the
further offence if the offence continues after he is so convicted and is
liable to a further penalty for (’m'h day during which the offence continues
of the atnount expressed. or $20.
Under Sec. 380 (3)."officer who is in default” meanany officer of the
company or corporation who knowingly and wilfully — (a) is guilty of the
offence. or (b) authorizes or permits the commission of the offence.
Section 381 provides (2) a three year limitation for proceedings for
summary offences. (3) that offences punishable by imprisonment for more
than six months are. subject to contrary intentions. punishable on
indictment and (4) that offences punishable by imprisonment for not tnore
than six months, or not being punishable by imprisonment are not declared
indictable. are punishable on summary conviction.
Time and space preclude detailed reference to.the provisionsof the
N.S.W. (‘rimcs Act. I would remind you, however, that larceny.
embezzlement by (clerks and servants (Secs. l55—l58), frauds by factors and
other agents (Secs. l64— I78, many of which refer speciﬁcally to directors
and officers of companies), fraudttlent ntisappropriations, passing valueless
cheques. obtaining credit by fraud and false pretences are in the tnain
felonies with penalties of up to 10 years’ imprisonment.
The Securities Industry Act. 1970.407], nukes provisions with respect
to stock exchanges, stockbrokers and other persons dealing in securities and
creates offences relating to trading iii securities. The general nature of the
offences the subject of this Act appears from the foll0wing table:
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Sccrit m Sllbjl.’('l Pcnulry
(3 Establishment etc. First Offence — SLOOO
of stock markets. Subsequent — $5,000
15A False statements etc. $1.000 or imprisonment
in application for one year or both.
licences
ZOB Maintaining registers $1,000
20D Notice by ﬁnancial $350
journalist
201. Short selling lst offence — 53,000
or 6 months
subsequent -
on indictment, $4,000
' or 2 years or both.
36 8c 37 , Records etc. on indictment, $3,000
, . or 2 years or both.
74 Trading in securities on indictment,
Sl0,000 or 5 years
or both.
75A Insider trading $2,000
Section 78 provides (1) a general penalty provision of $500, (2) where
a person, being a corporation, is guilty of an offence any director, manager.
secretary or other officer knowingly a party is also guilty, and (3) except
where otherwise provided, offences are punishable on summary conviction.
It may be thought that contravention of a large majority of the
provisions of the relevant legislation, particularly the Companies Act, would
constitute mere breaches of regulations for good corporate housekeeping. I
suggest, however, that in very many cases failure to observe what may
appear to be merely regulatory provisions will result not simply in bad
housekeeping but may lead to disaster for the corporation involved and to
financial loss to others. Moreover, such breaches will often be symptomatic
of corporate dishonesty and fraud. In corporate affairs, when natural
persons both, within and without the corporate structure will be affected,
and the number so affected may be small or very great, good housekeeping
should become almost an end in itself.
The vast majority in number of prosecutions in the field of corporate
affairs are dealt with to finality in a summary way in the courts of petty
sessions. I have taken at random the court papers for the Summons Court
at Central Court of Petty Sessions for two days this year on which
Corporate Affairs Commission prosecutions were listed. A total of 75 of
these matters were listed on these two days. Of this 75, 30 were finally
disposed of, 4 informations being withdrawn and 26 resulting in. the
imposition of penalties totalling $1,110, an average of $43. The 26 matters
in which penalties were imposed related to 20 offences under Sec. 158
(failing to lodge annual return) and 6' under Sec. 134 (failing to lodge
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return of directors. etc.) l3 defendants were companies. H were company
secretaries. Three of the .‘h defendants had prior records of similar offences.
‘l'hree’ pleas of guilty were entered. the remaining 23 matters being
disposed of in the absence of the defendant under the provisions of Sec.
758 of the .lusiives .‘it'l. l'he maximum penalties provided for offences
under Secs. 158 and 134 are respectively 5200 and SlOO with. in eaclt case.
default penalty. In no one of these In cases does it appear to have been
suggested to the presiding magistrate that there were any sinister elements
surrounding the commission of the offences. which having regard to the
nature of the offences involved may not be surprising. However. of the 75
(‘orporate Affairs (‘oinmission summons matters listed on these two days. on
one of the days four. concerning the one defendant, related to charges
under Sec. 303(3) of the Companies Act of contracting debts without
reasonable probability of payment (now repealed. see Sec. 374C (|)) and
were dealt with on that and many other days by another magistrate
although they too were only summary matters, carrying a maximum penalty
of three nunths‘ imprisonment or a ﬁne of $200.
Whether offences are to be disposed of summarily or on indictment
they will all. in the first instance, come before a court of petty sessions.
The “corporate offender” should certainly not necessarily be regarded as
being of a race apart or as a lesser breed within or without the law.
However, the very nature of the alleged offence and the proofs required
will often mean that these cases are lengthy and complex, requiring special
knowledge attd skills, and may seriously test not only the patience but also
the competence of the tribunal and of all those associated both with the
prosecution and the defence.
One case of some significancein which a Stipendiary Magistrate had to
decide whether there was sufficient evidence to warrant the accused
standing trial turned on the issue of an alleged false prospectus.
lnformations were laid against the five directors of a public company. These
included an accountant who had certified to the validity of the contents of
the document and an academic who had joined the Board because of his
special knowledge of the financial area involved. Four senior counsel, and
their many juniors, appeared on both sides of the record. The hearing
occupied six weeks. The basic issue was as to whether at the time of issue
of the prospectus the company had title to property of an alleged value
exceeding $1,000,000. Numerous other properties and mortgages were
involved. The documentary evidence was voluminous. there being some 250
separate exhibits. Constant decisions had to be made on admissibility and
the construction of the principal document necessitated the closest scrutiny.
Unravelling the affairs of the company, which extended to Victoria and
Queensland, presented a considerable burden to the Inquiring Magistrate as
did the final matter for consideration by him as to whether there was
sufficient evidence to warrant committal for trial of any or all of the
defendants. Every element of the company’s affairs over a period of about
three years had to be exhaustively analysed and witnesses examined in
relation to matters occurring up to ﬁve years prior to the hearing date.
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aAnother cause t'c/clm’ concerning eight defendants charged with
conspiracy to cheat and defraud and with numerous false pretence charges
occupied. iii the committal proceedings. some ten months of hearing time
and over twelve months from start of hearing until committal. The case
against the defendants involved proof of a bogus share and debenture
operation which extended over many years and “caught" a very large
number of unfortunately gullible people. The very bulk of the evidence.
contained in almost H.000 foolscap pages of transcription. is enough to
highlight the task of the tribunal and of the prosecution and the cost to
society in money and resources of such prosecutions.
A further example. at a less spectacular level. of the demands at
least on time and resources — which prosecutions under the relevant
legislation may make is another case concerning a defendant charged under
the O't'mes Act and the Companies Act with certain fraudulent conduct.
Although the issues were perhaps not unduly complex, the ltearittg of the
committal proceedings (recorded on sound) extended over eight days. twelve
witnesses being called for the prosecution and over sixty exhibits being
tendered.
Although these three instances are of committal proceedings it should
be remembered that summary offences may result in hearings of equal
length and complexity. Further, prosecutions under such sections of the
Companies Act as 375 (2) or 375A may be. at the election of the
prosecution, indictable or summary. A prosecution under Sec. 374C (I), a
summary offence. may involve lengthy and extremely complex evidence
relating to the liquidity of a company. its solvency. a multitude of
transactions and dealings in shares and other securities and the activities of
the company and many other people over .a long period of time. A
conviction (“summary”) of this offence may result. under Sec. 3740, in the
Supreme Court declaring the defendant personally responsible without any
limitation of liability for the payment to the company of an amount equal
to the whole of the debt in respect of which the conviction was made. The
amounts involved in these matters may extend to hundreds of thousands of
. dollars.
Do ordinary principles of sentencing apply?
If, as I understand to be the position, the comments on this paper are
to be rmde by an eminent academic criminologist and by an eminent
practical penologist, l shall leave literal “treatment” of offenders, as
theoretically desirable or as actually practised, to these two gentlemen. As a
practising sentencer I await their comments with interest and with a
considerable degree of apprehension.
In the context of the original title of this paper it might be bold of
me to suggest that any other than ordinary principles do or should apply.
Perhaps, however. some bold leadership could be given even in this limited
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field. of offences against the relevant legislation. by higher judicial officers.
Perhaps, even at the summary level of courts of petty sessions, it might be
thought that the element of general deterrence is particularly relevant to this
type of offence as also is consideration of the prevalence thereof.
The real problem of the Courts in regard to corporate crime.
I have referred to the original title of this paper and have said
Something as -to my reason for expanding it. In the paper, and set out in
some detail in the appendices, are examples of offences under the relevant
legislation. l have said that we should remember the breadth and scope of
the legislative provisions and not think that our concern is only with the
major perpetrator of company frauds. l have said that the sections of the
Companies Act set out in Appendix “B" comprise a code of obligations.
I now submit that neither these sections, nor all the provisions of the
Crmtpanies Act, nor of all the “relevant" Acts, comprise a code, in the
sense of a complete system of rules, as to corporate offenders. Nor is such
a code made complete by reference to the common 'law offence of
conspiracy to cheat and defraud. I suggest that we delude ourselves by
seeking shelter under a detailed prescription of offences and penalties. We
have inspected and catalogued the trees; we have to look at the wood.
Who, in essence, is the corporate offender? He is the swindler — one
who practises fraud, imposition or mean artifice for purposes of deceit; a
cheat — who uses, shelters under or manipulates the corporate structure. The
problem of coming to grips with such a swindler, be he big or small, lies in
the nature of corporate crime. .
Most crimes consist of a single overt dramatic act', or a series of such
acts, with physical consequences to some person or persons. The deleterious
consequences of the act will usually be obvious and the problem will be
one of identification - who committed the crime.
In the case of corporate crime, in the broad sense I am using, the real
problem will be proving the commission of the crime — the identify of the
corporate swindler may often not present the major problem. The factors
proving the crime will, largely, be documents. As to documents there are
two aspects, their presence and their absence. The latter may give rise to
overwhelming suspicion but it may be virtually impossible to persuade a
judge. let along a jury, that such suspicion should blossom into conviction
of guilt —— given a good liar to explain the absence, and by deﬁntion we are
concerned with liars, highly qualiﬁed in the art. Where the documents are
present and their spuriousness made plain there will be the need to have
the author present for cross-examination if there is to be any hope of
destroying a seemingly innocent explanation — “True”, says the liar, “when
put against other objective facts the document is spurious, but I didn’t
know anything about it.”
’ (1|
Major corporate crime will involve a hierarchy of actors from the
chief swindler to the petty villain down to the incompetent clerk. The
perpetration of major fraud will depend not only on the master-planner but
also on petty villains who, perhaps for relatively insubstantial rewards, a
company car or even entertainment expenses, will be prepared to alter or
“cook” bank records, minutes, etc. The names of these petty villains may
never appear on any records and as a result they may never be questioned,
let alone charged. Also further down the scale there may be those not
really capable of appreciating the large villainy but whose greed and
ignorance make them willing tools and participants.
It has been said, in regard to conspiracy, that it rarely happens that
,the actual fact of the conspiring can be proved by direct evidence. Such
agreements ordinarily can be proved only by a mere inference from the
subsequent conduct of the parties in committing some overt acts which
tend‘so obviously towards the' alleged unlawful resu—lt as to. suggest. that
they must have arisen from an agreement to bring it about. Upon each of
several isolated acts a conjectural interpretation is put; and from the
aggregate of these interpretations an inference is drawn. See Kenny, Outlines
of O'iminal Law, lSth edition, P. 341.
Having regard to the» complexity 'ot‘ corporate affairs and corporate
structures, the number of interlocking companies which may be involved,
the multiplicity of transactions in which many people may play a part, the
vast documentation which may have existed but which may or may not
know be in existence, the immensity of the problems of proof of the
commission of major corporate crime and of guilt is obvious.
The Courts, at all levels, will continue to function and to play their
parts as best they can. I conclude, however, by suggesting that our society
has hardly begun to comprehend the nature and extent of corporate crime
let alone reached the point of realizing that our attempts to combat it are
at a very primitive level. .
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- successor
appointed trustee
, failing notify
Commission S. 74A (6)
person
authorizing
or causing
the issue
direct or
signing
statement
person
responsible
company and
' every
officer in
default
every
ofﬁcer _
of
company
company and
‘every ofﬁcer
in default
substantial
‘ v shareholder
company and
every
ofﬂeet
in default
new
trustee
Imprisonment
one year
or $1.000.
or both
one year
or SI,000
or both
5400
default
Penalty: S l00
SI 00
default
penalty
Imprisonment
three
years
51 9000
default
penalty:
3200
SI ,000
Default
l’enalty:
5200
SI 00
default
penalty
SI 00
default
penalty
I
v
obligations of
borrowing
corporation as to
reports to
Commission $.74H I)
Inn-rests other
Ilum Sharer
Debentures etc.
general
contravention or
failure comply
covenant etc...
S. 86 (I)
Title and Transﬁ-rx
« failing comply
re share certificates
S. 97 (2)
- det'ault rc issue
of certificates
8. 99(2)
Registration of
Charges
- - delivering
debenture not
endorsed as
required S.l(l4(3)
Ofﬁce and Name
— failing display
names. ”'3 (3)
Directors and
Ofﬁcers
— undischargcd
bankrupt acting
as director etc.,
without leave
'of Court S. ”7 (l)
persons convicted
of certain - offences
so acting without
leave S. 122(1)
-- disclosure
of interests by
director S. 123
tlircclurs
any person
company and
every
officer in
default
ditto
every
person .
knowingly
acting
compa ny
any
persbn
ditto
director
5400
default
penalty:
SI 00 ‘
Oné
year
or
$1 .000
General
penalty
3 l 00
$1 00
daily
penalty
$100
$200
' $100
default
penalty
6 months
or $1,000
or both
6 months
or $400
or both
$1 .000
- failing act
honestly etc.,
S. 124 (3)
— register of
directors etc.,
and lodgment of
'returns 5. 134
Meeting: and
Proceedings
— failing hold
annual general
meeting 8. 136 (4)
— circulation
intended
resolutions 8.143
0 — minutes of
Proceedings
S. 148
Register of Members
- failing keep
register etc. 8.151
— default by
agent S._ 154
Annual Return
— failing make
return 8.158, 159
~ - auditor's
statement S. 159A
director
or
ofﬁcer
, company and
every
ofﬁcer
in default
ditto
ditto
ditto
‘ ditto
agent
00ml”!!!
and every
ofﬁcer
in .
default
ditto
$2,000
+ civil
liability
SI 00.
default
penalty
General
penalty
51 00
$1000
$200 .
default.
penalty
3100
default
penalty
$106
default
penalty.
3200
default
Penalty
ditto
.3
:
 Art-mulls
accounts to be company. $1.000
kcpt SJGIAHU) director, or 6
office! months
in _ _ default
. default ‘ penalty.
$50
-— disclosure of registered $200
information company
S. l6lA (9) _ auditor
‘
- director failing , director $1,000
take all ' or
reasonable steps » ‘ 6 month
s
to comply ‘
0 Division 5. 163(1)
_ with intent to ' director $2,000
defraud 8. I63 '(3) or one
‘ yw or
both
(imprisonment
only if
offence
committed
'. wilfully)-
Audit.
— unqualified any $200
auditor S. 165 (1)0) person . defau
lt
. penalty
- ﬁrm of auditors ‘ each - $200
contravening member
S. 165 (9) v of ﬁrm
—— fail allow access officer $100
or give or . default
information S.l67 auditor. penalty:
(10) 810
Special Invesligalions
‘— fail'comply ofﬁcer $1,000
inspector‘s of
requirement to company
appear etc., 8. 174(1)
— on application ditto Punishment
to Supreme Court , as for
on failure comply contem
pt
8.175 (2)
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— limited use of
notes of examination
supplied S. 176(6)
— concealing etc.,
books of company
being investigated
S.l79A (I)
— contravening
restraining etc.,
order by Minister
S. 179]! (4)
— where such
offence committed
by company
S.l79B (5)
Take-overs
- misstatement: in
PART A statements '
S. 180]
— general penalty
provisions,
contravention Part
VIB Sl80w
Arrangements
and Reconstruction:
— failing supply
information, file
copy orders etc.,
SS. 181—186
Receivers and Managers
- failing file
notice appointment .
etc., to state
appointment on
invoices etc.,
SS. 187—197
Official Management
— default re meetings
of creditors,
statement of affairs
etc., SS.198—2l$
legal
practitioner
any
person
ditto
every
ofﬁcer
in ’
default
the offcror
or certain
directors of
offeror
corporations
any person
or. where
offence by
corporation,
ofﬁcer in
default
company and
every
ofﬁcer
in default
corporation
every
ofﬁcer,
liquidator
company
and every
officer
in default
ofﬁcial
manager,
auditor
etc.
(18
5200
54.000
or two
years
SI .000
Default
penalty
$200
ditto
$2,000
0" one
)‘eul’
or both
Sl,000
or 6 .
months
or both
from $100
and
default
penalty
to 5500'
from
$100 and
' default
penalty
to $100
from .
$100
to $400
and
default
penalty
SI 00
 20 Winding l 'p
— ut'l'cm'es' relating ‘
tn winding up by the
Court. liquidators,
voluntary winding up
etc., SS. 216-3l8
-- failing submit
prescribed statement
of affairs to
liquidator S. 234 (5)
— making declaration
of. solvency in
voluntary winding up
without reasonable
grounds. S. 257 (4)
No-Ihhility
Invcslmeur and
Foreign Companies
—- general default
provision as to
investment company
S. 343
- other offences
SS. 319—361,
applicant,
company and
every
ofﬁcer
liquidator
, etc.
69
every
person in
default
without
reasonable
excuse
director
company and
every ofﬁcer .
in default
ditto
plus agent
wilfuuy
authorizing
from $40 ’
to $200
. and
default
penalty
3 months
or $1,000
or both
default
penalty
6 months or
$|,000 or both.
$2,000. Default
penalty: $200
from $40 to $200
and default penalty
Restriction
an offering
shares. .
debentures. m...
for '
subscription or
purchase
Appendix B
New South Wales Companies Act, 1961—1973
PART Xll..DlVlSlON 2. — Offences.
Sec. 374(1). A person shall not, whether by
appointment or otherwise. go from place to place offering.
shares for subscription or purchase to the public or any
member of the public.
(3) A person shall not make an offer in writing to
any member of the public (not being a person whose
ordinary business it is to buy or sell shares, whether as
principal or agent) of any shares for purchase. unless the
offer is accompanied by a statement in writing (which shall
be signed by the person making the offer and dated)
containing such particulars as are required by this section
to be included therein and otherwise complying with the
requirements of this section, or, inthe case of shares in a,
corporation formed or incorporated outside the State.
either by‘ such a statement, or by such a prospectus as
complies with this Act.
(8) Every person who acts, or incites causes or
procures any person to act, in contravention of this section
shall be guilty of an offence against this Act.
Penalty: Imprisonment for six months or four
hundred dollars or both and in the case of a second or
subsequent offence imprisonment for twelve months or one
thousand dollars or both.
(9) Where a person convicted of an offence under
this section is a corporation, every officer concerned in the
management of the corporation shall be guilty of the like
offence unless he proves that the act constituting the
offence took place without his knowledge or consent.
(10) Where any person is convicted of having made
an offer in contravention of this section. the court before
which he is convicted may order that any contract made
as a result of the offer shall be void and may give such
consequential directions as it thinks proper for the
repayment of any money or the re-transfer of any shares;
and an appeal against the order and any consequential
directiors shall lie to the Court.
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(“i'ZS'W‘ h," 374A. (l) Every person who, being a former offic
er,
0”"""‘ ”' or an ofﬁcer. of a company to which this section applies -—
cur lain
companies.
(a)
(b)
(C)
does not, to the best of his knowledge and
belief; fully and truly discover to the
appropriate ofﬁcer all the property, real and
personal, of the company, and how and to
whom and for what consideration and when the
company disposed of any part thereof. except
such part as has been disposed of in the
ordinary course of the business of the
company;
does not deliver up to the appropriate ofﬁcer,
or as he directs:
(i) all the real and personal property of the
company in his custody or under his
control which he is required by law to
deliver up; or
(ii) all books and papers in his custody or ‘
under 'his control belonging to the
company which he is required by law to
deliver up;
within five years' next before the relevant day
or at any time on or after that day:
(i) has concealed any part of the property of
the company to the value of one hundred
dollars or upwards, or has concealed any
debt due to or from the company;
(if) has fraudulently removed any part of the
' property of the company to the value of
one hundred dollars or upwards;
(iii) has concealed, destroyed, mutilated or
falsiﬁed or has been _privy to the
concealment, destruction. mutilation or
-falsification' of, any book or paper
affecting or relating to the property or
affairs of the company:
(iv) has made or had been privy to the
, making of any false entry in any book or
paper affecting or relating to the property
or affairs of the company:
(v) has fraudulently parted with, altered or
made any omission in. or has been privy
to fraudulent parting with. altering or
7|
 
(d)
(e)
(f)
(3)
making any omission in, any document
affecting or relating to the property or
affairs of the company:
(vi) by any false representation or other fraud,
has obtained any property for or on
behalf of the company on credit which
the company has not subsequently paid
for;
(vii) has obtained 0n credit, for or on behalf
of the company, under the false pretence
that the company is carrying on its
business, any property which the company
has not subsequently paid for; or
(viii) has pawned, pledged or disposed of any
. property of the company which has been
obtained on credit and has not been paid
for, unless such pawning, pledging or
disposing was in the ordinary course
of the business of the company;
wilfully makes any' material omission in any
statement relating to the' affairs of the
company;
knowing or believing that-a false debt has been
proved by any person, fails for a period of one
month to inform the appropriate officer of his
knowledge or belief; '
prevents the production of any book or paper
affecting or relating to the property or affairs
of the company;
‘within ﬁve years next before the relevant day
or at any time on or after that day, has
attempted to account for any part of the
property of the company by making entries in
the books of the company showing ﬁctitious
transactions; losses or expenses; or
72
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where
proper
accounts
not kept.
(h) within five. years next before the relevant day or
at any time on or after that day. has been
guilty of any false representation or other fraud
for the purpose of obtaining the consent of the
creditors of the company or any of them to an
agreement with reference to the affairs of the
company. or to‘its winding up,
is guilty of an offence against this Act.
Penalty: Five thousand dollars or imprisonment for
two years.
. (2) It is a good defence to a charge under paragraph
(a), (b) or (d) or subparagraph (i), (vii)_ or (viii) of
(paragraph (c) of subsection (I) if the accused proves that
he had no intent to defraud, and to a charge under"
paragraph (f) or suhparagraph (iii) or (iv) of paragraph (c)
of that subsection if he prbves that he had no intent to
conceal the state of affairs of the company or to defeat
the law.
(3), Where any person pawns, pledges or disposes of
any property in circumstances which amount to an offence
under subparagraph (viii) of paragraph (c) of subsection
(1), every person who takes in pawn or pledge or
otherwise receives the property knowing it to be pawned,
pledged or disposed of in those circumstances is guilty of
an offence against this Act.
Penalty: Two thousand ﬁve hundred dollars or
imprisonment for one year. _
3748. Where the provisions of section 161A or any
corresponding previous enactment for the time being in
force have not been complied with in respect of a
company to which this section applies throughout the
period of two years immediately preceding the relevant day
or the period between the incorporation of the company
and the relevant day, whichever is the shorter, every
officer who is in default is, unless he shows that he acted
honestly and shows that in the circumstances in which the
‘ business of the company was carried on the default was
excusable. guilty of an offence against this Act.
Penalty: Two thousand five hundred dollars or
imprisonment for one year.
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. 374C. (1) If an officer of a company to which this
section applies was knowingly a party to the contracting of
a debt by the company and had at the time the debt Was
contracted no reasonable or probable grounds of
expectation, after taking into consideration the other
liabilities, if any. of the company at the time. of the
company being able to pay the debt, the ofﬁcer is guilty of
an offence against this Act.
Penalty: Five hundred dollars or imprisonment for
three months.
(I) If any business of a company to which this
section applies has been carried on with intent. to defraud
creditors of the company or creditors of any other person
_or for any fraudulent purpose. any person who was
knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business in
that manner is guilty of an offence against this Act.
Penalty: Two thousand five hundred dollars or
imprisonment for one .year.
374D. (I) Where a person has been convicted of an
offence under subsection (I) or subsection (2) of section
374C, or has been convicted of an offence under
subsection (3) of section 303 or subsection (4) of section
304, as enacted before lst January. 1972, the Court on
the application of the Commission or a prescribed person
may, if it thinks proper to do so, declare that the person
is personally responsible without any limitation of liability:
(a) in the case of a conviction under subsection
(1) of section 374C, for the payment to the
company of an amount equal to the wholeof
the debt in respect or which the conviction was
made. or such part thereof as the court thinks
fit; and
(b) in the case of a conviction under subsection (2)
of section 374C, for the payment to he
company of the amount required to satisfy all
or any of the debts of the company as the
Court directs.
(IA) In relation to a company to which a
conviction referred to in subsection (1) relates:
(a) the appropriate ofﬁcer; and
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(h) a creditor or contributory of the company
authorized by the Commission to make an
application under subsection (I);
are prescribed perSons for the purposes of that
subsection.
374F.‘(I)Any person who gives or agrees _or offers to
give to any member or creditor of a company any valuable
consideration with a view of securing his own appointment
or nomination. or to securing or preventing the
appointment or nomination of some person other than
.himself. as the company’s liquidator or ofﬁcial manager is
guilty of an offence against this Act.
Penalty: Five hundred dollars.
(2) livery officer or contributory of any
company who destroys, mutilates. alters or falsiﬁes any
books. papers or securities, or makes or is privy to the
making of any false or fraudulent entry in any register or
book of account or document belonging to the company
with intent to defraud or deceive any person is guilty of
an offence against this Act;
Penalty: Five thousand dollars or imprisonment for
two years.
3740. Every person who. while an officer of a
company: '
(a) has by false pretences or by means of any
other fraud. induced any person to give credit
to the company;
(b) with intent to defraud creditors of the
company. has made or caused to be made any
gift or transfer of or charge on, or has caused
or connived at the levying of any execution
against. the property of the company: or
(\c) with intent to defraud creditors of the
company, has concealed or removed any part of
the property of the company since or within
two months before the date of. any unsatisﬁed
judgment or order for payment of money
obtained against the company,
is guilty of‘an offence against this Act.
Penalty: Five thousand dollars or imprisonment for
two years.
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374H. (1) Unless cause to the contrary is shown. the
Court may. on an application by the Commission and on
being satisﬁed as to the matters referred to in subsection
(2), make an order prohibiting a person speciﬁed in the
. order from acting, as a director of. or being concerned in
the management of. any company during such period not
exceeding ﬁve years alter the making of the order as is.
speciﬁed in the order.
(3) A person shall not contravene or fail to comply
with an order under this section that is applicable to him.
Penalty: Imprisonment for ‘six months or one
thousand dollars .or both. ‘
375 (1) Every corporation which advertises circulates
or publishes any statement of the amount of its capital
' which is misleading or in which the amount of nominal or
authorized capital is stated without the words “nominal"
or “Authorized" or in which the amount of capital or
authorized or subscribed capital is stated but the amount
of paid up capital or the amount of any charge on
uncalled capital is not stated, and every ofﬁcer of the
corporation who knowingly authorizes directs or consents
to such advertising circulation or publication shall be guilty
of an offence against this Act.
375 (2) Every person who in any return, report or
certiﬁcate or in accounts or in any other document
required by or for the purposes of this Act wilfully makes
or authorizes the making of a statement which is false or
misleading in a material particular knowing it so to be
false or misleading or wilfully omits or authorizes the
omission of any matter or thing without which the
document is misleading in a material respect and is known
by him to be misleading shall be guilty of an offence
against this Act and be liable —
(a) on conviction on indictment to imprisonment
for a term of two years or to a ﬁne of ﬁve
thousand dollars or both; or
(b). on summary conviction to imprisonment. for a
term of six months or to a ﬁne of one
thousand dollars or both.
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.375A. An officer of a corporation who, with intent
to deceive. makes or furnishes~~ or knowingly and wilf
ully
authorizes or permits the making or furnishing of,
any
false or misleading statement or report to:
(a) a director, auditor. member, debenture holder
or trustee for debenture holders of the
corporation: 1
(b) in the case of a corporation that is a
subsidiary, an auditor of the holding company;
or .
(c) a prescribed stock exchange in Australia or
elsewhere. or an ofﬁcer thereof;
relating to the affairs of the corporation is guilty of an
offence against this Act.
Penalty: On conviction upon indictment, ﬁve
thousand dollars or imprisonment for ,two years, or both;
on summary conviction, one thousand dollars
or
imprisonment for six months or both.
376. (1) No dividend. shall be payable to the
shareholders of any company except out of proﬁts
or
pursuant to section 60.
. , (2) Every director or manager of a company
who wilfully, pays or permits to be paid any dividend
out
of what he knows is not proﬁts exept pursuantto‘se
ction 60:
(a) shall without prejudice to any other liability be
guilty of an offence against this act; and
(b) shall also be' liable to the creditors
of the
company for the amount of the debts due by
the company to them respectively. to the extent
. by which the dividends so paid have exceeded
the proﬁts and such amount may be recovered
by the Creditors or the liquidator suing on
behalf of the creditors.
Penalty: One thousand dollars.
378A. (1) If, in the State, a person does an a
ct or
omits to do an act'and that person would, if he h
ad done
that act, or had omitted to do that Act, in anot
her State
or in a Territory of the Commonwealth, have been
guilty
of an offence against the law of ‘that State or Te
rritory
that corresponds to a provision of this Act, that
person is
guilty of an offence against that provision of thi
s Act.
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IS THE LAW ADEQUATE —,
ARE PENAL SANCTION-S APPROPRIATE FOR CORPORATE CRIME?
J. M. Rothr'rjv
Solicitor of the Supreme Court of New South Wales
The Institute. being concerned with a critical and modern appraisal of
the role of penal sanctions and punishment in the prevention of acts
injurious to public welfare, is an appropriate forum to debate whether
present sanctions and punishment are appropriate or the law adequate in
matters. of “corporate crime”.
In the limited time available. an approach to the problem is to picture
the opportunities available to be a corporate criminal. The background of
the picture can be taken from the provisions of the uniform companies law
(Companies Act 1961 N.S...W) A random glance at this legislation will
illustrate a wide choice of offences that may be committed in corporate
activities, ranging from comparatively small peccadilloes to offences of great
moment. Except for the Oimes Act (I900 N.S.W.) probably no other piece
of legislation is so studded with punishments and penalties. Of the 385
Sections in the Act, about 160 attract speciﬁc penalties, ranging from $20
up.to a.couple of thousand dollars, with or without imprisonment for a
couple of years. lllustrative of the type of offences are such administrative
or mechanical offences as failure to produce books (5. 7(9)) or not
displaying the company’s name (s.ll3) while offences of more importance
and significance are those involving the failure of directors to act honestly
(s. 124); fraudulently removing company property (5. 300); contracting debts
without reasonable probability of payment (5. 303); false statements in
reports or returns (5.375); circulation of a prospectus contrary to the
provisions of the Act (5. 40A).
Another part of the picture can be taken from the more solemn and
fearsome provisions of the criminal law as spelt out in the Crimes Act
(1900 N...SW) where apart from offences having general application to
corporations in their place in the community, such as the taking of the
petty cash or embezzlement, there are speciﬁc offences directed at officers
or members of corporations involving imprisonment for S or 10 years.
Typical of these are the provisions whereby directors, officers or members
of a company who fraudulently take for their own use or beneﬁt or
destroy any property of a company (s. 173, 174) or who destroy alter
mutilate or falsify any book entry or valuable security (3. 175) or who
make circulate or publish any written statement or account which is known
to be false in any material particular with intent to deceive or defraud
(s. 176) are liable to specific penalties provided by the Act.
Again the carrying on of a business by a corporation gives rise to
many opportunities frowned upon by other general legislation such as the
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Sccrct (ivmntission Prohibition .111 (NW N.S.W.) and in the background
there are always charges that may be laid under the common law for
offences such as conspiracy. whether it be to cheat or defraud or for
attempted false pretences or otherwise. ‘
A very important purl of the picture of corporate offences'is that
being created by new legislation - as e.g., the Securities Industry Act (1970
N.S.W.) which defines offences in relation to the making of false and
misleading statements about marketable securities (s.73). Currently, a whole
new concept of offences is being prescribed in the form of the Trade
Practices Bill (1973 Commonwealth) whereby some types of conduct, until
recently regarded as good clean commercial practice. will suddenly become
fraught with danger, attracting penalties ranging from $50,000 in the ease
of individuals up to £250,000 in the ease of corporations. ‘
In painting the picturew it is interesting to note that a corporation
itself can be involved in corporate crime. Gower points out in his Principles
of Modern Company Law (Third Ed. P.l46-l48):‘
”The question whether a company ought, on the ground of public“
policy. to be made criminally liable has been much debatedbu't has
been answered in the afﬁrmative by the Courts. As we have seen the
ultra vircs doctrine has beensuccessfully bypassed“ Another difﬁculty
that has had to be overcome is that. generally speaking,‘ there is no
rule of vicaribus liability in criminal law. mens rea on the part of the
accused being an essential element... Recent years have seen a
further development whereby the mic that the acts of directors are
treated as those of the cmnpany is. in effect, applied in reverse so
that the acts of the company are treated as those of its directors.
Matty modern statutes and regulations provide that if an offence is
committed by a company; every director or ofﬁcer Who was
implicated shall be guilty of that offence and often the onus is placed
on him to prove that it was committed without his consent and that
he exercised due diligence to prevent its commission. "
6?
As to the significance of this principle see by way of example Section
84 of the Trade Practices Bill (l973 Commonwealth).
In examining 'modern legislation, whether it be in respect of new
subject matter or it be the various amendments made to existing corporate
law, such as the amendments to the Companies Act‘ covering prospectuses,
takeover requirements or detailed disclosure to be made in respect of
accounts, two tendencies are vegy evident — one. a more embracive and
inclusive deﬁnition of conduct to be outlawed to catch the ingenious
corporate offender and the other a hardening and extending of the penalties
attaching to the forbidden aet far in excess of even present day rates of
inflation. As penalties and punishment are a substantial part of such law,
the first question that has to be answered is: Are such sanctions appropriate
for such crimes?
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ln offering an answer to this question I confess to little experience in
the practice or philosophy of the criminal courts, but I take the generally
accepted principle that the courts. representing the community, do not seek
revenge, but acknowledge that a sentence imposed should accord with the
general moral sense of the community. (R. v. Chrhbcrt 86 WN Part I N.S.W.
723). But of no less importance is the function of the criminal'law to
protect the community from crime and the words of the New Zealand
Court of Appeal in the following passage from R. v. Radich (I954 N.Z. LR
86) are of signiﬁcance: .
“One of the main purposes of punishment is to protect the public
from the commission of (such) crimes by making clear to the offender
and to other persons with similar impulses that, if they. yield to them,
they will meet with severe punishment. The fact that punishment does
not entirely prevent all similar crimes should not obscure the cogent
fact that the fear of severe punishment does, and will, prevent the
wmmission of mmy that would have been committed if it was
' thought that the offender could escape without punishment, or with
only a light punishment."
The above pictured scope of legislation and criminal law with its
inherent penalties and punishments is undoubtedly designed to make it
“clear to the offender and to other persons with similar impulses that, if
they yield to them, they will meet with severe punishment”.
There is no doubt that this legislative policy has put teeth into
corporate law. The dark clouds of ﬁnes and imprisonment have undoubtedly
made those responsible for the administration of the affairs of companies,
whether they be directors or management, more conscious of their
obligations and more careful in the performance of their duties. This
growing awareness of duties and obligations is increasingly apparent to those
members of the Institute who enjoy the beneﬁts of corporate and
commercial law advising. Even apart from this beneﬁcial aspect, one would
be hard pressed to deny that the policy of severe punishment and a greater
likelihood of being caught is appropriate in respect of corporate crime.
affecting as it does wide sections of the public and, probably more
importantly, reﬂecting the general public morality.
But the were important question which falls to be answered is: Is the
law adequate? ‘
The corporation in modern day society is daily having a greater
signiﬁcance not conﬁned only to the state or country in which it is
incorporated. With the rapid growth of the corporate structure. there are
increasing opportunities for double dealing and sharp practices inherent in
such structure. There, those who deal in securities or extend credit or make
capital investment, whether they be the wealthy capitalist or the oft-quoted
poor widow, are forced to rely upon the representations and judgments of
those who request money. By virtue of their position and the control they
‘1
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exercise tltey tnay with great opportunity misrepresent their expectations by
word and phrase and supporting data and have the occasion to use funds
for purposes other than those announced. Indeed, in the corporate structure
with its ramifications and opportunities for concealment there are
possibilities for wrongdoing not otherwise available in the affairs of the
community.
In this context remarks are taken front the very recent report of Mr
Peter Connolly, QC, on the affairs of the Queensland Syndication
Management Pty Ltd group of companies are illustrative of the problem
which has to be met. '
“As Queensland's economy and wealth increase we shall inevitably
become of increasing interest to the fraudulent company operator. The
public interest demands that we be ready for him. The waves of
conﬁdence men who moved into QSM will not prove to be the last of
their kind. " -
In determining whether the law is adequate in these circumstances one
tnust ask whether it is sufficient that the community as a whole is satisfied
and adequately compensated with the publicity and drama of the revelation
of some corporate coup or loss of large sums of money and whether its
moral conscience is satisfied by the trappings and colosseum-like
performance of trial and imprisonment of those defaulters unlucky enough
to be caught. What other methods are available?
in seeking an answer to this question we can look to the practices of
both our English and American cousins to weigh these against our own. The
two bodies of law have diverging policies in dealing with the problem.
in broad terms the English approach has been influenced by their
laissez t‘aire attitude, strengthened in recent years by more stringent
requirements in their legislation. This approach has been inﬂuenced in no
small way by the acceptance of a self regulatory code which has been of
signiﬁcance in the particular circumstances that operate in “the City” whic
h
basically controls the free enterprise financial activities of the Unite
d
Kingdom. In America where there is not the same aggregation in one
centre
of ﬁnancial strength because of the vastness of the country and the
different commercial influences, the control of corporations has becom
e
subject to a much more detailed Governmental and administrative c
ontrol
including particularly that of the Securities and Exchange Commission wi
th
its large administrative functions and facilities. The underlying philosophy
of
the English View can probably be taken in the views expressed by S
ir
Geoffrey Howe,the U.K. Minister for Trade and Consumer Affairs unde
r the
Heath Government, in an address which he gave the Financial Times
conference on company law reform in October last year. The purport of h
is
remarks were that his Government accepted that modern company law had to
operate in ways that were socially acceptable but rejected the demand for
inquisitorial surveillancge over the activities of all companies to protect each
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individual shareholder from every imprudent judgment or piece of bad luck.
Instead he described the Government's aitn as being “to strengthen a
company’s legal obligations, to introduce the sanction of the criminal law,
to increase penalties, to provide civil relief. (normally through access to the
courts) for those who suffer 1085 and make it easier for the Department of
Trade and Industry to investigate and to pursue its investigations where the
public interest requires it”.
Our American friends, being more advanced and imaginative in their
commercial and corporation machinations. and thereby suffering various
forns of fraud and conspiracy on a gigantic scale. exotic examples of which
are described as “boiler room tactics", “gun jumping" and “shingle theory".
have taken their legislative attack much further. Both in the laws and
machinery set up by their States under their “Blue Sky Laws" and
nationally under their Security Industry Legislation and Antitrust Acts they
"have developed a body of law supported by a large administrative
machinery designed to probe and examine and to delay and prevent a
suspect operation. Particularly in the SEC machinery there is inbuilt a
process of examination in depth and stop orders in the administrative
sphere, supported by rules and orders with a final recourse to the Courts
with their inherent powers of injunction and orders for contempt.
However, even there because of the complexity and diversity of
business activities, the American courts have exhibited a marked reluctance
to interfere with what may be “good faith business judgment”. For
example, in Universal Camera Corporation (Securities and Exchange
Commission 1945—19 SEC) the Court stated:
“It is plain that the policy Congress has established by the Securities
Act and the machinery that Act creates for making its policy effective
are designed to afford protection to investors, not by requiring the
Commission to identify ‘good’ and ‘bad' securities and forbid the sale
of the latter, but by requiring those who propose to offer securities
to the public to disclose plainly the facts an investor needs to know
how to make an informed judgment concerning the nature and quality
of the security to be offered. 77w Act leaves to the investor, on the
basis of the facts disclosed, to weigh the earning prospects of a
registered security against the risks involved and to judge for himself
whether he wishes to invest his money in it. ”
In Australia we are seeing and will undoubtedly see more new law
whether originating from federal or state parliaments. It is more likely to be
based on the American approach rather than the English. The apparent
tendency will be to force a fuller disclosure of facts and to maintain the
principle of severe punishment where the facts are misrepresented or
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 presented in such a way that a false picture emerges. In this context some
further remarks of Mr Connolly are worthwhile considering. While dealing
with the subject of enforcement of the law he felt constrained to suggest
that:
”The time may well be approaching when society must reappraise its
traditional approaches to the criminal law, at least in relation to the
complexities of the commercial world .. even more important is the
likelihood that much public loss may be forestalled by timely
preventive action. ”
In contemplating the possibilities of this approach, as a lawyer trained
-under the heavy'hand of Sir John Peden and Dicey’s Rule of Law, my
belief in the law has been that it should be certain and I have had an
inherent horror of administrative tribunals with powers that may not be
legally ascertainable or subject to control by the Courts. Nevertheless, when
considering whether the present corporate law is appropriate to the
circumstances and requirements of our day, it may well be better to have
some administrative system which may be prophylactic in its approach
rather than continue to experience the horriﬁed pleasure and anticipation
with which the community learns of still another company default whereby
the widows have been mulcted of their savings.
. In the light of these thoughts 'l turn to a memorandum which was
issued by Mr F. J. 0. Ryan, the Commissioner of Corporate Affairs, in
September of last year. In his memorandum he says:
"It is in my view, therefore, that if the Legislatures continue to place
exclusive reliance upon civil proceedings at the suit of shareholders
and upon criminal sanctions to discourage the misuse or the arbitrary
exercise of power by directors, it will, because of the unequal position
of the parties, fail to achieve an adequate measure of justice for
shareholders. "
He proposes that directors could be called upon to justify their
conduct before an authority where the authority had grounds for believing,
‘by reason of complaint or otherwise, that the directors were about to
embark upon some course of action which on the face of it appeared to be
contrary to the interests of shareholders. Such proceedings would take place
'in camera, and if the authority was not satisfied it would be vested with
the right to apply to a Court for an injunction where, if necessary, the
mattereould be heard in private. a perpetual injunction granted or
shareholders be directed to be called together to have the full facts placed
before them. He suggests that the advantages of the scheme are that it
would enable matters to be dealt with speedily and informally whilst
preserving confidentiality; it would provide assurance to shareholders who
must sometimes be concerned over the propriety of actions by directors but
are incapable of challenging them. The availability of the procedure could
itself be a significant factor in deterring directors from behaving
O
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unreasonably or arbitrarily. He is careful to emphasize that it would be
essential that the courts and/or authority “in the ﬁnal analysis should not be
required to substitute its own business judgment for that of the directors”.
In considering Mr Ryan’s proposals it is well to remember that the
Australian Associated Stock Exchanges have many desirable rules in their
listing requirements designed to ensure a quick and full disclosure. These
requirements are of particular importance and reliance in cases where
directors and/or management propose or are undertaking a course of action
not known to or contemplated by- shareholders. Many such occasions can
arise such as where directors who are common to apparently unrelated
companies seek to apply funds for their own ulterior purposes or where an
unlisted company seeks to gain control of a listed company or in takeover
situations, where no matter how specific the law is, all sorts of stratagems
are open to the sophisticated entrepreneur; The Exchanges can use their
powers in a quick and informal manner but the defect attaching to them is
that the requirements of the Exchange cannot be enforced other than by
suspending or delisting a company. If such a body as that proposed by Mr
Ryan could support the Exchanges in their requirements and generally could
move quickly without having to rely upon rules of evidence and delays of
court proceedings it could act to stop or delay any corporate move which
may be suspect until the facts were brought out into the open and either
the general body of shareholders have approved of the transaction or the
Court had given its sanction.
May I suggest for consideration by this Seminar that such a body may
make the law more efﬁcient or “adequate” in dealing with a wide and
developing area of “corporate law”. In offering this suggestion I draw
attention to a comment made by Mr Ryan. He said “such a proposal would
be quite an alteration to the procedures of law as now exist and
undoubtedly the scheme would require debate and consideration before
being implemented”. . ,
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 CHAIRMAN‘S OPENING ADDRESS
5 Mr Justice J. H. McClemens,
Ladies and Gentlemen:
I will only take up a minute of your time to welcome you here this
afternoon.
Before I introduce the first speaker there is just one thing I would
like to mention, and i do this with a considerable amount of ambivalence. I
want to express my regret and, I am sure, your regret, that Sir John Kerr
will no longer be the Chairman of the Advisory Committee of the Institute.
But in saying that, I say it is with ambivalence because I am sure that we
are all delighted that he has been honoured with the position of Her
Majesty's Representative in Australia. During the two years that Sir John
has been‘ Chairman he has made a great contribution to the, Institute. He
was the second Chairman, following the late Sir Leslie Herron. I am pro
lam the third Chairman, but not for long, although I am not going to tell
you the reason for that at this juncture. But I would just like to take this
'opportunity of paying tribute to the work that Sir John has done for the
Institute during his period as Chief Justice of-this State.
May l just move- on from that to welcime here this afternoon Mr
Justice Street, the Chief Justice designate, and Mrs Street. I am certain that
over the years Mr Justice Street will manifest the great interest in the work
of the Institute that has been manifested by Sir beslie Herron and Sir John
Kerr.-
With that, I propose to open the seminar. The papers have been
circulated and the first paper will be presented by Sir Richard Eggleston.
After Sir Richard Eggleston has spoken to his paper the commentators will
be Mr John Valder, the Chairman of the Sydney Stock Exchange, and Mr
Peter Grogan, the Executive Ofﬁcer of the Institute of Directors in
Australia. The second paper will be delivered by Mr Olson, the Acting Chief
lnspector of the N.S.W. Corporate Affairs Commission, and the
commentator will be Mr Rodney Purvis.
It is my pleasure now to call upon'Sir Richard Eggleston to present
his paper. - -
Sir Richard Eggleston:
Some of you you may wonder why, when one has compiled a paper
running to 25 pages or so, it is necessary for the speaker to give another
quarter of an hour or so to introduce it. However, the organizers of this
seminar are shrewd and experienced people and they realize that there are
two things that have to be done after a paper has been written. One is to
explain to the audience that some of it mustn't be taken too seriously, and
the other is to put in all the clever things you had thought of and should
have said in the paper itself‘and wish you had remembered at the time. I
have got a little of both. First of all the things that mustn’t be taken
seriously.
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l have classified the crimes that can he committed by corporate
ofﬁcers according to the maximum penalty provided in the legislation. But
this has to be taken, of course, with a grain of salt. because the penalties are
not determined (as I point out in" the paper) according to any consistent
scale. If a penalty for one offence was originally fixed, say, in |‘)45, and
another in [970, it is quite possible that although the penalties are the
same they were very differently regarded by the legislature at the time the
legislation was introduced. However, having said that. the classiﬁcation l
have adopted is valid within reasonable limits, certainly reasonably valid
where you are comparing maximum terms of imprisonment, because (again,
as l have said in the paper) apart from the attitude of the custodians, one
term of imprisonment'in one year is very ntuch the satne as a term of
imprisonment in another year from the point of view of severity. l don’t
know whether it is nicer to be in gaol now than it was twenty years ago,
but at least one can assume that if the legislature imposed a maximum of
12 months in I945, and a maximum of 12 months in 1070, the legislature
regarded the two offences as being of approximately equal heinousness.
Secondly, I have referred (again, in a general way) to the number of
sections that create offences. l have only referred to the number of sections
in order to give you an idea of the extent to which the legislature has
relied on criminal sanctions for the implementation of the provisions of the
company law. But again, nothing turns on the actual number of offences
that fall into the different categories which I have chosen to make, and if
it did one-would have to (as was pointed out in one of the other papers)
take account of the fact that there may be one section creating an offence
but it may in fact create 6 or 7 or 8 offences — different classifiable ‘
offences within that one section. So that nothing really turns on that. And
then of course apart from the sections which specifically impose a penalty
for disobedience there are those sections which impose a duty, and by
virtue of section 379 fo the Act the failure to perform a duty imposed by
the Act is itself an offence punishable by fine.
The next thing I want to say is (and this perhaps comes more under
the heading of those things which I might have said more felicitously in the
paper itself) something about the duties of Directors under the l96l Act.
Re-reading the paper I am not sure that i made the situation quite as
clear as it might be, and I am not sure after I have said what I am going
to say I will have made it any clearer, but here goes. The 1961 Act, in
‘dealing with the obligations of Directors to present the accounts and to
present a report used this form: “The Directors of every company shall. .”
This was an obligation imposed collectively on the Directors. And then in
that division of Part VI, Division I of Part VI, in which the obligation was
contained, there. was a penalty section, section 163. But section l63
referred only to Directors failing to take steps to secure compliance by the
company or being the cause, of any default by the company in the
performance of the provisions of this division. Now, the obligation to
present accounts and to make a report wasn‘t an obligation imposed on the
company. The company couldn‘t comply with it, and the company couldn't
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make default. because the duty was imposed on the directors as a collective
body. So that section ”)3 in its then form had no application to the
failure to present accounts or to present accurate accounts nor to failure to
present a report or to present an accurate report. Section 379 certainly
referred to a person who doesn‘t do that which by the Act he is required
or directed to do .or otherwise contravenes or fails to comply with any
provisions of the Act, but there might be some doubt as to whether, if the
obligation was laid on the Directors as a collective body, you could say
that any individual Director had been in breach of section 379. Probably he ,
would be, but it was as well to make it clear. Moreover, the penalty
available under section 379 was only $100 — somewhat inadequate for a
failure to present a report dealing with the matters which the statute
required should be communicated to the shareholders. It was for this reason
that we recommended that section I63 should be recast in substantially its
present form. You will find in the paper, which you will have already read,
some discussion of what the obligation is under section 163. As an
additional reference, anyone who is interested in our discussion of this
problem in our first interim report of the Company Law Advisory
Committee will ﬁnd it at pages 28—30 of that report. That is, if you can
get it. That Report is now out of print and copies are unobtainable from
the Government Printer. This is, I think, true of certainly the first four
Reports that we produced. Whether we will ever be able to get‘them
republished, or whether there is a demand for it, I don’t know.
One person I haven’t really mentioned in the paper is the Secretary of
the company, and for quite a good reason. It is a curious thing that‘
although the Act requires the appointment of a secretary it is almost
completely silent as to what his duties are. It has been suggested in the
text-books that he ought to attend the meetings of the Board and take the
minutes, although these days he Will rarely take the minutes himself. There
will be a tape-recorder or some other device or a stenographer there to take
a record of what is said. He will normally be charged with the
responsibility of ﬁling the appropriate returns in the Corporate Affairs
Commission and maintaining the Registers. But these duties don’t depend
on any statutory provision, and in fact the Share Register is often
maintained by someone else. an outside contractor, for example. You would
have expected that having required the appointment of a Secretary the Act ‘
would have specified him as the person who would be held responsible for
failure to comply with the machinery provisions, but that hasn’t been done.
There are, h0wever, a couple of things that he must do. He must record
declarations of interest in the minutes: where a Director declares his interest
in a particular matter the Secretary must record that in the minutes.
Perhaps by implication he is responsible for keeping the minutes. And he
must be present himself or by his agent or clerk, not necessarily personally,
when the registered office is open under section l32. Otherwise the duties
of the Secretary depend on the terms of the articles and the instructions of
the Directors. There would be something to be said for having a provision
in the Act making the Secretary responsible for doing a lot of things,
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because difﬁculties have arisen in catching an ofﬁcer under section 380.
Section 380 is the section which deﬁnes “an ofﬁcer in default”. It deﬁnes
him as being a person who is guilty of the offence or who knowingly and
wilfully authorizes or permits the commission of. an offence, and some of the
difﬁculties which'have arisen in that connection will be found discussed in
the case of Welsh v. Comfoot, (1973) V.R. 31, in which the company had
failed to ﬁle various documents which should have been ﬁled. The
documents had to be ﬁled within a lmonth. Some time after that month
had expired certain Directors were told (and this was, as far as appeared,
the ﬁrst time they knew about it) that these documents hadn’t been filed.
Well, they did nothing, and they were prosecuted as ofﬁcers in default. Mr
Justice Lush said that the offence was complete when the month expired,
and they couldn't have authorized or permitted it unless it was shown at
least that they knew of the offence, or of the failure to ﬁle before the
offence was complete, or at the time when it became complete. There is a
provision in section 380 that for certain purposes makes the offence a
continuing offence, so that after conviction you can get a penalty of so
much a day for the failure to remedy the breach, but that very provision
itself shows that except in those circumstances the offence is not a
continuing offence, so these Directors escape liability although the breach
had been drawn to their attention and they had done nothing to remedy it.
“Authorize or permit” hasn’t as far as l have discovered, received much
attention in the company cases. Does an ofﬁcer who knows that a
docurmnt ought to be filed and fails to see that it is filed, “authorize or
permit” the ornmission to ﬁle?0r does he do so in the absence of a duty?
Does he do so even though it is his duty internally so far as the company’s
affairs are concerned to ﬁle the document? Presumably in the latter case,
yes; in the former case, I would think, no.
Section 173 of the Crimes Act, on p. 14 of the paper: 1 have put in,
there _a reference to Reg. v. Armstrong (1972) l N.S.W.L.R. 559. In that
case the Directors of a company made a loan to another company. It was
within the powers of the lending company to make the loan, and it was
within the powers of the Directors to decide that such a loan should be
made. Nevertheless, the Crown alleged that the scheme was a dishonest
scheme to advantage the Directors of the company at the expense of the
company itself. In other words, that the loan was being made not because
the Directors considered that it was in the interests of the lending company
but because they wanted to get a beneﬁt which would accrue to them from
the loan being made to the other company. And they were charged under
section I73. Mr Justice Nagle directed an acquittal because he said that
although it was open to a jury to conclude that it was a dishonest and
fraudulent dealing, nevertheless a loan by a company which had power to
make loans to another company was an application of funds to the use of
the company because the loan was a use of the company. Now, the section
in fact says (I haven’t quoted it in detail here) “any Director who
fraudulently takes or applies for his own use or benefit or any use or
purpose other than that of the body corporate or company”, and I would
have thought that perhaps it would not be sufﬁcient to show that it was an
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 application for the use ot’ the company if in fact it was an application for
thc bcnclit of the Directors or an application for the use of someone other
than the company. In other words that it is not sufficient to show that
technically it was a loan which the company might have made if the Crown
proved that it was an application of funds for a dishonest purpose and not
with any intention to beneﬁt the company. However, this was the ruling,
and an acquittal was directed, and the judge gave examples of some of the
things he thought might be covered by the section: the use of company
moneys to pay the personal debts of the Director, or to buy a car for his
wife. 1 am not sure that those wouldn’t come under other statutory
provisions, but it will be seen that on the decision which has been given as
to section I73 it is a relatively limited provision providing against
dishonesty by Directors.
Just a word about the conspiracy cases. I have referred on pp. 22—24,
speciﬁcally at the bottom of p. 22, to a number of recent decisions on the
laws of conspiracy. They made it quite clear that in order to lay a criminal
charge of conspiracy you do not ‘have to establish either a tort or a crime.
Perhaps the most striking is the South Australian case of Reg. v. Howes
(1971) 2 S.A.S.R.293, where the conspiracy was to persuade the Public
Examinations Board that the particular person had sat for a particular exam
at the matriculation level and had got certain marks, and because this
involved cheating and deception it was said that the conspiracy to achieve
this result was a criminal conspiracy for which the accused could be
convicted. Some anxiety was felt by the Court of Criminal Appeal in England
at the suggestion that if two people agreed to take a short cut across
someone else's land they had conspired to commit a trespass and therefore
would be criminally liable. Because of the English love of the countryside
they were at pains to say that not all agreements to commit torts are
criminal. 1 think it is unfortunate that they introduced this complication
.into what was otherwise reasonably clear, but in that particular case of
Kamara v. Off. (1973) 3W.L.R.198, they said that if the trespass involved
entering the public domain, trespass in a public building or a foreign
embassy, or if it involved excluding the owner from his land that was
enough — if there was substantial damage inﬂicted, that was enough" to
make it criminal conspiracy. But it still remains true, as indeed Mr Justice
lsaacs decided in Murray’s case. that it doesn’t have to be a tort or a crime
in order to constitute a criminal offence. incidentally, if you are looking at
Murray (1973) A.L.M.D. Case No. 1220, you will ﬁnd a reference to the
N.S.W. Law Reports (complete with page) there, but don’t bother to go
and look in the N.S.W. Law Reports, because it isn't there.
The other thing that 1 just want to say briefly is about this question
of difficulties of proof. First of all, 1 quoted from Reg. v. Mitchell (1971)
V.R. 46, and they referred to the provisions of the Evidence Act in
Victoria. which i have attached as an annexure. it is a provision (149A it is
now of the Victorian Act) which enables accused persons in criminal
proceedings to make admissions. One of the difﬁculties of coming front
another State is that one is not readily familiar with the places in which
8‘)
 
 corresponding provisions appear, and i am indebted to the (‘hairman for
telling me that that corresponding provision is to be found in the Crimes
Aer here (section 404), it is not in the Evidence A(1.Tl1e other thing I
want to say about that is that the difficulties are perhaps not quite as great
as I might have thought they “ere when I wrote the paper. I Would motel)
refer you -— because there isn’t much time to do anything else - to the
cases of Johnston v. Kersliaw, l De G.&Sm.3(10 at p. 264; ()3 ER. 105‘)
at p.106l. Potts v. Miller. 64 C.L.R. 283, and a recent decision of Mr
Justice Gibbs itt Re Montet'atini’s Patent 47 A.L.J.R. ltil at p.l69. which
seem to show that it is possible where you have these complicated company
frauds to put in the books and so on which constitute the evidence of the
way the business is. carried on and then to call experts to produce lists of
documents, schedules and all the rest of it to show exactly what the system
was that was followed. Now, [think if there is any doubt about this there
ought to be legislation to make it clear that this can be done. I think it
can be done already, but so often if you don’t have legislation people just
don’t believe you when you tell them it is possible. So that I would myself
be in favour of legislation which made it clear that in criminal cases and in
civil cases, if there are complicated transactions, provided the documents are
produced or are available for the other side. experts can be called to
produce written statements showing the system that was followed and how
the transactions were carried out. Just how you phrase it would of course
bear consideration. That is all I wanted to say.
Chairman:
Thank you Sir Richard. Now, the first of your commentators is Mr
John Valder, Chairman of the Sydney Stock Exchange. 1 will ask Mr Valder
to comment on Sir Richard’s paper.
Mr John Valder, Chairman of the Sydney Stock Exchange:
It is with some sense of very real humility that I appear here
this evening to comment on a paper in this seminar with the very succinct
but rather macabre title of “Corporate Crime”. You will understand my
humility when I tell you that I happen to be neither a lawyer nor a
company director. Whatever deﬁciencies that gives me, it does leave me
with some comfort in that i don’t think anybody can accuse me of having
any conflict of interest.
1 think those of us who have read, and now heard, Sir Richard’s
paper, and particularly perhaps those of us who are not lawyers and those
of us who are not directors of public companies could only be left with
one clear overriding impression, and that is that the responsibilities of
company directors are very considerable. Sir Richard conﬁned his comments
to three Acts to begin with — the Companies Act. the Crimes Act and the
Securities Industry Act (or Acts), so that even with those three, company
directors already find themselves confronted with a very large field. and a
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growing field, of legal responsibility. These Acts tend to be amende
d and
expanded witlt considerable frequency, and it does seem (
depending, of
course. on what happens on May l8th) that it mightn't be long
before
company directors and those of us in the securities industry might also have
some Federal legislation to contend with.
Unfortunately for company directors it doesn’t necessarily st
op there.
Putting on my Stock Exchange hat, there are of course the
Rules and
Regulations. or more precisely, the listing requirements, of
the Stock
Exchanges which company directors and ofﬁcers are required to observe.
Now, these Stock Exchange requirements suffer the disadvantage of
not being enforceable, although those of us in the Stock Exchanges h
ave
drawn some comfort in recent times from some remarks made by
Mr
Justice Street in last year’s case involving R. W. Miller and Howard Smith
in which His Honour referred to the obvious contractual obligation wh
ich
company directors have with the Stock Exchange by virtue of their
agreement with the Exchanges in relation to these listing requirements.
His
Honour went on to say that investors generally should be able to expect
that the directors of those public companies would observe the rules wh
ich
they had contracted to observe.
But whilst the Stock Exchanges have the disadvanta
ges of having no
further powers of enforcement, the Stock Exchanges
do also have the
advantage of some ﬂexibility in their application of rules.
That flexibility, i
think, extends as far as being a vehicle at times for some
degree of moral
persuasion. Some of you might have noticed that
just in recent weeks the
Stock Exchanges have been indulging in perha
ps a little more moral
persuasion than they might have done at othe
r times in relation to
takeovers and what might be expected in takeovers.
'
You would all know that there are certain
provisions regarding
takeovers in the Cbmpanies Act and in the Stoc
k Exchange requirements.
We in the Sydney Stock Exchange have rece
ntly applied what can be
described as nothing more than moral persuasion
on a number of companies
in the context of some very ﬁerce takeover bat
tles that have been waged
just these last few months. ‘
In particular you might have noticed the
Exchanges taking some
exception to the practice that where a comp
any announces that it is going
to make a takeover offer at one price that it thereu
pon goes into the market
and starts paying a higher price for the same s
ecurities. Obviously it would
be better if some disincentive to this practi
ce was incorporated in the law,
or even in the Stock Exchange Regulations. B
ut I make no apology for the
fact that the Exchanges, without that in thei
r Rules, let alone in the law,
are nevertheless prepared to lean upon that po
int. It seems to me that there
can be no moral justification whatever for any com
pany publicly saying
that it is going to pay one price for your
shares and at the same time
going out elsewhere and perhaps selectively
paying a different price for
q]
 
 those very same shares. I think this is 'an illustration of the type of
responsibility that company directors have a responsibility not 'simply within
the law or within the rules but extending far beyond the written word, and
takeovers seem 'to be a topical vehicle for drawing 'atention to this at «the
moment. ,
Just this very week one has the example of a company of which the
directors signed the usual Directors’ Statement concerning the true and fair
view of the company’s assets at a date last September saying that the
Balance Sheet reﬂected the true and fair view of the state of affairs of that
company as at June 30th, and now, some eight months later, the same
directors of that company are able to say (just yesterday) that “following
recent preliminary valuations of the group’s principal land holdings, which
no doubt proved an irresistible attraction to the bidder, we can report that
the company’s land and buildings are worth in the vicinity of Sl4 million
above the stated book values”. 514 million happens to be something of the
order of 130—140 per cent in excess of the stated book values. Again,
without being able to .comment on the legal implications of that. there
seems to be an enormous moral deficiency whereby company directors can
certify to one statement and then a few months later say, “Our ﬁgures
were out by not just a small amount but by something in excess of IOO
per cent”.
Then again, there is current a Part A statement in relation to another
takeover in circulation which I think is distinguished only by the fact of
what little information it happens to give. Now, once again this Part A
statement no doubt complies fully with the law as it is today, but the very
emptiness of it points up certainly the inadequacy of that law, and the
inadequacy it would seem in this particular instance is’ in the directors’
obligations, legal or otherwise, to feel that they should give the maximum
possible information. ’
Now [just mention these three different aspects as an illustration of
what I, as a no'n-lawyer and as a non public company director, see of the
further responsibilities of company directors over and above those in the
Acts. It is simply an illustration, [ suppose, of the great dilemma which
faces both those who draft company legislation and rules, including the
Stock Exchanges, and the practitioners — the company directors. It is the
dilemma of what is necessary to protect the public interest and what is
reasonableinterms of the practitioners. it is a dilemma to which nobody
has yet found the solution. Obviously if the law becomes too stringent and
there is too great a desire to regulate, there will be nobody left to regulate.
Nobody will be prepared to undertake such responsibilities bearing in mind
their other responsibilities as company directors. I can see that there must
be some risk that, if these things go far enough and if company directors
are left to be overawed by their legal responsibilities, they might tend to
overlook their wider responsibilities in other areas. particularly the
formulation of policy and overseeing of management.
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There were two other points in this same context that I think Sir
Richard just touched on and on which l would like to comment very
brieﬂy. One is in relation to the size of penalties. Reading his paper, one
could only agree with the anomalies which tended to appear.- Once again, if
I could go back to a recent takeover situation where one company was
reputed to have said (certainly not to us, and I hope it wasn’t said, because
it came to us in a third-hand way) that it was worth breaching a particular
provision ol the Cbmpanies Act in relation to takeovers because the penalty
was so modest in relation to the stakes at hand. I don’t think actually that
if_ that was true that the Directors were being quite sensible, because whilst
the monetary penalty was Sl,000 [don’t know whether they were aware
that there was a less comfortable penalty of 6 months imprisonment. Again,
this is an illustration of the need from the investing public's point of view
to ensure that there are significant enough penalties to act as a suitable
deterrent
The other point of the paper I would just like to very brieﬂy
mention. relates to delays in court cases involving company directors and
corporate law generally. l would think that the investment community, if I
. might take that point of view for one moment might perhaps not be so
.concerned with the time these cases take when they get to court as with
the, tin it does take to get these cases to court at all and as to what the
fairness might be in that to all concerned. I am sure we are all aware of
cases at the moment involving incidents going back three years. There is
nothing usual, I think, in corporate prosecutions coming to court something
of the order of three years after the event. One must question the wisdom
of this in relation to the success of the prosectuion, the fairness to the
directors involved, and by no means least, the public interest.
- As I say, all those matters add up to, I think, the basic tenor of Sir
Richard's paper, which is the basic responsibilities of company directors.
One can only see that those responsibilities and obligations are not likely to
diminish in the future but are probably only going to become greater.
 
Which brings me to my final point, which may bea mercenary one —
some may even say cynical — but my point is that if more and more is to
be expected of company directors, the public at large and the investing
public can hardly complain when company directors put forward proposals
for increased fees. I say that a trifle lightheartedly, but I mean it quite
seriously, because quiteol‘ten at company meetings or in the press or
elsewhere one hears criticism of the fact that the directors of such-and-such.
a-company are proposing increased fees for themselves. If the community is
to expect a greater degree of responsibility for its company directors surely
it is going to be only fair, if they are to get the right calibre of people to
perform those duties, that they be remunerated accordingly.
l
Chairman: .
The next commentator is Mr Peter Grogan, Executive Director of the
Institute of Directors in Australia, and l call Mr Grogan to the microphone.
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Mr Peter Grvgan, Executive Director, The Institute of Directors in Australia:
It is a privilege to have this opportunity of commenting on Sir
Richard’s paper. It is a pleasure to note that, at least on the figures
presented in this and the other papers to be discussed at this seminar, the
number of directors and employees of companies guilty of corporate crimes,
as they are being discussed here, is relatively very few indeed. Throughout
Australia there are several million — certainly more than three million —
ofﬁcers of companies. When one looks at the figures of prosecutions,
indictments and other proceedings listed in the appendices to Mr Olson’s-
paper one is able to get the picture into what may be the proper
perspective. I recognize, of course, that Mr Olson’s ﬁgures relate only to
New South Wales, but in terms of registered companies this is undoubtedly
the most significant State. On a comparative basis the number of company
ofﬁcers (which of course includes all employees as well as the company
secretary and directors) dealt with for 'crimes under the Companies Act,
Securities Industry Act and relevant provisions of the Oimes Act may be
less relatively than, for example. the number of members of the legal
profession who are dealt with for breaches of the practising rules or by the
courts for offences arising from or in the course of their practice. To look
at it another way, when one has regard to the enormous volumes of money
and other property which are handled by companies (and this means by
directors and employees of the companies) it is clear that it is only a small
proportion of company ofﬁcers who fail to comply with the duties and
obligations cast upon them by these Acts.
This seminar has concentrated upon the private sector, but there may
be some helpful information to be gained from other comparable areas. There
would seem no 'intrinsic difference, for example, between embezzling a sum
of money from one arm of the Government, the Rural Bank, or a private
‘trading bank. Obviously one of the purposes of this seminar will be to
establish, if it is at all possible, exactly what the proportion of defaulting
company officers is. For small though it may be in relative numbers, it
clearly causes harm to the corporate system, damaging its reputation and
acceptability to the community.
It is presumably only when this minority can be identified and
assessed in some way that one can proceed with finding answers to
important questions such as:
1. What effect, deterrent or otherwise, does the penalty prescribed
for a speciﬁc offence have on any one, or a class, or all of the
members of this group?
2. What effect, if any, would variations in the penalty have on the
conduct of those who may be inclined, for any reason, to
commit the offence? For example. if the penalty was doubled,
or quadrupled, or multiplied by twenty, or was a penalty of
$250,000, what effect would this have?
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3. Are our administrative and judicial procedures appropriate having‘
regard to tlte nature of the offence? This involves a
consideration of whether there is anything inherently different
about corporate crimes as distinct from other crimes. .
4. Is there any justification for a‘different emphasis in the
treatment or punisltment of a person convicted of such a crime
for example. a tendency to prefer heavy pecuniary penalties
to long prison sentences for persons convicted of a corporate
crime? '
5. If one is satisfied that a number of offences are committed for
which no person is brought to book, is this because of a lack of
proper or desirable investigation facilities, or some other reason?
6. Finally. one could ask whether an examination of relevant
corporate behaviour shows that conduct not now prohibited
should be forbidden. If so. what precisely is the offence, and
how should it be defined so that those who may be affected by
it will known what the law requires of them.
In this context, Sir Richard’s paper provides a most useful starting
point. It raises a number of questions, some of which will no doubt be
dealt with more fully in discussions on other papers.
The ﬁrst matter is, of course, the range of pecuniary penalties,
generally associated with a prescribed maximum term of imprisonment. l
have already raised the question of whether the prescribed pecunia
ry and
gaol penalties are, jointly or severally, appropriate. Let us cons
ider for a
moment a middle income earner. In current political parlance this seems to‘
vary front $4,000 to $14,000 per annum. l'wonder just how important a
pecuniary penalty of, say,‘Sl,000 or $2,000 is to‘a man who, if co
nvicted,
stands to lose his reputation, position, and an annual income
of. say,
$14,000. But more. he is exposed to the possibility of enormous
legal costs
in defending criminal proceedings, especially where both
committal
proceedingsand a trial could be involved. Sir Richard. and M
r Goldrick in
his paper. both draw attention to the enormous time
and costs involved in
some prosecutions.‘Sir Richard’s paper draws attention to th
e great variety
of the offences in‘the various Acts discussed. even if there
are apparent
inconsistencies in the penalties provided. In the second
edition of Brown’s
Company Directors there is a list of ill sections under wh
ich directors
may incur liabilities 'under the Cmnpam‘es Act. In the third
edition. soon to
be published, this has grown to I35, and many of the
sections of course
involve several. or indeed many. different and not necessa
rily cognate
offences. *
Time will permit me to select only a couple of matters for c
omment.
First. let me ,mention section |63 of the Companies Act.
Sir Richard says
that prior to the introduction of this section in its present fo
rm there was
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 no effective provision imposing on indiridual directors any obligation with
regard to the Directors’ Report. “It would be difficult”, Sir Richard said,
“to fasten responsibility on an individual director, and impossible to impose
an absolute liability on every director for failure to report or to report
correctly”. “Hence”, Sir Richard says. “we recommended a form of section
163 that would conﬁne the responsibility of an individual director to taking
reasonable steps to see that the Board carried out its collective
responsibility". Strictly, of course, what is required of the individual
director is that he take all reasonable steps, and what these will be will
vary from company to company and depend on a host of factors, such as
the nature of the business of the company, the scope of its operations, the
experience and skills of the members of the Board and nnnagement of the
company, and so on. I have no doubt that what is now required of
directors is much more than was in I925 expected of directors under the
City Equitable Fire Insurance case principles. I' do not say this is a bad
thing, but I do suggest that pending some judicial interpretation of the
provisions, the outer limits of what is expected of directors under this
section is not clear.
i am particularly interested in the separation of the individual
director’s responsibility from that of the collective responsibility of the
Board. i agree that under the new accounts provisions each director has
individual responsibilities. In the past it was generally regarded that the
Board’s responsibility was essentially “collective”. In some cases, of course,
the directors are concerned with important matters of judgment or opinion,
such as, what is an adequate provision for doubtful debts, or what is the
proper value of current assets such as stock-in-trade or work-in-progress. If
different directors hold varying views about the proper values of these
items, it is not immediately clear that the statutory obligation of each
individual director viewed separetely will be satisﬁed by his accepting a
consensus of majority opinion of the Board. It is possible to imagine a
number of different situations in which an individual director may have to
consider his position very carefully in the circumstances which have arisen.
A related problem arises in the new takeover provisions. The minutes
of the Board meeting authorizing the signing of a Part A statement must
record the name of any director (a) who is absent from the meeting, (b)
who votes against the resolution, and (c) who, although present, abstains
from voting on the resolution. A director absent or who voted against or
who refrained from voting cannot be prosecuted for misstatements or
omissions in a Pan A statement, nor be sued for compensation in respect
of it. Not a very great encouragement to the exercise of unanimous
collective responsibility}
My next comment is concerned with insider trading, mentioned by Sir
Richard. Introduction of insider trading provisions was supported by the
Institute of Directors. indeed, the Institute considers that the present
provisions do not go far enough and should apply to.all consultants,
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including geologists, and to employees of bankers and to clerks of solicitors
and auditors. There seems no reason, also, why Government ofﬁcials and
journalists, to whom confidential information may come, should not be
brought into the ambit of insider trading provisions. On the other hand, it
is considered that when a person makes use of insider information to gain
an advantage he should not be liable to another person for loss incurred by
the other person who knew, or reasonably ought to have known, that
information. This is one provision of section 124A of the Companies Act
adopted in other states which should be adopted in 75A of our Securities
Industry Act. The reievzuit analogy is that of unjust enrichment, and a share
trader should not be entitled to take advantage of a transaction which he
entered into with full knowledge. The insider will, of course, still be liable
to conviction for the offence. This is just "one of a number of areas where
the new interstate Corporate Affairs Commission will, hopefully, be able to
bring about acceptable uniformity in the law of the participating States.
I
Finally, may i draw special attention to. the concluding sectionlof Sir
Richard’s paper, dealing with procedural problems. i' support entirely the
spirit with which Sir Richard has made those remarks. it is essential that
confidence in our courts be maintained, because so many new and stricter
requirements are being imposed upon individuals in the society. The courts
are being given increasingly greater powers to exercise discretions — for
example, whether under section 122 of the Companies Act to give a
‘convicted person leave to take part in the management of a company, or
whether to make any one, or more, of a number of possible orders in
relation to the shares of a defaulting substantial shareholder under section
69N. it seemsto me that the fruitful development of proper law in this
area is likely to depend very much upon the community’s confidence in the
decisions of the courts, and fortunately there seems no reason at the
present time why this confidence in the judicial system. should not
continue.
Chairman:
That concludes the first aspect of our seminar this evening, and i will
now ask Mr Olson, the Acting Chief inspector of the N.S.W. Corporate
Affairs Commission, to present his paper on the investigation and
Prosecution Division.
Mr P. 7'. Olson, Acting Chief Inspector, N.S. W. Corporate Affairs
Commission. '
i
Much that is in the paper that is presented to you and its highlights
which i will bring out this evening have been blotted out of my mind by
the pounding waves on a particular beach resort down on the south coast.
At about 8.00 pm. last night i thought that i would brush up on what i
had said previously and to also read the other papers and as i did so i
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 realized that much of the material contained in the papers by Sir Richard
and Mr Goldrick overlapped when it came to describing the main types of
offences that come under that overall heading of Corporate Crime.
I am conscious of the fact that this is the ﬁrst occasion that the
functions of the Investigation Division and the form of its establishment has
been put in written form and produced outside the confines of the
Commission itself. In previous times when we have had various groups come
to the ofﬁces of the Commission to be shown around and to_ see what
happens, talks are given by the various Divisional heads. They are then
ushered around through the various Divisions of the Commission but are
given only about a minute‘s stay outside the portals of the Investigation
and Prosecution Division, told that is what it is and away they go. So this
evening I propose to highlight the establishment of the Division itself and
from where most of its'work-load comes. ,
I joined the Commission a little over ten years ago and at that time it
was known as the Registrar of Companies and it had two branches. One
was called the Registration and Documents Branch and the other the
Investigation Branch, which consisted of eight Inspectors led by a Chief
Inspectbr and Senior Legal Ofﬁcer and these Inspectors were assisted by a
small group of young people know as Audit Clerks who were studying to
become qualified and to become Inspectors later on. In l964 the
Government approved extension of the Investigation Branch when it
recognized that one of the areas dealt with in this new legislation, the
Uniform Companies Act, concerned mainly the activities of companies
which had been wound up. This required particular attention in that
reports were being made under Section 306 of the Act that creditors would
receive less than 50 cents in the dollar and in many instances Liquidators,
particularly Ofﬁcial Liquidators, were reporting that they were of the
opinion that alleged offences had taken place in these windings up.
At the same time in 1964 the Branch also blossomed when the public
borrowings legislation became law which had such a dramatic effect on the
form and content of prospectuses particularly the Auditor’s report and the
material contained in the ﬁnancial accounts that were presented in
prospectuses. In 1966 we had further amendments effecting the Ofﬁcial
Management and the Accounts provisions of the Act and in 1970, some
time during part of the mining boom, we saw legislation come forth in the
form of the Securities Industry Act. This Act contained provisions with
respect to Stock Exchanges, stockbrokers and other persons dealing in
securities. At that point of time the Registrar of Companies went out of
existence and the Corporate Affairs Commission came into existence or as
some people refer to it, the C.A.C. and. of course, if the Interstate
Corporate Affairs Commission goes through we will probably be called
I.C.A.C. which adds to some of the things that we are called from time to
IImC.
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The l97t) and l‘)7l legislation extended the powers of the
Investigation Division especially in relation to the conduct in the selling of
securities on The Sydney Stock Exchange and consequently a new Section
in the Division came into existence. There are four sub-Sections within the
Investigation and Prosecution Section of the Division. These are known as
the Liquidation Section which deals primarily with reports from Liquidators
which say that less than 50 cents in the dollar will be received by
unsecuréd creditors and in which they report the possible commission of
offences under either the Companies Act or the Crimes Act. We then have
what is known as the Preliminary Review Section.Now, the object of the
Preliminary Review Section, in other words, reports that come from
Liquidators and reports or'complaints that come from the public in relation
to what appear to be insolvent companies are referred across to the
. Preliminary Review Section. The Inspectors immediately go out and look at
the possibility as to the availability of the evidence to sustain the offences
that have been alleged. They quickly settle the elements of those offences,
go out and visit Liquidators and other people and as a result of that quick
preliminary review the case is either no further actioned or it is referred
across to the Liquidation Section where the Inspectors further take up the
investigation on the Inspector‘s report that all the elements are available to
sustain offences in various places and from various people.
We then have the Complaints Section which is the Section which
seems to receive all types of matters ranging from disputes in home unit
companies down to general domestic type disputes between husband and
wife or brother directors falling out and things of that nature where they
make allegations against one another. But the main function of the
Complaints Section is to follow through those persons who have come
under notice through a system that is in existence within the Division of all
company officers who are recorded on Forms 43, that is, changes in
managers, directors and secretaries, which come through the Division. These
are checked against a master listing and depending on the reasons for which
those people are known to the Commission these matters can then be
referred to the Complaints Section for general inspection again and many of
the matters that are referred to the Inspectors result in the discovery of
many summary offences which are dealt with generally by the Legal
Division of the Commission.
The remaining Section within the Investigation Section is the
Securities industry Section and this came into existence, as I said, following
the proclamation of the 1970 legislation dealing with securities. Also one of
the basic functions of that Section is to process and consider applications
and make recommendations into' those applications for a Dealer’s Licence.
the term which includes stockbrokers, Dealer’s Representatives, Investment
Advisers and investment Representatives, which are designed mainly for
those people who sell their wares as experts. It is felt, particularly in relation
to investment Advisers, that they should come under some close scrutiny
and their suitability to hold a licence is considered in that Section. Of
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 course, one of the arms of this particular Section is that dealing with
Section l24 matters, or as Mr Grogan has pointed out, insider dealings, and
also alleged market rigging, market manipulations and so on, on the Stock
Exchange.
Under item 2 of the paper, “Basic functions of the Investigation
Division", it has now grown to the stage where there are 37 investigating
accountants from the Chief Inspector down together with one Inspector
(Accounts) who processes those reports received from Liquidators. And, of
course, coupled with the Inspectors we have 12 Audit Clerks who assist the
Inspectors in the course of their investigations. At the present time we have
seven experienced Inspectors and when I say seven I include Brian Smith
our Chief Inspector who is still away ill and these Inspectors are engaged
on special investigations. We have four special investigations currently
running in New South Wales at the moment and there are two in Victoria.
We had the unusual happening some weeks ago in the Commission in that
the whole six of them, the two Inspectors were up from Victoria examining
on the same day and, of course, needless to say all the facilities of the
Commission were strained to the stage where we had to ask our Police
Officers to vacate their office so that one of the major specials could
proceed with examinations. As a result of the appointment of Inspectors to
these special investigations, the Public Service Board and the Government
are considering the recruitment of additional Inspectors to the Division to
replace those officers and also to provide for what appears to be a sudden
upsurge in the number of matters that have come before the Division.
The one remaining sub-section of the Division is the Inspection and
Prosecution Section particulars of which are set out later in the paper and,
of course, the prime object of the officers within this sub-section is the
prosecution of directors, secretaries and companies for failing to lodge
annual returns and other documents that are required to be lodged under
the Act. And you will see therein from the annexures attached to the paper
that last September we started a special programme because of the
unprecedented number of defaults that had come to notice. I was advised,
prior to going on leave the other day, that the number of defaults for the
calendar year 1973 is as great, if not greater, than that for 1972 so it
would seem that we will once again be asking the Justice Department and
the Chief Stipendiary Magistrate to make available a Court on one day per
week at Central and four of the outlying Courts to deal with these
prosecutions as they come forward. The strange thing about the defaulting
list at the moment seems to be that a great deal of the company names
contained therein were not dealt with for defaults in 1972. They seem to
be a totally fresh lot altogether.
It is pointed out in the latter part of the “Basic functions of the
Division” that Inspectors are required to have a basic knowledge of the
Companies Act and Securities Industry Act and they are also required to be
familiar with what is known as the “companies offences” sections of the
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('rimcs Act. namely Sections I73 to I70 and also Section ISSA
fraudulent arrangements. The Division. at the present time. has an intensive
training programme going which runs for some l4 weeks and Inspectors are
taught many of the basics that are already well defined in the Detectives
Manual and about 60 per cent of the lectures in this training programme
are given by Police Officers. Inspectors are also taught how to prepare a
brief. they are taught the laws of evidence. they are taught as far as
possible the conduct of records of interview and they are also expected to
keep working papers of the investigation so that documents which come
into their hands from time to time are acceptable for tendering in the
various matters which come before the Courts.
‘ Attached to the four main Sections of the investigation side of the
Division are four. Police Ofﬁcers — a Detective Sergeant, and three Detective
Senior Constables at thepresent time. who are seconded from the Fraud
Squad for a two year period and these Police Ofﬁcers work in close liaison
with the Inspectors as a team. Sometimes two Police Ofﬁcers and two
Inspectors, sometimes one Police Ofﬁcer and one Inspector, the whole thing
is quite flexible depending on the size of the matter and the complexity of
the matter being investigated. And, of course, we are extremely grateful to
the Police Ofﬁcers who come to us from time to time because they come
from different areas of Detective work and particularly-those who have had
experience in matters of fraud. This is of great assistance to the Inspectors
and also forms part of their training programme.
The investigation matters which are put together for prosecution or
“briefs", as the members of the legal profession call them, go to two
different places. Those of a summary nature, that is, those that have a gaol
penalty up ‘to six months or a fine or both are channelled into the Legal
Division of the Commission itself and these are prosecuted before the
Courts of Petty Sessions by Legal Ofﬁcers of the Commission. Those
matters involving indictable offences which carry a gaol term of 12 months
or more are referred across to the State Crown Solicitor’s Ofﬁce to what is
known as the Companies Prosecution Branch where there are 12 instructing
Solicitors. The matters are reviewed by those Solicitors and then they are
referred to one of three Crown Prosecutors, one of whom has the status of
a Queen’s Counsel. Then following discussions and conferences, those parts
of the brief which perhaps need tightening up are tightened up, the
prosecutor advises and it comes back down through the system and process
'is issued through the Commissioner who nominates one of the Inspectors,
usually the Inspector who handled the case, as informant in any prosecution
proceedings. You will see from the paper that there are nine sources from
which the Division receives .its workload and these are categorized as
follows: Complaints by members of the public, closely followed behind that
are representations by Members of Parliament. These of course, have been
great in number over the last six months and the significant thing about
l0|
 
these types of matters is that they receive first consideration within the
Commission. You have newspaper articles. you have reviews ot‘ lodged
documents, that is, balance sheets and things of that nature. you have
Section 306 (3) reports by Liquidators. An interesting thing about 306(3)
reports is that in the ll years to 30th June. I973 there werc 2.587
companies which had been wound up either by the (‘ourt or as crcditors‘
voluntary windings up and approximately 650 of these. or 25 per cent.
were involved in the form of reports received from Liquidators alleging
offences had been committed under either the Oimes Act or the (imipanics
Act. That 650 were contained in 2.198 reports that had been received from
ofﬁcial and general Liquidators and the main types of matters alleged to
have occurred in those reports are failure to keep proper books. Section
3743 of the new legislation, misappropriation, Section l73 of the Oimes
Act, fraudulent trading, Section 374 Companies Act. and incurring credit
without reasonable expectation which seems to be an extremely popular
one. Of course, the question of failure to keep proper books and incurring
credit without reasonable expectation of payment are not easy to prove
because of the time factor which elapses before the matters are reported to
the Commission coupled with the fact that documents disappear and there
is a reluctance on the part of witnesses to come forward to give evidence.
It is interesting to note that in those windings up the total
deﬁciencies of those companies are in the vicinity of $15lM. There were
$116M which were estimated deﬁciencies in Court windings up coupled
with $22M in creditors’ voluntary windings up taken from Statements of
Affairs and when you consider that all of the companies which were wound
up and which did not lodge Statements of Affairs it is conceivable that the
ﬁgure is closer to between $l60M and $170M.
The results of operations are set out in section 4 of the paper and
they seem to run through most of the types of offences which have been
spoken about tonight by Sir Richard and many ofthe problems of which Sir
Richard spoke are experienced by the Inspectors notwithstanding that, we
do from time to time put the necessary matters together to enable process
to issue. I would conclude by saying that it has been demonstrated since
the Commission came into existence, and more so over the last ﬁve years
from the details attached to the paper, that the Commission is making a
signiﬁcant contribution towards the enforcement of the corporate law in the
interest of the investing public and creditors and whilst we might run into
many problems from time to time I am reminded that the other day we
had six Queen’s Counsel going virtually on the one day in relation to
advisings and to persons who were appearing before Inspectors for
examination. Notwithstanding the fact that we hope our ﬁgures will
improve in the future with additional staff, we are,at least having some
effect upon the availability of Senior Counsel to handle matters other than
corporate crime.
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'l'he commentator on Mr Olson‘s paper will be Mr Rodney l’urvis of
the New South Wales Bar.
Mr Rot/mgr .\'. l’urris. liurrisIcr-aI-lalw:
I am indeed pleased to make some commentary on Mr Olson’s paper
and to commend him for the manner in which the material appearing in his
paper has been collated. and the amplification which he has given to us of
it this evening.
, Those of us who have worked through the last [4 or l5 years, from
the period prior to the introduction of what we once called the Uniform
Cmnpunicx Ac! up until the present time, have been impressed with the
growth of the-Corporate Affairs Commission (as it is now called, but
formerly the Registrar of Companies) and the role that it has played and is
playing in the commercial community of New South Wales. '
The role of the Corporate Affairs Commission is the point that 1
would wish to take up this evening. What is it intended to do in our
‘ environment. and can it be availed of in aid of the prevention of corporate
crime? Alternatively. is there a more effective means of preventing the
commission of these acts“?
As Mr Olson said in his paper, the introduction of the new legislation
widened the responsibilities of directors and officers in the administration of
company affairs; it also brought clearly into focus the need for a higher
degree of policing of the provisions of the Companies Act than had hitherto
been the case, if the legislation was to be effective.
I do not in this commentary propose to debate the'form of the
Corporate Affairs Commission, the shape it should take. whether it should
assume a mantle of responsibility similar to what is seen in comparable
bodies overseas. Nor do I speak'of uniformity in the sense of there being ‘
one corporate Act in Australia. Rather, what I would like to do is to direct
my observations to situations which will, arise under any modern-day
company legislation and the manner in' which a Corporate Affairs
Commission can carry out its statutory duties --- what might be done in this
context by the Commission, or by another body. to further protect
creditors, investors or employees from dishonest and/or unprincipled
officers. It is to this latter group that most of the punitive provisions of
the Acts are directed. As Mr Grogan quite rightly commented, the group is
relatively small in number, but I might likewise comment, not in impact. At
the end of l97'l (and this is the most-recent figure available to me)'there
were l07.606 companies registered in New South Wales. On an average.
there would .be somewhere between two and three directors per company
and, having in mind a degree of overlapping where one person is a director
l03
of more than one company. it would be reasonable to say that in New
South Wales there would be over 300,000 directors of companies. However.
because the term “officer” does not only include a director. and nor does a
director as such only include persons appointed to the role of “director”
the number of persons about which we are talking is even larger. “Ofﬁcer”
includes a director, secretary or an employee ot'a corporation and “director"
includes any person occupying the position of a director by whatever name
called and includes a person in accord with whose directions or instructions
directors of a company are accustomed to act.
Inspector Olson tells us in his paper that the number of proceedings,
summary and indictable, for the five years l969 to I073 were l,261
excluding breaches of the provisions of the Act relating to the lodging of
Annual Returns (Sections 158 to 159). These figures. however, I would
suggest belie the true situation, namely. the persons consequentially affected
,as a result of an infringement of the Acts and in a monetary sense the
prospective impoverishment of many others. The ripples flowing from any
one breach may affect many persons and situations before they are
exhausted.
It is fair to say that the situation latterly mentioned is not peculiar to
corporate crime, but it does seem to be more likely with corporate crime
than in the case of breaking and entering, larceny, assault and criminal acts
to which we are more generally accustomed. MOreover, the commission of
an offence under the provisions of the Acts being considered is
premeditated‘to a far greater extent than is otherwise the use. For
example, one need only look at Section 47 (the issue of a false prospectus),
Section 164 (relating to dishonest directors), Section 375A (relating to false.
and misleading statements in a report to a director, auditor or Stock
Exchange) or Section 375 (relating to a false statement in a document) to
assess the degree of premeditation which would normally and essentially
exist.
Restitution following on a loss is rarely possible, and proceedings
against an officer himself in a civil cause seeking compensation rarely
available.,The nexus between the loss is hard to establish in a proximate
sense. The damage is well done by the time the offence is proved, and if
the rewards are great enough no penalty, it might be thought, other than
'deprivation of liberty will sufﬁce to inhibit breaches of the Acts.
Looking then to what is really involved, not in the protection of the
body of the individual but of his property, how can the Corporate Affairs
Commission, or some comparable body, assist in the prevention of acts
resulting in breach of the various provisions of the statutes? We have heard
from Mr Olson as to the activities generally of the Corporate Affairs
Commission. It is a registry, and in that capacity is a vital ingredient of our
commercial community. It makes available corporate information and acts as
anapproving body as to incorporation and the issue of prospectuses. The
Commission acts as the party initiating proceedings, both summary and
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indictable. having the various powers given to it resulting in the
appointment of inspectors and other persons required to carry out
'cwnrinations of various kinds. The provisions of the statutes confer powers
upon officers of the Commission sufficient to enable them to investigate a
situation. but a situation which has arisen and at a time which may well be .
loin.l past the happening of the event.
To regularize commercial dealings and ensure formal compliance with
the Act. and conduct investigations, the Commission is very effective.
Nowhere. however. in the structure of the Commission and of the Acts is
the ('otnmission enabled to examine a situation as and when it occurs or is
about to occur and then and there put a stop to what might otherwise be
a breach of the Acts and/or the commission of an offence. instead of
endeavouring to prevent corporate crime by imprisonment and/or ﬁne, what
might merit consideration (and I understand that this is already receiving
some consideration) is the creation of a review tibunal, between the
Corporate Affairs Commission and the courts, sitting in camera to avoid
adverse publicity either to the company or to the individual where no
improper conduct or proposed improper conduct has yet been'established
and to which the Commission and an individual creditor, investor or
interested party may refer matters considered to necessitate examination.
A tribunal of this nature could consider the complaint made, and if
of the opinion that it has merit. may then call in aid the facilities and
powers of the court. lfnot. the complainant is so informed and no
consequential harm arises. in order, however, to carry this sort of scheme
into effect we would need to change rather drastically some of the
requirements that exist at the present time. and i shall mention just a'few
of them in the time that is available.
It would be essential:
l. for facilities to be available for early reporting of an anticipated
breach and early reporting of an alleged criminal act;
3. for information from interested parties to be obtained and
available at an early stage. Ready co-operation between the
Stock Exchange and such a body would be essential;
3. to have the obligatory tiling by directors of reports on oath
answering specific questions as to their compliance with the
provisions of the Acts: -
4. for there to be compulsory audit of all companies and a
six-monthly ﬁling. not necessarily of accounts, but of'an audit
report as to compliance or otherwise by the company with the
statutory provisions. We nearly have this in the present Section
IOS
 
l()7, sub-sections (8) and (fl), and the obligation there of
auditors to report current breaches conﬁdentially in the first
instance:
5. for the tribunal to have tlte necessary expertise to deal with
these matters when referred to it:
' 6. for the proceedings before the Board to be without cost to the
complainant. This is extremely important:
7. for the Board to have the power to require companies to divulge
' information and produce records to it.
'It seems to me that if it be possible to institute an enquiry of this
nature, and at an early stage, then this would be a way in which an act or
proposed act in breach of the legislation cotild be frustrated or brought to
the attention of a responsible body at an early stage and remedial action if
necessary then taken.
There is one other matter upon which I would like to comment, and
that is the substance of the question raised in Sir Richard’s paper and l
think commented upon by Mr Valder, namely, the time taken for a matter
.to come to court and be dealt with on trial.
In this context, consideration should also be given to time taken for
committal proceedings, and it is probably in this latter procedure that“
innovations can be more readily introduced, reducing considerably the cost
of and time necessarily taken in theproceedings gel-nerally
It would be fair to say that whilst one may talk about 88 days for a
trial, in all probability the committal proceedings took twice as long, if ,not
longer. lam referring here to the introduction of a system whereby the
presentation of material intended to be led on behalf of the Crown is in
written form, whether it be by affidavit or whether it be by declaration. It
would seem to me that if prospective evidence could be made available to
the parties — and it would have to be made available to the parties at an
early stage so that witnesses could be called if need be for the purpose of
cross-examination and perhaps some elucidation of their evidence in chief
only — then this would have the effect of reducing the time to be taken
on committal proceedings. The same procedure might well be adopted in
relation to proposed exhibits, many of which in cases of this nature are
lengthy and complicated and may well require inspection of a company’s
books and records before they can be understood or their signiﬁcance and
relevance to the proceedings appreciated.
Chairman:
Thank you Mr Purvis. We will now adjourn the seminar until 7
o’c,lock but may I remind you that it will be open for general discussion
after Professor Harding’s commentary, and we hope there will be full and
lively discussion on the papers.
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Well. Ladies and Gentlemen. we now open the second half of this
evening‘s programme. and the first speaker I propose to call on is Mr J. B.
(joltlrick. Stipcndiary Magistrate.
Mr .I. B. (in/drick, Stt'pwidiary illagt'srratvs
. i would remind you that the suggested title of this paper was
originally “Treatment of Persons offending against the provisions of the
Relevant Legislation. i.e. the Crimes Act, the Companies Act and the
Securilies Indtts'tn‘ Act". I have expanded that title, as I felt that it might
lhave limited me to a description or analysis of the way in which such
offenders are dealt with once they come before the judicial arm, at
whatever level, and of the way in which they may be dealt with after they
have come before the judicial arm. This is in the best of Gilbert and
Sullivan tradition, to have an alternative title, and I would remind you that
one of those operas, The Pirates of Penzance, had the sub-title, “or The
Slave of Duty". On the original billing so far as this paper. was concerned
my Chairman had the billing and I had to Write the paper, 1 was pleased to
realize that at least for tonight I have the billing. i also felt that the word
“treatment" might be somewhat clinical and conjure up visions of highly
skilled brain surgeons, closely directed by corporate experts, excising that
portion. of the brain that governs avarice or stupidity in corporate affairs. A
vision of lobotomies came to my mind, but on reﬂection i think perhaps
corporate vasectdmies might be more appropriate.
It does seem to me desirable that the type of crime we are concerned
with should be looked at as to the way in which its existence and the
attempts on the part of the appropriate authorities to legally prove its
existence in individual cases affect the courts and their function. I have set
out the definition of “corporation” as being any body corporate formed or
incorporated in the State or outside the State, not including any body
corporate being a public authority or instrumentality or agency of the
(frown or any corporation sole. Mr Grogan has made passing reference to the
fact that by the'terms of the papers we are not making reference to
statutory bodies in the public sense, we are dealing with private
corporations as opposed to public, and l have suggested in passing that
many of our fellow citizens might feel that some of the bodies coming
within exclusion (a), that being public authorities in the governmental sense,
are as much villains as some in the private sector.
1 have also reminded you that the offenders Win not only be
individuals —- ofﬁcers, directors and employees of corporations — but also the
.corporations themselves. Mr Rothery has made further reference to this
aspect of the situation. I have mentioned that corporations are subject, as
are natural persons, to a hugh range of obligations, and the range is growing
wider almost daily under such environmental and other legislation as the
Clean Waters Act.
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l have referred also to 5.306A of the Crimes Ac! under. which every
provision of an Act relating to offences punishable ttpon indictment or on
summary conviction may. unless a contrary intention appears. be construed
to apply to bodies corporate as to individuals. and where there is a penalty
being only a term of imprisonment the Court may if it thinks fit. in the
case of a body corporate. impose a pecuniary penalty. and that ranges from
$200 if the term of imprisonment is up to 6 months to $2.000 if the term
of imprisonment specified is in excess of 2 years.
I have referred to the great breadth and scope of provisions in the
N.S.W. Companies Act. extending over 385 sections. and to the general
contravention and penalty provisions of s. 37‘).
I have made reference to a comment by Mr Purvis in a paper written
by him and included in a recently published book of essays. that it is a
matter for some concern in our society that company ofﬁcers are not
required by law to be familiar with the legislation under which they operate
and which may well govern their very liberty. l have gone on to suggest
further, and this may be heretical in some circles, that the honest and
reasonably careful man concerned with corporate matters is not likely to'
ﬁnd himself charged with an offence and brought before a'court.
l have suggested that we must not lose sight of the wood for the
trees. but that it is very important nevertheless to keep constantly in mind
the huge breadth and scope of the speciﬁc legislative provisions, and in
Appendix A l have set out, as a sample rather than' a summary although it
is certainly a lengthy sample, many of the penalty provisions in the first
36] sections of the Companies Act. Sir Richard has referred in his paper
also to the many offences, but perhaps it may be convenient for those who
are not, even though criminologists, very familiar with the provisions of the
Companies Act to look at that Appendix to see the samples given of
offences and of penalties and of who the offenders may be, and to realize
that it does indeed cover a very wide range of activities of commission and
omission, that those who may offend may be the corporation itself or in
regard to the substantial shareholding provisions a substantial shareholder,
and under s. 176 you will ﬁnd that in certain circumstances even a legal
practitioner may find himself charged with an offence.
I have also referred to the speciﬁc penalty provisions from s. 374
onwards in the Companies Act and have set these out verbatim in Appendix
B. I apologise to those in the audience who are experts in the ramifications
of company law, but perhaps even for them it may be convenient to have
the very words of the legislation before them. I have not set out there 5.
37413, which does make provisions as to which companies the earlier
sections apply to, but that has also been referred to by Sir Richard in his
paper.
It is to be noted that the powers of the Supreme Court under s.
374D, following a conviction under s. 374C (1) or (2), may result in a
declaration of personal responsibility, and it might be noticed that the ﬁrst
of those sub-sections creates a summary offence.
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 l have referred to the provisions of S. 380“) and
it is necessary to
bear in mind the definitions and meanings given to the
phrase “default
penalty" when considering what penalties are available, what
offences may
be committed. and it is necessary to bear in mind the defini
tion of “ofﬁcer
who is in default”. It will also he noted by reference to
s. 380(1) and
Appendix A to my paper that there are a considerable n
umber of offences
triablc Summarily. and this of course may mean a conseq
uent burden upon
Courts of Petty Sessions.
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l have referred brieﬂy to the provisions of the Crimes Act, and
Sir
Richard has referred to these at some greater length, but one thing mig
ht
be commented on. in the paper I mentioned penalties of up to 10 years
imprisonment, and when the Crimes and other Acts Amendmen
t Act of
W74 comes into force (I think in the very near future) this
will be
increased to 14 years. On the other hand the crime of fraudulent
personation, a matter not particularly related to corporate crime, has had
the penalty reduced from life to 7 years.
I have made reference to the Securities Industry Act and set out in a
Table certain of the offences created by that Act and the penalties that may
be imposed. in all cases the penalty mentioned, whether in the Appendix or
the body of the paper, is the maximum penalty. I might add that there is
one section I have not referred to, 5.40, under which not only
a
stockbroker but each of his partners in a firm may be liable to a penalty
of $500 with a daily penalty of $100. A
l have said that it may be thought that the contravention of a large
majority of the provisions of the relevant legislation might be s
aid to
constitute mere breaches of regulations for good corporate housekeeping
, but
I would suggest very positively that in very many cases failure to o
bserve
what appear to be merely regulatory provisions may result not sim
ply in
bad housekeeping but may lead to disaster for the corporation inv
olved and
to financial loss for others, and such breaches will often, I would
suggest,
he symptomatic of corporate dishonest-y and fraud. And I woul
d suggest
that good housekeeping in the corporate sense should become
almost an
end in itself, and this proposition does, in my submission, pr
ovide a very
large justiﬁcation for what might be regarded as the merely
routine duties
of those charged with the administration of the relevant legislation.
1 have referred to two days taken at random in the Summ
ons List at
Central Court, and it might be suggested that this woul
d indicate they are
matters of little signiﬁcance, but again I would remind yo
u that the
concept of corporate good housekeeping is an important
one and also that
although nothing sinister was suggested in the 26 matters that
proceeded to
imposition of penalty on those two days, at
the same time another
magistrate was dealing with a summary prosecuti
on in which the
complications were many and the amount in mon
ey terms involved was
very, very considerable. ‘
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lliave reminded you in the paper that whether offences are to be
disposed of summarily or on indictment they will all in the first instance
come before a Court of Petty Sessions, and the very nature of the alleged
offence and the proof required will often mean that these cases are lengthy
and complex, requiring special knowledge and skills which may test
seriously not only the patience but also the competence of the tribunal and
of all those associated both with the prosecution and the defence. l have
instanced,in order to put a little ﬂesh on the bones of the argument, three
cases dealt with by way of committal proceedings in the Court of Petty
Sessions at Central. The ﬁrst occupied some six weeks in hearing and
covered a very wide ﬁeld; the next, being in a sense not a corporate crime.
in that any corporate connotation was bogus, lasted virtually twelve months;
and the third illustrates that even in matters that may not be unduly
complex a considerable time may be involved — in that case the committal
proceedings extended over eight days even though it was hot a particularly
complex matter.
Mr'Purvis made reference to ways in which the committal proceedings
in corporate matters might be shortened. This, of course, is a matter that
the magistracy has looked at, that the Criminal Law Committee has looked
at, and that will continue to be looked at. It may be that by borrowing
from overseas experience and perhaps by some original, thought the time to
be spent in such committal proceedings can be considerably shortened.
I have made reference also to the fact that it is not only committal
proceedings, it is not only indictable offences, which may occupy the time
of the lower courts and the higher courts, but also summary prosecutions,
such as under s. 374C (L). These may well involve extremely complex
evidence relating to the liquidity of the company, its solvency, a multitude
of transactions and dealings in shares and other securities, and the activities
of the company and other associated companies and many people over a long
period of time; and in view of the powers of the Supreme Court as to
declaration of personal responsibility, although i have some personal doubts
as to the effectiveness of that provision, it may result in a declaration of
personal responsibility involving huge sums of money following upon a
summary conviction.
1 have asked the question as to whether ordinary principles of
sentencing apply, and I have said that I would leave the treatment of
offenders, as_theoretically desirable or as actually practised, to my two
commentators — that eminent academic criminologist, Professor Hawkins,
and that eminent practising penologist, Mr McGeechan. The cynic of course
might say that we don’t treat many and if you look at Mr Olson’s paper,
Appendix C, indictable matters disposed of for 1973, you will ﬁnd that in
respect of six charges there were committals for trial and five of those
charges related to one defendant. Five charges resulted in No Bills, and I
would suggest that that is not a matter for horror, that l have no doubt
that the Attorney-General on the advice of his Law Officers may well have
had to consider, among other things, the unlikelihood of obtaining a
NO
conviction and the huge public expense that may well ha-ve been involved.
That would be a perfectly proper consideration for the Attorney-General to
take into account and I would be very surprised if that was not one of the
considerations taken into account. l Would suggest that that may well
highlight the need for bold and creative thinking when one comes to
consider corporate crime.
Referring again to treatment of offenders (and that of course
predicates that the offence has been found proved) one might indeed think
in looking at the offences (in one case on appeal) in respect of the ﬁve
defendants convicted of indictable matters as set out in Appendix C of Mr
.Olson’s paper, that the treatment is very light indeed. Reference can also be
.made to the fact that on the summary level 2,500 matters were completed
that year under ss.158 and 134, many of those by virtue of withdrawals,
and that would indicate that the responsible body may well be achieving
some success in ensuring good corporate housekeeping. But only some 100
other matters apparently proceeded to ﬁnality even at the summary level
and l am afraid, although I in no way wish to defame Mr Grogan’s
Optimism, or rather his institute, I do not share his optimism as to the
good conduct generally of a very large number of directors and ofﬁcers of
companies even though i would certainly agree that the vast majority of
directors and ofﬁcers are truly honest men. '
I came ﬁnally to what I would call the real problem of the courts in
regard to corporate crime. Here I have suggested that we have inspected and
catalogued the trees, I have, Sir Richard has and Mr Olson has, but we now.
have to look at the wood, and being a little pessimistic l perhaps feel,
rather than can prove, that there are many corporate offenders who are
never brought to book. I have chosen the word “swindler” as applying to
the person that we should really be concerned with, and I have given the
Shorter Oxford Dictionary deﬁnition of swindler as “one who practises
fraud, imposition or mean artiﬁce for purposes of deceit; a cheat”. That
word apparently came into the English Language late in the 18th century
from the German. But the problem, I suggest, of coming to grips with such
'a swindler, be he big or small, lies in the very nature of corporate crime. It
is largely, I would suggest, a problem of proving the actual commission of
the crime. That is the real problem that criminologists should be concerned
with. When one has regard to the complexity of corporate affairs and
corporate structures, the number of interlocking companies that may be
involved, the multiplicity of transactions in which many people may play a
part, the vast documentation which may have existed but which may or
may not now be in existence, the immensity of the problem of proof of the
Lcommission of major corporate crime and of guilt isobvious. I would hope
that the use of experts and schedules of documents as outlined by Sir
Richard might come to pass.l would not be quite so optimistic as Sir
Richard as to defence counsel (in New South Wales, in any event) making
admissions when the corporate criminal is concerned.
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I concluded my paper by suggesting that our society has hardly begun
to comprehend the nature and extent of corporate crime. let alone reached
the point of realizing that our attempts to combat it are at a very primitive
level, and here I am referring to our society as a whole. There are those
who are very much aware of the magnitude of the problems involved and
who are making constructive proposals in order to attempt to solve them. I
can refer you to Mr Rothery’s references to proposals made by Mr Frank
Ryan, the Corporate Affairs Commissioner, as examples of constructive
proposals, although l wouldn’t say, and i am sure that Mr Ryan himself
would not say, that these necessarily represent the final solution. However,
I would ﬁnally say that there is no cause for us to leave this seminar on
Corporate Crime with that sense of warm satisfaction that has been ascribed
to a hen’s vent. it is very much the function of criminologists to devise
procedures and remedies that will allow corporate crime in an electronic age
to be fought with more effective weapons than those which have been
inherited from the 19th century and earlier. l thank you.
Thank you, Mr Goldrick. Now, the ﬁrst of the commentators is
Professor Hawkins, Associate-Professor of Criminology in the University of
Sydney. ' '
Aweiate-Prqfewt J. G. Hawkins:
Mr Goldrick has said‘in. his paper that he is being followed by two
people, one an eminent practical penologist and the other an eminent
academic criminologist, and I am the eminent academic criminologist. You'
might not have guessed, but from this eminence i would like to make a
couple of remarks on the question of white-collar crime.
Actually I thought that the most interesting suggestion we have had
this evening was the one made by Mr Peter Grogan of the Institute of
Directors in Australia, that directors fees ought to be increased. This no
doubt is a very good idea and might well do something to diminish the
amount of corporate crime in this country, although my feeling is that
there would have to be a very substantial increase, perhaps even more than
Mr Grogan had in mind.
However, I am following Mr Goldrick, whose paper i listened to with
great appreciation, and he asked two questions which he directs the
commentators on his paper to answer. The questions are: whether ordinary
principles of sentencing apply, and whether the element of general
deterrence is particularly relevant to this type of offence. What eminent
academic criminologists usually say on these occasions is that we ought to
do more research, and follow up rather swiftly by putting in an application
for funds.
I think it may be true that more research is needed, but I think we
should also recognize, without doing'a great deal of research, that what we
call white-collar crime, and what in this seminar is called corporate crime,
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 represents a very substantial amount of money, and that all the reasonable
estimates based on research done in countries where they do research into
these matters suggest that the amount of money involved in corporate crime
.is vastly greater than the amount of money involved in the sort of
conventional crime which we all get very excited about, like bur
glary and
larceny and automobile theft. if you take the principal crimes in the F.B.l.
Uniform Crime Statistics there is no question whatsoever that in the United
States the amount of money involved in whiteeollar crime vastly exceeds
the amount of money involved in these offences. i" don’t have any ﬁgures
here, but I think one has only to mention, such names as Tasminex,
Poseidon and Leopold Minerals — and if you have read the papers
today there is an awful lot of something in Brazil — and one doesn’t have
tp have a lot of imagination to realize that this is a fairly substantial
problem.
l think when one looks at Appendix C of Mr Olson’s paper, “Analysis
of matters for which either committal proceedings or trials were completed
during 1973”, one of the most interesting things is to see the sentences
imposed in the relatively small number of cases in which something seems
to have happened at all: liquidator, fraudulent misappropriation, 9 months
by periodic detention; director charged with false pretences, convicted,
accused ordered to enter into recognizance for the sum of $500 to be of
good behaviour for 3 years; No former officers charged with conspiracy,
nulle prosequi — there are a lot of nullc prosequis; former employee
charged with fraudulent misappropriation, convicted, sentenced to 2 years
imprisonment. non-parole period of 6 months, appeal lodged, conviction
upheld, modified, accused ordered to enter into recognizance to be of good
behaviour for 2 years and to receive compulsory psychiatric treatment (we.
all hope, I am sure, that he is beneﬁting from the compulsory psychiatric
treatment); two former clients charged ,with conspiracy to cheat, each
ordered to enter into a recognizance for $100 to be'of good behaviour for
12 months (and let us hope they have been).
* That is the sum total in the proceedings completed during 1973, and
that is interesting, isn‘t it? We have succeeded during that period in putting
a lot of people in gaol, we have succeeded in punishing quite a lot of
members of this mmmmity, not. very well off members maybe, but
members of the community. We have managed to put them away for quite
substantial periods and no doubt Mr McGeechan will have something to say
about the problem of looking after them. But white-collar criminals seem to
come into a special class. We don’t appear to regard them as really
criminals, and they, certainly don’t regard themselves as criminal. I was a
prison governor 'for about seven years and I saw a good number
of
white-collar criminals, and their attitude was this: “We were just careless in
doingwhat we did. Everyone else in business is doing the same thing, but
we were unlucky.” . »
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IMr Goldrick has suggested that one of the questions we might
consider is, what about deterrence. Well, what about deterrence in this area?There was an interesting case in 1960/6] in the United States — the HeavyElectrical Equipment anti-trust case. Some of you may well be familiar withit, several vice-presidents of the General Electrical Corporation and the. Westinghouse Electrical Corporation were haled into court. These are thetwo largest companies in the heavy electrical equipment industry in theUnited States. For once something was done about it, although nothingvery severe of course. The counsel for the General Electrical Corporationattacked the government for demanding a gaol sentence, called itcold-blooded, and said that they clearly didn’t understand what it would doto his clients, these ﬁne men who would be put behind bars with commoncriminals. Yet in this particular case the court recognized that there wereserious, blatant, wilful violations of the law, the anti-trust legislation, and infact a number of vice-presidents in this particular case were put in gaol,although not .for very long. Four vice-presidents, two divisional managers,one sales manager, were put away for 30 days and some fairly substantialﬁnes were irriposed — nearly $2,000,000, and after that there were tripledamage suits,‘ something like $160,000,000 was awarded against the GeneralElectrical Corporation, although it was mostly tax deductible you will behappy to know. ‘ .
I - -. But subsequently the'U.S. Senate set up a Sub-committee to inquire..int,fo:§-.anti-trust and monopoly — the Kefauver hearings of 1961, and hisVerity.‘irtteresting to read the report of these hearings. They askedf-‘thei ,'vice'sp‘resident of General Electric, “Did you know that what you weredoing was illegal?” and he said, "Illegal, yes, but not criminal”. And i thinkone of the things we ought to remember is, to paraphrase Getrude Stein,that a crime is "a crime is a crime, and it doesn’t make any difference whatyou call it. They knew perfectly well what they were doing. They hadthese price-ﬁxing meetings, the had an attendance roster which was calledthe Christmas Card List, their meetings were put down as choir practices. It'was, of course, a deliberate conspiracy to defraud the public. One man, avice-president of the General Electrical Corporation, earning $140,000 — afairly comfortable income one would have thought — appeared before theKefauver Committee and they asked him whether the fact that he had beento prison had made him reconsider what he had done. He said that it wascertainly true that the consequences of his crime (i.e. imprisonment) hadmake him revaluate his actions, and he said, “What I have been through,what i have done to my family, has made me. The taint of a gaol sentencehad the effect on me and many of my colleagues of making us look at ourmoral values a bit.”
Now, it is just my opinion, and I may be wrong, but I think that inthis area it might be a good thing if we were to divert a little of the ﬁreand thunder which we draw down on the heads of juvenile delinquents andhousebreakers and petty thieves on to the white-collar criminal. [think thereare a number of areas we could well look at here, but i will just mentionone. Under the N.S.W.‘ Consumer Protection Act, under the N.S.W. Clean
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Waters and (‘lean Ait Acts, why is it necessary to get the Minister’s
approval lor prosecution in these cases.’ Why is it that here, unlike other
areas ol criminal behaviour there is this absence of independent prosecutory
discretion? lsnt independent prosecutory discretion more essential here than
in any otheI area! And yet prosecutions for certain corporate offences,
certain pollution offences, certain consumer protection matters, are barred
other than with the consent of the relevant Minister. Shouldn’t we consider
whether in this area, as in other areas, judicial control of prosecutorial
discretion is essential“?
4
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Chairman:
Our second commentator on Mr Goldrick’s paper is Mr McGeechan,
the New South Wales Commissioner of Corrective Services. ' '
Mr W. R. McGeechan, Commissioner of Corrective Services:
My innnediate impression on coming into the hall tonight was that
there are more people interested in a'seminar on Corporate Crime than
there were in the one on Rape. in passing, let me mention that it is always
a delight to follow my friend Gordon Hawkins, who is celebrated not- only
for his haberdashery but also for some remarkably inaccurate statements.
From time to time he introduces me to seminars of police ofﬁcers and i go
through hell for the ﬁrst two or three minutes, and tonight he attributed to
Mr Goldrick another statement which to my hearing wasn’t quite accurate.
Mr Goldrick very kindly and in a most charming manner described me as
“an eminent practising penologist” and ’I thought, what delightful words.
But Gordon Hawkins attributes the words as being “eminent practical
penologist" and my immediate reaction was to rush home and write a book
on Practical Penology. But having said that, I know that I will have to be
tremendously cautious of Hawkins for some time to come, because, like the
elephant, he has a very long memory.
When I ﬁrst spoke with Professor Roulston and received a very nice
letter from Rodney Purvis l thought,,“l‘m not quite sure how a practical
practising penologist would fit into this situation on corporate crime.” But I
thought that taking into account the fact that the corporation is inanimate
and has no real voice other than through pe0ple, my interest should be directed
towards the people involved in this sort of crime as distinct from the
corporation as an offender acting thrOugh its agents or ofﬁcers as the case
may be.
I recall that in the passage of my public service i once had occasion
to be involved. with revenue law and company law and a particular
gentleman sitting in my class said, “What would happen if we did
so-and-so‘.’" My immediate reaction was one of some concern for him, and I
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said. “I should imagine you would get into fearful trouble." Well, I
followed his developments with his company, holding companies and
subsidiary companies for some time. Later, when l was seconded to what
was then the Prisons Department, I came across him in the complex of
prisons at Malabar and, sure enough, my grim prophecy had come about.
He said, “You were right again, weren’t you”, and I said, “Unfortunately,
yes”. And I have marvelled at that, because I thought that although the
Companies Act of 1936 was a particularly fine piece of legislation it had
one interesting characteristic — there were very few, if any, inspectors. At
the time, I think, the annual registration fee was £1, and you don’t get a
great deal of inspection, control and supervison for £1 per year.
However, that has changed, as one now hears from Mr Olson, and l
have a somewhat unhappy picture of a large and increasing number of
people examining a large and increasing queue of people who without doubt
will be found wanting. And there are some frightening sentences available
for the recalcitrant, the schemer and the swindler. We are talking about 14
years, and we gloss over this very lightly. But this is an enormous sentence.
To endow a heretofore respectable member of the community at the age
of, say, 40 with 14 years penal servitude is to my mind staggering. My
friend Gordon Hawkins touches on a sentence of 9 months periodic
detention very lightly, but 9 months periodic detention has been described
by people undergoing this form of detention as “like going to gaol 36
separate times”. We place a great deal of importance on the physical
connotation of imprisonment and we don’t measure the emotional and
psychological aspects of this. And 14 years, or 12 years, is an enormous
sentence for corporate crime.
The difficulty is that my Service is concerned with future crime, and
not so much with history. It unfortunately has to carry the responsibilities
for history, but by way of a philosophy it is concerned essentially with
future crime, that is to say, the reduction of future crime. And, I cannot
help but feel that this particular area, of the corporate criminal, will expand
with a dramatic rate because of two factors: first, the growth rate of our
economy, and, secondly, the fact that this particular form of crime has
attracted attention and appropriate legislation is being introduced. to control
it. These are two factors which will most certainly bring to account all of
these, people who up to date have not been brought to account or
examined. \
The Australian view on corporate crime and the corporate offender
was, l thought, a remarkably bland one until relatively recent times. In
Scandinavia — Norway, Sweden and Denmark — and also in Russia, they
take a somewhat moralistic, puritanical, nationalistic view of this form of
crime. The Scandinavians describe it as even more serious than robbery or
armed assault, largely because they have become conditioned to this type of
crime and they tend to rationalize and ﬁnd reasons for the very short
sentences for such crimes. But I was assured by prominent people in
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Norway. Sweden. Denmark and Russia that with corporate crime they
would make examples of such people because they are clever. educated
people and should know better. With all respect, I think this national sense
of outrage. this moral objection to this form of crime, is already evidenced
in our connnunity. When I heard my friend Rodney Purvis speaking
brilliantly on a particular aspect of corporate crime, I felt for one moment
(and I am not being presumptuous or facetious) that Rodney had recently ,
prosecuted on this. and that this isn't his role. The feeling I had about the
weight of emotion in this particular argument about the aspect of intent
and planned crime was that there wasn’t any real difference between the
company embezzler and the simple, ordinary common thief who came in
using a weapon. It was a question of subtlety and reﬁnement and education
and. lamentably and deplorably. lack of supervision.
l have very ﬁrm views on the sort of treatment that should be meted
out to the so-called “white collar" criminal, and I strongly object to the
maximum security concept. I find it very difﬁcult to validate that real
estate to the value of 530,000 per capita and a maintenance cost of $70
per week should be paid out to support a person simply to satisfy moral
and emotional indignation. I don’t believe it is therapeutic, I don’t believe
it is beneficial, and I am absolutely certain that the taxpayers do not
appreciate this form of investment — if it is an investment. It is certainly a
very expensive luxury punishment.
One of the most interesting cases — which I think reﬂects public ‘
opinion - comes from an embezzler who received a very long sentence and
is now in custody. The case was celebrated for two reasons — the
magnitude of the embezzlement and the lamentably lack of supervision that
permitted an individual in our community to put himself in this position.
The mass media have displayed an extraordinary and insatiable interest in
What is happening to this man. Now, if I had my way this man would not
be in maximum security. However, public and moral outrage is such that
[
am certain that if I moved him out of a maximum security environment
there would be certain changes in the manangement of my Service, and
I
am not anxious to perpetrate this too quickly. because notwithstanding
my
appearance i am not all that old -- l have just grown older rapidly in thi
s
particular job. But such is the interest of the media that l have received
a
call at I230 one morning from a sub-editor of one of our major jour
nals
and he said, “So-and~so has been seen playing cricket at Silverwater.” I said,
“Is that right? It is 12.30 in the morning!" “Don’t be academic. Is it true
or false? My readers would be interested to hear about this. What right
does he have to be playing cricket?” I wasn’t sure what rights were
involved. so I said, “Well, I can’t tell you.” A quarter of an hour
later the
telephone rang and a tearful young voice explained that she was a cadet
journalist and her editor had said she had to get this information or sh
e
would lose her job. In the wake of this emotional appeal my heart
softened. and I said. “Will you quote me directly?" She said. “Yes". and i
said. tell your editor that the man of whom we are speaking is alive and
well and is driving a taxi in Moscow under the name of Rasputin?” At this.
she called out,“My God. he has escaped!"
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Now, in the case of this person — as with most corporate offenders —
quite frankly the last thing on this earth that would enter his mind would
be to escape. He would be better known than John Dillinger or Al Capone.The thought of ﬂight is an emotional luxury which unfortunately seems to
pertain to poor, largely inoffensive people who are detained in open
security or open camp atmospheres and who run off in emotional
situations. l was speaking to a Judge of the District Court only last
Monday, and he said what a difﬁcult case he had before him. One of my
inmates had run off from an open institution and had got lost. The officers
then had to go into the woods to ﬁnd him and, having found him, they
charged him with escaping from lawful custody. You just can’t win in those
circumstances.
Now, what would I recommend for the corporate offender, whether it
be one or two million dollars involved? 1 would suggest that he should do
his detention at home. I am not speaking about probation or a suspended
sentence, lam talking about a sentence of eight, nine or ten years — but he
should do it in his home. I won’t bore you with the mechanics of it, but
they are quite feasible and I would suggest that within three or four years
that is what will actually happen here in New South Wales — that is, the
sentence will be served at home in fairly strict circumstances. I say “his
home", but the interesting phenomenon for this class of offender is that
almost invariably he has been interviewed by the Ofﬁcial Receiver anddivested of his estate. 50, the possibility of his having a home is a bitremote unless once again he has used those extraordinary talents inherent in
skilful embezzlers in making appropriate dispositions at the appropriate time
for the benefit of his wife and family. Incidentally, on the aspect of trustlaw, if ever you want to get a Scandinavian emotional, tell him about trusts— and we are fairly conversant with trusts here in New South Wales.
One of the essential features of crime affecting the corporate criminal
is, of course, that he has very little to lose by the time society is through
with him and by the time compensation is levied. By the time his wife. and
family have suffered the social stigma of his crime there is very little left to
lose. So all he has is a future, because he doesn’t have a past. It is a
question then of establishing him in an appropriate job, establishing (or
re-establishing) him with his family and with a new circle of friends. Almost
invariably when a person with a professional background comes into
custody he doesn’t have very many professional people calling upon him,and the result is that he has to ﬁnd a new circle of acquaintances.
The other thing that comes to my mind is that I am opposed to theoffspin, or indirect, punishment on wives and children of these offenders,because I don’t think there is any justiﬁcation for this form of punishment.Quite frankly, as any of my officers will assure you, the wives and childrenof professional people most certainly receive a higher degree of punishmentthan those of other classes. They are simply not conditioned to this sort ofliving — the loss of social status, loss of income, loss of friendship andsocial acceptance and, more importantly, the loss of their own self esteem.
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There are different social levels of acceptance, but tonight I am speaking
about corporate offenders. and I think that with very few exceptions the
punisluncnt of that sort of person needenot be physical. I am not speaking
about the notorious hard-shell professional embezzler from way back. I am
speaking about the opportunist. the pillar of our society who, between the
ages of (say) 40 and 50, is lacking in one of the essential salts and turns to
crime. And if you say. What sort of salt? — well, if we knew that we
wouldn‘t have crime.
Chairman: -
Well, that was provocative enough, wasn’t it? It presents some grave
problems. I will now ask Mr Rothery, a Solicitor of the Supreme Court, to
introduce the fourth topic: “Are penal sanctions appropriate for corporate
crime?" 4 ’
Mr J. M. Rothery, Solicitor of the Supreme Court
At the beginning of the seminar this evening, l‘was somewhat
horrified to hear that our remarks on our papers were to be taped as 1 had
not prepared any particular material in respect of the discussion. I had in
mind I would talk generally by way of background to some of the
suggestions made. What I have attempted in my paper is to throw some
bait into the water by way of new thoughts to see whether it will be taken
up. In doing so I have to publicly confess to some of my junior partners
who have been wondering whether, as an old man who is always black and
white in his views, l am becoming a little silly in my old age.‘l have always
adhered to the principle that the law should be certain — that the law
,should' be capable of being ascertained by professional advisers and that
those advisers should be in a position to advise with some certainty. Some
of the proposals are completely at variance with my previous views but in
suggesting them I am fortiﬁed in my paper when I heard some of the
comments of the other speakers.
As we know, Sir Richard has given a long and dedicated service to
the improvement of company law. It is pertinent that one of his closing
remarks was: _
The need to reform our procedures to cope with the increasing
complexity. of modern society is, however, one that does not only
apply to criminal cases. The rule of law is in jeopardy also because
the inordinate length of some civil cases generates increasing distrust
of the courts. It is to be hoped that somehow a solution of the kind
of problem I have been discussing can be found, capable of being
applied in both jurisdictions.
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Mr Olson’s paper was also of interest to me as it shows that in
corporate crime. as in commercial life. the market is booming. In his budget
for 1973—4 he tells us that .the prospects of corporate crime are better
than ever.
When we pass to Mr Goldrick‘s remarks he expresses what I sense is a
feeling of frustration when he says: .
The courts at all levels will continue to function and to play their
parts as best as they can, I conclude. however, by suggesting that our
society has hardly begun to comprehend the nature and extent of
corporate crime, let alone reach the point of realizing that our
attempts to combat it are at a very primitive level.
One’s views and principles in life are affected by the experiences that
one has, and in preparing this paper I thought about my own experiences.
A number here are barristers but as an ordinary solicitor l think I am
somewhat closer to people than counsel who are more concerned in
interpreting and implementing the law in its technical exactitude. 0n the
other hand we have our friends from the C.A.C. who of course take a view
against the background and obligations which they have to enforce the law
as it is. But in my personal experience as a solicitor, as a company director,
and associated with the Stock Exchange. for whom my firm advises, we
come across many problems from time to time, which leads one to think
that the law is inadequate. Let me talk firstly about the type of people
whom I consider become involved in corporate crime.
You have, ﬁrstly, people who don‘t know what they are doing, the
negligent people, the small people who have no proper advice. Examples of
these are the small builders who form small companies, and I think possibly
a large part of their problems arises from the fact that they just don’t
know what they are doing commercially or legally.
Then you have the people who work in bigger companies and who
should know that they are doing. It is very strange, but I believe that many
of these often don’t know the obligations of the law. It is all very well to
talk about sending them to gaol for IO, 12 or 15 years and ﬁning them
$2,000, but often they just don’t appreciate what is required of them. In
companies of which I am a director, when the accounts fall to be signed I
make sure that I go through the accounts with the people who are
responsible for their preparation. Most responsible company directors do
that, and spend some considerable time with the people who are responsible
for the preparation of the trial and final accounts. My ploy has been, over
the last three or four years, certainly since Sir Richard amended the law. in
the presence of the various people one interviews in settling different parts
of the accOunts,such as the ﬁnancial controller, secretary and possibly
general manager who is responsible for certifying stocks and so on, to
solemnly read to them the provisions of s. 375A of the Act, which provides
that where any officer of the company (which includes all these people)
gives any wrong information to a director or an auditor, then he is faced
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with very severe penalties of up lo I: months or 2 years imprisonment and
ﬁnes of up to 55.000. The first time you tell such people as these about
these penalties. there is quite an air of amazement on their faces — often
an air of terror. One generally gets quickly to the truth when they realize
the seriousness of the exercise. I think it would not be a bad idea
(although it might sound silly) if people who signed accounts, and people
who are resonsible for accounts, had also to sign a statement that they had
read the Cinnpanies Act once a year. At least they would know what some
of their obligations are. It is simply amazing in professional advising that
one comes across competetent secretaries of companies not realizing, for
example, their obligations under the provisions of 567. All sorts of ideas are
proposed which should never even be considered at any level just because
people don't realize or know what the law is. So there is then this second
class of people who should know more about the law but who don’t know
the law, and often get into trouble. Having got into trouble they always
hope that things are going to get better, but usually they get worse and
generally it finishes up in some sort of a trial or a prison sentence.
Then you have another type of person — the person who is a real
swindler. a cheat and a crook. i think we are going to see more and more
persons of this type, and i am convinced that the law is completely
inadequate in dealing with them. They are intelligent, they are inventive,
they have no moral scruples, and money is their god. How do you deal
with that sort of person? They can get the best advice around the town —
and more often they do not need it. They are well aware of what the law
says, and they know all the ways to make money at somebody else’s
expense. In America, of course, as Professor Harding will tell you, they
have been through this to a much greater extent than we have, but our
turn is coming. i mentioned Mr Peter Connolly’s remarks in the
investigation he made in Queensland. To illustrate the point i am making —
for example, we all know that the Stock Exchange has certain rules and
requirements. But what can a Stock Exchange do in forcing out the truth
when there are two or three companies which are, say, 30 per cent owned
by a group of promoters or ﬁnanciers in the background who would never
dream of consolidating the accounts of g subsidiary companies, because then
they are obliged to eliminate all inter-company transactions. But by passing
management fees from Company A to Company B to Company C and
ﬁnally burying the result in Company D which is a private company, they
do not have to disclose the true accounting picture. It is a very simple
thing to do. Thereby one can throw up proﬁts with the eventual company
crash, but in .the meantime the people responsible have probably got out.
There are difﬁculties also with our accounting procedures the way
they are. i see some of my accountant friends here and they well know my
complaints when I talk to them. I don’t think ﬁgures are presented these
days in such a way as to give a true picture of a company, and there are
many opportunities of presenting misleading accounts. There are possibilities
of either overvaluation or undervaluation, and the people who are smart
enough or wise enough to take advantage of these short cuts can
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tmanipulate accounts within the limits of accounting standards as we know
them. By way of example as to how proﬁts can be differently presented.
do you bring in proﬁts on the sale of a contract, or wait until you have
got your moneys, or declare a proﬁt even if you have got the smell of a
contract. Losses of course are never brought to the picture until the
liquidator moves in.
So there are all sorts of opportunities available to the fraudulent type
of person and he takes advantage of them. As business opportunities alter
he' is alert to take advantage of the opportunities. In mining companies you
have seen sheer fraud in some cases. In property companies you have seen
property being sold off from one company to another, the prices being
forced up, and the people responsible getting out. All these things will
continue to happen because there are vast volumnes of money to be made
in the manipulation of companies.
So when we look at the picture, what do we do to stop it? ls there
any way in which this type of conduct can be stopped by imposing more
and severe penalties? ,
In my position I find that when dealing with responsible people, such
people are more careful and are more aware of the penalties and in turn
they ensure that they have people who work for them who in turn are
more careful and responsible. In these cases the penalties do have some
effect. But for the sheer crook who is out to do something which is wrong,
penalties won’t deter him. He may get caught but in the meantime the
damage has been done.
Hence I espouse what has been suggested by Mr Frank Ryan. In doing
so I would like to briefly explain his scheme. As I understand it from my
discussions with him and the proposals which he has sent to various
professional bodies, including the Bar Association and the Institute of
Accountants, asking for their comments (and I know that from certain
circles in the city he is receiving a very negative type of approach, as
people are worried that it will place the Corporate Affairs Commission in a
position where it may pry into the affairs of companies), what he seeks to
do, is purely and simply to adopt some of the principles of the American
legislation, which relies to a large extent on stop orders and injunctions to
prevent something from happening rather the C.A.C. itself determining what
is good and what is bad in business.
Many of you who are in business and the professions well know that
information and rumour go around the town long before events can be legally
proved. That is the time when action should be taken to stop what may be
a corporate crime then in the making. If people who hear these rumours
and people who have access to information which other people don’t have,
such as the press and the media, have a facility available to go and make a
complaint, or give information, even though based on rumour, I think you
will ﬁnd that in a number of cases it will be sufﬁcient for the C.A.C. to
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call before it the people about whom the complaint has been made. It may
not be necessary to go past this stage but if so, possibly some prop’osed
questionable action can be stopped or delayed if information sought can be
required by way of affidavit or declaration or alternatively a meeting can be
required to be called at which shareholders, the press and other media can
be fully informed. '
You will appreciate that the Stock Exchange is in the position that
whereas it may ask for these things at the present time, it can do nothing
except delist. That is very little solace to the people who are still
shareholders in the company — it doesn't achieve anything. For example,
backdoor listing. This is bad because it avoids all the protective
requirements of company law such as the prospectus requirements which do
have some teeth. By buying into a company or making an exchange of
shares with an unlisted company there is nothing which has to be signed
which places a legal liability upon people seeking a backdoor listing.
Certainly the Exchange rules provide that a company which has acquired
backdoor listing has to supply all the information which it would have to
supply if it was applying fora public listing but the only way in which the
Exchange can enforce the supply of this information is to delist. [n the
result. in a backdoor listing the promoter or entrepreneur escapes all the
obligations of issuing a prospectus and yet achieves the beneﬁt of being
listed.
The foregoing remarks are only illustrative of the opportunities that
may occur. I do not believe it possible to draw legislation to cover all
possibilities. Let me test it this way. These days it is still fairly respectable
to try to avoid (as distinct from evade) income tax, and l know many
professional advisers who take both an intellectual interest and a malicious
enjoyment, every time the income tax is amended, in seeing how they can
get around it; You have seen the complex way the Income Tax Act has
grown over the last three years, and yet people are still ﬁnding a way
around it with, for example, “loss companies” and how to use “loss
companies". And I am sure that with company legislation there is still a
way to be found around legislation.
I know that many legal people are very much opposed to giving a
government authority a right to interfere and to exercise an administrative
function. For this reason I would like to see these ideas debated not only
here tonight, but in the various circles the people here tonight come from,
to see whether they could be made to work, because I think the essence is
this: if you can stop something from happening then it is a much more
effective way than punishing afterwards. As an illustration, in our ofﬁce we
act for various trustees for debenture trust deeds. At times we have a
difference of opinion with the people acting for the companies. If we get
into a stalemate where pressures are being put on us because the
prospectuses are being printed and people are in a hurry and so on. our
stock answer is, “Well. we don‘t like it ~ you really want it -» Come up
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and have a talk to the C.AC. and see whether they approve”, I guarantee
that nine times out of ten we get our way The very tact that such an
opportunityexists is sufﬁcient in itself to achieve an objective.
Hence I have made the suggestions in my paper as l have come to the
conclusion that the law as it now stands, with all its penalties and with all
its refinements and with all the hard work done by people like Sir Richard,
is not adequate to catch the very smart people and the very smart crooks
who are arOund at the present time and who will continue to be around
because of the vast opportunities available in any corporate function to take
moneys improperly and to destroy the investments and the faith of the
peop e.
Chairman:
The ﬁrst of our commentators is Mr Ford, Q.C., one of the Crown
Prosecutors who is particularly interested in this problem of corporate
crime.
Mr J. Ford, Q.C., Gown Prosecutbr:
If my remarks appear to be perfunctary. then I intent to disrespect
to the paper nor to Mr Rothery. I read Mr Rothery’s paper with great
interest, and I entirely agree with the stress and the. emphasis and the
direction in which it tends. I Was very interested when I ﬁrst read the
'paper to engage myself in some research into the aspects of the
administration of corporate law in America, but after a short discussion
with Mr Rothery I discovered that Professor Harding would be particularly
interested in the American situation, and of course Professor Harding has
ﬁrst hand experience. Solthought I would assume a rather more humble
role and speak in perhaps a rather vague way of a couple of broad general
impressions that I have.
The ﬁrst impression I have, and this is in a very limited sphere, is
that a recent decision of the Supreme Court - R. v. Armstrong (1972) l
N.S.W. L.R. SS9 — has extracted the teeth from section 173 of the Crimes
Act, the section which deals with the fraudulent taking or misapplication of
company property by directors and certain other people. The practical
effect, I think, of that judgment is to render the section useless, because
most of the prosecutions that might be contemplated under it would be
brought ordinarily in Petty Sessions or Quarter Sessions, or the District
Court as it now is, not at the august level of the Supreme Court, and it
seems only a matter of common sense that prosecutors in Petty.Sessions
and in the District Court would be daunted by the prospect of trying to
argue against that decision. That seems to be an immediate practical effect.
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But even it" one disagrees with the reasons of the learned trial judge.
even if one is convinced that it could be overturned in a superior court on
appeal, then one still faces the practical difﬁculty that in a very much
earlier case. the case of Nelson v. The King (IQO‘Z) A.C. 474, the Lord
Chancellor seemed to take the view that that particular section (or the
English equivalent of it) was afflicted by all the primitive technicalities of
the law of larceny. If that is so, and it appears to be so, then it is very
narrow in its application if it is merely a form of larceny. Larceny is
seriously conﬁned because of the necessity to prove a trespassory taking,
the necessity to prove coincidence in time, of men rea, and the actus reus.
In England it seems that the English equivalent of section I73 has
disappeared from the statute book and the English have been able to give a
very broad definition of larceny which apparently renders it unnecessary to
have a special section dealing with fraudulent misapplication of property by
company directors. There is the broad general or generic crime of larceny,
which is so all embracing that it covers not only the old style larceny
recognized at common law, but also embezzlement and what was known in
England for many years as fraudulent conversion. Indeed, the English
equivalent of our section 173 was part of section 20' of the Larceny Act
(I0l6) (England). It appeared in the fraudulent conversion section, and it
seems that the proponents of the English Theft Act of l968 took the view
that they would by their broad enactment, their broad statement or
definition of larceny. dispense with fraudulent conversion in the form in
which we see it in section 173.
So it seems to me that in order to be practical the legislature should
turn its attention to this particular matter, and indeed to the broad
question of whether there should not be an adoption, at least in part, of
the English Theft Act. I understand that the Victorians have already
committed themselves, or almost committed themselves, to enactment of the
Theft Act. although it appears that in England at lase one section has been
giving enormous trouble.
My other impression is probably a controversial one, but Lean express
it very briefly. It is this. It does seem strange to me that complex litigation
such as company litigation, commercial litigation, which is ordinarily
administered by the most sophisticated and skilled lawyers — certainly when
it is a question of civil litigation -— is not necessarily so administered when
it comes to criminal litigation. I am referring now particularly _to indictable
matters and to the determination of complex company and commercial
matters by juries. lrealize that in saying that l have probably kicked
someone’s sacred cow, but nonetheless if one does have an extraordinarily
complex set of circumstances one can’t really expect a jury, which may
consist of quite untutored people. people who are inexperienced in business
and inexperienced in accountancy, to be able to give proper attention to
the matter. It may be that legislation could be enacted providing that juries
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may be dispensed with in certain complex criminal cases. It may be that an
application may be made to a judge of the Supreme Court, who will
consider whether or not the issues are of such complexity that they should
be dealt with by a tribunal which doesn’t include a jury.
One last observation l have is this: that I recently had the great
pleasure of re-reading Sir Patrick Hastings’ Cases in Court, and for those of
you who are interested in good legal jokes I recommend his account of his
participation as Counsel in the famous Royal Mail case when Lord Kylsant
was put up for trial, his co-accuSed being a very distinguished accountant.
who, incidentally, was acquitted. I don’t propose to recount it to you but
only wish to remind you of it if you haven’t read it for some time.
Chairman:
Our ﬁnal commentator on Mr Rothery’s paper is Professor Harding of
the University of New South Wales.
Professor D. E. Harding:
1 would like to congratulate Mr Rothery on his constructive paper.
He has drawn on his substantial practical experience and has shown an
awareness of the public interest in the provision of meaningful regulatory
protection for shareholders. As an alternative to the lengthening list of
criminal offences which deal with undesirable behaviour, after the damage
has been done, he calls our attention to the suggestion made by. Mr Ryan '
that there be provision for proceedings to prevent harm to shareholders
before it happens. i agree that such an interventionary function should be
developed.
[would like also to applaud Mr Rothery’s comments. It is heartening
to hear a solicitor and company director, with so much experience, say that
lawyers are so ingenious at devising ways around the detailed statutory
provisions, which it has become the convention to devise in areas such as
tax and takeover regulation, that a new approach‘to law-making and to the
design of regulatory frameworks is needed in some areas of commercial
regulation. Given the formulation of a broad standard of equitable
behaviour, there is nothing offensive to notions of the “rule of law" in the
provision of injunctive procedures for intervention to forestall damage. The
principles and remedies provided by the equity courts have long involved
recognition of the need for such procedures and principles if there is to be
effective regulation. Administrative procedures such as the United States
S.E.C.’s “no-action” letters, and the clearance procedures provided in the
new trade practices legislation, are examples of more modern refinements
intended to overcome commercial uncertainty about whether a proposed
course of action will prove acceptable to the authority administering a
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 broad standard. Some thought may need to be given to advance clearance.
even in an area where the consequence of taking action may only be
intervention as distinct from a substantial civil or criminal penalty.
Leaving these speciﬁc comments on Mr Rothery’s proposal, it has
occurred to me that, as the acadetnic commentator on this topic, I shoul
d
take up the general theme, posed by the title, of the role of penal
sanctions in the regulation of corporate behaviour and the activity of
individuals connected with companies. I will therefore seek to articulate a
few of the considerations which limit the effective use of penal sanctions in
this area. Others such as Sanford Kadish' have dealt with this matter at far
greater length that I will attempt to, tonight. it will be apparent however,
that Mr Rothery’s concrete suggestion accords well with the general
principles one cart articulate.
As the paper has pointed out, there is a vast and increasing range of
regulation of corporate activity which uses penal sanctions. One can classify
these offenses into three categories. The first concerns traditional crimes.
The history of the criminal law documents well the development from the
classic larceny offence to the crimes of embezzlement and misappropriation.
But, in addition to this first category ofttraditional property offences, we
have, secondly. offences intended to encourage observance of a range of
administrative or procedural requirements — what Mr Rothery calls
administration or mechanical offences —' what Mr Goldrick has referred to
as “corporate good house-keeping". There has been a tendency in the
1960’s and recently for the list to grow.
Some of .the new requirements are surprisingly vague for criminal
offences and liability is imposed for failure to take reasonable steps to
comply. This is the case. for example, with the relatively new obligati
ons
imposed on directors with respect to accounts in Sections 162 and 163 of"
the Companies Act. The question can be asked whether we have
created
these offences a little indiscriminately and without sufﬁcient attent
ion to
the limits on the role of penal sanctions mentioned below.
The third category embrances provisions which are part of a scheme
of economic regulation. They are intended to implement econ
omic
philosophies in favour of competition or the control of market
power,or
philosophies of what is fair in dealings, for example. with consum
ers and
investors. Corporate crimes are increasingly to be found in c
onsumer
protection legislation. such as the New South Wales Consumer
Protection
 
l. S. H. Kadish. “Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sa
nctions in Enforcing
Economic Regulations“ (I936) 30 U. Chicago LR. 423.
|_‘7
‘Act, 1969, and the Securities Industry Act, l970-1972. In the United
States, antitrust legislation contains several provisions, carrying penal
sanctions, which are crucial components in the scheme. At the national level
in Australia economic regulation is developing apace. There is some
indication however, that the major provisions will often not involve criminal
sanctions.
What I wish to suggest, broadly speaking, is that while there is a place
for penal sanctions. we should use imagination in devising administrative
procedures and remedies which are apt to secure effective regulation. Penal
sanctions, I suggest, have a limited role to play.
There are at least three factors limiting their role. First, some business
conduct, ‘which is not good house-keeping, or which is not conducive to
goals of economic policy, does not. in itself incite sufﬁcient moral
indignation in the community at large to warrant the stigma of criminal
conviction.
Second, it is often the case that the conduct cannot be sufﬁciently
well deﬁned in advance to ensure that a conviction will be seen as fair and
in accordance with the community’s sense of procedural justice. And third,
the difficulties of detecting and successfully prosecuting the prescribed
conduct may be so great that the offences do not effectively deter the
undesired behaviour anyway.
Perhaps I should indicate what I understand by the references in the
title for this part of the seminar to penal sanctions. I take it that we are
referring to the sactions, commonly in the form of ﬁnes or imprisonment,
imposed by courts of criminal jurisdiction after hearings which follow the
rules of criminal procedure. Of course, ﬁnes are imposed by the Tax
Commissioner, by the Stamp Duties Commissioner, and there are hefty
“civil penalties” proposed in the Trade Practices Bill. The distinction
between such civil penalties and criminal ﬁnes may seem rather slight. A
civil ﬁne may operate as a form of pecuniary punishment particularly of
those with limited capacity to pay who are not in a position to pass the
ﬁne on - companies in business often are. The petty regulatory offense
punishable by a small fine may not excite strong concern about whether
the community’s sense of moralityais aroused by the conduct.
, But, the principal distinction between the criminal offence and the
administrative or civil breach, lies, I suppose in the fact~that criminal
conviction is supposed to reﬂect the community’s moral outrage at the
action. It is accordingly thought, generally speaking, that corporate action
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should not be subject to penal sanction unless it excites a degree of moral
opprobrium. It is because of the seriousness of criminal proceedings and the
stigma attached to criminal convictions that there is such a panoply of
protections for the accused. It is because of these protections that
enforcement is so difﬁcult. Prosecutors like Mr. Ford are presented with
many hurdles. These include such rights as exist in this area to refuse to
answer an investigator or inspector, and the difﬁculty of fixing
responsibility on the principal executives of the corporation so as to hold
the corporation liable under the organic theory of corporate criminal
responsibility, as well as in order to deal with the real masterminds of the
organization. This difﬁculty was evidenced by the Electrical Companies price
ﬁxing conspiracy litigation to which Gordon Hawkins referred. it resulted in
a settlement imposing liability on middle echelon executives, but left the
top executives with only the discomfort of the Kefauver Senate hearings and
publicity. it is evidenced on a more modest scale by the difﬁculty which
the ofﬁcers of the Department of Labour and Industry have in successfully
prosecuting those responsible for misleading statements under section 32 of
the Consumer Protection Act, 1969 (‘N.S.W.)
A further difﬁculty is the insistence in criminal procedure on
specificity of allegations. The objection that is taken to informations on the
grounds of duplicity and the obligation on the prosecution to supply
particulars are illustrated in the area of company law by the decisions in
Marches! v. Barnes2 and Byme v. Baker3in Victoria. Another difﬁculty of
course. is the criminal burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt and the
fact that in practice the prosecution is often put to strict proof in
accordance with a body of laws of evidence which lend themselves to the
obstructive tactician. In addition there is the policy of the courts in favour
of strict construction of criminal statutes.
These factors of moral reprehensibility and difﬁculty in detection and
prosecution, impose limits as it seems to me, on the utility of criminal law
in regulation of corporate activity. The decision of the House of Lords in
Tesco v. Nattrass‘refusing to hold a company operating a chain of
lsupermarkets in Britain liable for the omission of the branch manager of
one supermarket, is perhaps indicative of judicial reluctance to make the
path to conviction easier unless it believes that the conduct in question is
.morally reprehensible. ' -
Admittedly, stress was also laid in the judgments on the point that
there is no rational justiﬁcation in terms of the effectuating legislation in
holding liable an employer who is admitted to have taken all precautions
which can be expected of him.
2. [1970] V.R. 434
3. [1964] MR. 443
4. [l972l A.(‘. 153.
IN
 
The history of antitrust prosecutions in the United States provides
plenty of evidence of the unwillingness of juries ‘to convict what Sutherland
in his work on white-collar crime.s calls “respectable corporate executives of
high social status". Even the Nader Report on enforcement of the United
States antitrust lawséadmitted that when juries realise that a well-dressed,
white wealthy, articulate father of three. might actually go to gaol with
unkempt, 'poor, uneducated, criminals with long records, they tend to
acquit. The Report, with F. Scott Fitzgerald, asks “why is this so — are the
rich somehow different?" and gives the reply, “well yes, they have money".
Indeed there have been instances of juries acquitting the individual agents of
the corporation who acted for it, while holding the corporation itself guilty.
The logic of this escapes one at times. It also happens that some eases of
corporate conduct involve evidence which is too complex for a jury.
1 do not mean to convey approval in all cases of the paucity of
convictions. One does hear the arguments of the General Electric executive
in the price-ﬁxing conspiracy case that collusion was illegal but it was not
unethical, and that the law is so complex and uncertain that the innocent
may be convicted. But on the other hand it is said that breach of consumer
or investor trust is often more harmful than petty larceny, and that the
complexity of white-collar. fraud does not make it any the less
blameworthy. -
Nader quotes Woody Guthrie’s observation on the matter —
“As through this world 1 have rambled,
1 have seen lots of funny men.
Some rob you with a six-gun and
Some with a fountain pen."
' What I am seeking to suggest is that if one is realistic about what is
necessary for effective regulation, in many instances penal sanctions are not
the whole answer and we should try to formulate other approaches.
Nor am 1 suggesting that there is not a useful role for penal sanctions
in all three areas covered by the categories of offences mentioned above. A
simple ﬁne may be the obvious and appropriate means of enforcing many
basic, simple requirements with respect to procedures to be observed and
documents to be kept or filed. In the field of economic regulation there are
aggravated abuses or conduct involving fraud or dishonesty in respect of
which the community expects penal sanctions. Despite the vagueness of
section 32 the Consumer Protection Act in New South Wales has been used
5. E. H. Sutherland White Collar Oime (1949) at 9. See also H. Edelhertz. National
Institute of law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, The Nature, Impact and
Prosecution of White Colbzr Cﬁme (lCR 70-1; May 1970).
6. The Nader Study Group Report on Antitrust Enforcement, Mark Green (ed.) The
Closed Enterprise System (1971) Ch.5.
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,in a valuable way to deal with some conduct in the used car industry. It
has been necessary for discretion to be exercised by prosecuting authorities
in choosing cases for prosecution.
i Nor do I mean to say that there is not a need for improvement in
the enforcement of criminal law in the area of corporate abuse. There is a
long strain of criticism in Australia of delays and lack of enforcement of
company law. Mr. Justice Eggleston’s comments at one of the legal
conventions, on the Rubinstein investigation provides .a case in point. The
report on the investigation went into the Crown Solicitor’s ofﬁce and
apparently nothing followed.7
The recent remarks of Mr P. D. Connolly Q.C. in the Queensland
syndication Management Report, are also in point. ‘
At paragraph 108 he says:
“It is with considerable regret that I feel constrained to report
that'the breaches referred to above were so ﬂagrant that they
ought, in my opinion to have been detected by the
Commissioner and his ofﬁcers. In fairness it should be recognised
that the Commissioner’s staff is small and overworked and that
its public service classifications are so low that it is surprising
that it is able to attract ofﬁcers of the necessary quality.”
Mr Connolly reports that he examined the ofﬁce of the Commissioner
of Corporate Affairs in Queensland. The result, he says, “was disquieting”.
He concludes, at paragraph ”2:
“At present the law is largely not being enforced. One advantage
that may well accrue from a general upgrading of the
Commissioner’s system is that costly investigations such as these
.t may be expected to be undertaken on most occasions within the
Commissioner's resources. Even more important is the likelihood
that much public loss may be forestalled by timely preventive
action."
> This strain of criticism is by no means conﬁned to Australia. In 1972
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the United States
House. of Representatives in its report with respect to its study of the
Securities lndustry8 recommended increased facilities for criminal
enforcement of securities laws.
The ﬁrst paragraph of the Report says:
“Testimony at the Subcommittee’s August 1971, hearing and
case studies developed by the Special Subcommittee on
Investigations revealed that, in several instances, wilful violations
7. (1967) '4] A.L.J. at 365-66.
8. 92d Cong. 2d Scss. H. R. No. 92-1519 (Oct. 1972).
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of the securities laws resulted in no more than an administrative
or injunctive proceeding in which the SEC obtained a consent
decree. whereby the defendant (without conceding guilt)
promised to ‘sin no more.‘ Although the precise reasons for such
lenient treatment were unclear. a partial explanation lies in the
manpower and'budgetary problems of the Commission. Since
criminal penalties must be credible to be an effective deterrent,
a special budgetary allotment should be given the Commission to
implement the criminal provisions of the securities acts.”
There can be little doubt that we in Australia also need to give
attention to improvement of enforcement of company and securities
industry laws. Mr Connolly in his Report mentions a number of aspects of
this. The Queensland commission is appallingly under-staffed and
overburdened with the administration of a large number of commercial acts
dealing with such matters as real estate agents and used car dealers. In
addition it has to deal with all the registration functions commonly
associated with company law. Last year one of the leading ofﬁcers on the
New South Wales Commission said that more lawyers are needed in our
State’s Commission. More thought needs to be given also to the
development of systems for detection of possible breaches occuring for
example, in the securities market.
. Another difﬁculty in this area has been the complaint that cases are
not handled well by the traditional prosecutorial authorities — the Crown
law ofﬁces.
There was some criticism in July of last year of the time taken by
the Crown Solicitor in New South Wales in dealing with reports from the
Corporate Affairs Commission. Mr Ryan in a letter to the “Sydney
Morning Herald”, 9 commented on these criticisms and disputed inferences
drawn by the critics from the report of the Commission’5 operations for the
year ending June 30, 1973. But he did say that “ . one could wish to
be able to demonstrate a more impressive record ”, of company
prosecutions launched in New South Wales relating to the mining boom of
1969—70, or “in the pipeline”. Certainly it has been a common criticism in
otherrjurisdictions, that the appropriate Crown law ofﬁcers, or in the
United States the ofﬁcers of the Justice Department, do not have the
manpower and expertise necessary to deal effectively and expeditiously with
long, complex corporate crime cases. There is something to be said for
allowing the appropriate Commission to have the carriage of its own cases
in the role of solicitor and to brief counsel itself.
In the United States in 1972 I heard similar criticisms and suggestions
voiced within the S.E.C. It was said that individuals within the S.E.C.
worked a case up and sent it over to the Department of Justice to ofﬁcers
with less expertise and a much greater case-load, who did not handle it as
9. S.M.H. July 12, 1973.
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well as the S.E.C. officers would have. A suggestion that S.E.C. officers
should at least work with the Justice Department ofﬁcers was being
mooted. .
t‘ Mr (‘onnolly and others have made several other suggestions for
improving the effectiveness of enforcement in this area. The Report says
that the role of evidence which makes more difﬁcult the proof and
understanding of the accounts of companies, should be re-appraised. The
attempt to lead expert evidence and opinion with respect to the company’s
accounts is likely to be met, it says, by the objection that the expert is
swearing the issue or stating the conclusion to be drawn from the facts, or
that the documents speak for themselves “They may indeed speak for
themselves". the Report goes on in paragraph 115, “but they speak to a
very limited audience.”
And in paragraph IN, the Report suggests that many of these cases
of corporate crime are largely beyond the understanding of the jury. It may
be necessary to ,re-appraise “traditional approaches to criminal law, at least
in relation to «the complexities of the commercial world". The Report even
suggests consideration of the expedient adopted in the Bankruptcy Act of
making all offences triable summarily unless the Court itself commits for
trial by jury. Summary trial under the Bankruptcy Act leads to a lesse
penalty than may be imposed on conviction, on indictment. -
But the main point remains that more attention should be given to
the tailoring of remedies of a civil and administrative kind, as well as to
penal sanctions. Mr Rothery’s approach accords with this, for one of the
general ways in which we should provide more effective regulation is
through preventive action.
Mr Rothery has taken up the excellent suggestion of a tribunal which
would bring up some of these corporate proposals, affecting the interests of
shareholders, perhaps in private, for consideration. There are a lot of issues
raised by that. What is the definition of the jurisdiction and of the grounds
for intervention? What is the effect of intervention on current activity? Who
initiates the action? Are you going to have some sort of detection and
surveillance system or will it just depend on a close reading of the press
and plugging into the “grapevine"? Who sits on these bodies? Is this just
a
city takeover panel with representatives from the securities industry — called
by another name and with the backing of government power? How do you
then overcome the problems of the interlocking associations and the rivalries
one finds in a small corporate world? If we do not pluck experts ou
t of
the industry, how will we find experts who can understand w
hat is really
going on?
But such interventionary machinery seems desirable in view of the
pointlessness of action in many cases after the damage has been done
and
the reluctance of individual shareholders to bring derivative or representa
tive
actions.
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There are many other aspects to a well thought out preventive
programme. It should facilitate compliance with the law. A common cry of
corporate executives - at least those in public companies — is that they
will do their utmost to comply with the law and not rock the
organizational boat — if only they know what the law requires. The United
States S.E.C. has given a lot of thought to the use of specially qualiﬁed
supervisors in brokers’ ofﬁces whose function it is to see that rules are
observed and to whom it communicates its requirements. Procedures for
advance clearance of proposals and for obtaining interpretations and
guidance from an administrative authority are valuable. The Trade Practices
Bill incorporates some such procedures in its clearance and authorisation
provisions.
Another aspect is the culling of those with bad records. This raises
issues of freedom of vocation of course. Section 374H of the Companies
Act is of this type. Professor Parsons suggested, in a lecture to an
accountants’ body, in Queensland, some time ago, that directors of public
companies should be licensed. I don‘t think that met with a very warm
reception, but it is an interesting idea.
The other aspect is the provision of sanctions and remedies to deter
and to repair. One of the points commonly made in this area is that
remedies should be tailored to provide a real incentive. One hears debates
about whether the ﬁne for insider trading should be $1,000 or $10,000. If
you have made $1,000,000 on the deal it probably doesn’t matter very
much whether it is $1,000 or $10,000 - you can afford either. It is highly
unlikely that a criminal sanction of $1,000,000 will be created fOr that
behaviour. What is needed is a proceeding to take away the profit, and that
is what is being developed. A penal sanction provides an additional
deterrent however, and is still important.
This is a general theme throughout the area of regulation of corporate
activity. In the United States, in the ﬁeld of consumer protection, the
F.T.C. (under stimulus, interestingly enough, from some law students) has
developed a remedy which is known as “corrective advertising”. They used
this, for example, against an oil company which had been advertising that it
had a special additive which did not exist. The company was required to
spend a certain percentage of its advertising budget over a speciﬁed period,
in a form of public self denunciation saying that it had sinned.
A similar approach has been suggested in the antitrust context in the
United States. In an article in the Harvard Law Review last year it was
said:
—’ “To arrive at an optimum antitrust policy the current arsenal of
antitrust weapons should be replaced in so far as they are
directed at deterrence with the unitary device of a ﬁne based on
a percentage of corporate proﬁts.”‘0
10. W. Breit and Kelzin , “Antitrust Penalties and Attitudes Towards Risk: An Economic
and Legal Analysis‘ (1973) 86 Harv. L. R. 693 at 704—05
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The person who has offended is trying to make proﬁts, and if you
guarantee that you will take away the proﬁts and add some other deterrent,
titan he is not so likely to pursue that particular line of action.
i Publicity can be an important feature of the deterrent -— apart from
penal sanctions. If you ﬁnd that a used motor car dealer has been guilty of
misleading advertising as the result of a proceeding in a court at the bottom
on Phillip Street, and no one hears about it, he may say, “this is not so
bad as a bad selling season". It may be necessary that there be more
attention given to publicity of convictions so that the moral opprobrium,
the stigma, that is said to attach as a result of criminal conviction, has
some bite in it. The reports of the Commissioner of Consumer Affairs have
been of some importance in this context.
I' would like to end my comment then on the note that penal
sanctions standing alone are of limited utility in dealing with undesirable
corporate behaviour. What we need is a more determined approach to
effective enforcement coupled with a realistic awareness of the limits on the
utility of penal sanctions and some flexibility and imagination in devising
remedies as alternatives to penal sanctions or to supplement them.
Mr Geoffrey Cohen, Solicitor of the Supreme Court:
There are only two matters 1 wish to refer to, the first a very minor
one. Since ofﬁcers are mainly the people who are affected by corporate
crime. I think some sort of clariﬁcation and deﬁnition would be handy. A
receiver appointed under the terms of an instrument is an ofﬁcer; a receiver
appointed by the Court is not. If a solicitor is sufﬁciently careless as to
draw a deed of charge without the power to appoint a receiver and the
creditor then goes to the Court to appoint a receiver, that man is not an
ofﬁcer. A liquidator in a voluntary winding up is an ofﬁcer; a liquidator
appointed by the Court or appointed by'creditors is not an ofﬁcer. I don’t
khow how creditors appoint a liquidator. In a creditors’ voluntary winding
up the shareholders nominate a liquidator, the creditors may then nominate
somebody else. But even if an analogy can be made out of “nominate” and
“appoint”, if the creditors sit quiescent then the person nominated by the
shareholders is the liquidator. So that unless the creditors disagree with the
shareholders the liquidator in a creditors’ voluntary winding up is an ofﬁcer,
but if they do disagree he is not.
i The only other thing l would like to say is that I must express some
amazement that only the eminent practising practical penologist appears to
disagree with the general concept of an extension of penalties, crimes and
deterrents. We seem to have spent a considerable part of the evening ﬁnding
out that we need to go much further in the takeover code, we need to go
much further in insider trading, much further in many ﬁelds. I don’t.
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contradict the general concept that there must be public protection. 1 don't
think anybody could, but I do contradict the concept of the “cradle to the
grave". philosophy. Out of 17,606 companies mentioned by Mr Purvis I
would think approximately 16,500 or more are private companies. How
many times have we been to the various courts, and particularly to the
company court, sought a winding up and heard the judge say, or said to
the judge, “This is a partnership in corporate form”?Why not take the
analogy a little bit further. Let us address our remedies to that much
smaller ﬁeld of about 1000 companies in New South Wales and let us look
to partnership remedies for that vast number of “corporate partnerships”. If
we create the analogy of a director of a proprietary company and a partner
— and here I say quite clearly the proprietary company requires a
total redeﬁnition, I am now talking of a subsidiary of a public company, I
am not talking of an exempt proprietary company, I am‘talking of a
partnership in corporate form — let us take the analogy right home, and
have,.the same remedies there for such people as though they had been
partners. And then let us have a look at the public interest, because we
have spent all this'evening talking about the public sector but we are
affecting ofﬁcers of another 16,500 companies whom we haven’t even
mentioned in the whole of the evening, and I do think it time that we did
consider something like 95 per cent of the people we are talking about and
not give consideration only to the 5 per cent because the remedies affect
investors whereas the others are only affecting creditors — who, after all,
,have received no honourable mention tonight either,
In brief, I think that consideration of the Companies Act requires
consideration of two basically different corporate forms: ﬁrstly, the
corporate partnership, and secondly, the “other” companies. Basically the
ﬁrst type requires to be orientated towards creditor interests whilst the
latter involves a more detailed consideration of investor protection.
MLJ. T. ﬂiatt, Q.C., Barrister‘at-Law:
In my view corporate crime now should be categorised as pornography
used to be. Hard core (fraud and improper selfenrichment) should be
treated as armed robbery, but non-fraud, no ﬁnancial advantage, should be
in a different arena of odium and treatment and penalty.
For balance, I want to deal with two practical aspects of being a
member of a Board of Directors. Firstly, Ido not admit that I am a
swindler. Secondly, I confess myself to be a corporate criminal — I just
have to be. Earlier this year I resigned as part time chairman .of a mining
company, after eight years. 1 resigned'partly because instead of advising
clients on the Companies Ac! or looking at it in vacuo, I thought of my
deeds as a part time chairman and applied the Act to myself. There is no
way in which I could not have committed offences.
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It goes further. I disagree completely with the proposition that good
and reasonable men are in no great danger. They are. In matters dealing
with a Board of Directors if you have one bad director the danger is, and
it is almost inevitable. that the whole Board goes for conspiracy, because
that is the charge and the policy. And, since there is no time to develop it,
I mention this: that at all relevant times Queensland Mines had not one
technical man on its Board.
Now, again for balanced discussion, 1 suggest that in the last three
years too many good, reputable and intelligent men have actually resigned
from Boards and now decline to go on them because of the responsibility
which they face.
It The second point i want to make is this. For a member of a Board
of Directors, if something goes wrong, there is only one charge —
conspiracy. Having framed conspiracy, we then examine the Crimes Act and
the Companies Act for a statutory charge “for the sake of symmetry”.
Once in conspiracy in corporate crime and you can’t escape the theme
“Justice delayed is justice denied” - which we all seek to avoid happening.
There was once (even if only once) an investigation of a company which
went on for six and a half years before. charges were laid. In a big
company collapse it is three years while the investigation takes place, six
months or so preparation for committal, then there are some ﬁve months
committal proceedings during which six weeks or so is taken reading the
evidence before the inspector on to the committal transcript. And
mandatorily any accused, even if he be then without means and albeit be
inn0cent or only there for lack of due diligence, but staring at conspiracy,
has either to forfeit his job and sit each day or he has to be represented
by counsel or solicitor and arrange payment. I leave alone delay which may
come from extradition, because that is rub-of—the-green delay which may
not be prevented. But what about possibly innocent parties caught up in
the conspiracy who may have to wait another twelve months until the trial
takes place? i leave aside the length of the trial, because I agree with what
Mr Purvis has already said.
. it seems to me that the procedure for dealing with corporate crime in
the sense of attacking a Board of Directors for deeds done is manifestly
unjust because such inordinate delay is inevitable before ﬁnality. I suggest
that some consideration ought to be given to legislating that the report of
an inspector, (which the directors presently never see) or the evidentiary
parts of it, be used as of right in the committal proceedings themselves,
with perhaps opportunity for an accused to cross-examine on it if so
advised. By that you may avoid a stale trial by avoiding two exceedingly
protracted proceedings. The reality is: three years between the offences and
the inspector’s report, four months before charges are laid, six months to
prepare the case' for committal, a foreshadowed six months for the
committal proceedings (which the defendants have to attend), a further
delay of twelve months preparing for trial, and then nine months trial
before conclusion is reached.
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I suggest that that distinguishes the corporate criminal (hard. soft or
alleged) from the ordinary larcenist or armed robber. who knows where he
stands and gets there quickly. With respect.the way the corporate law now
stands it has to happen that some directors. whether guilty or not. are
ruined by the time the committal proceedings are over. That gives me no
great conﬁdence that the law appears to be doing justice.
Mr David Pike. shareholder:
\
One of my recent experiences is as a unit holder in an unlisted Unit
Trust which has, at its complete discretion, the right of buy-back on the
units. What has happened is that the Unit Trust sets the buy-back price at
50 cents; the value of the assets is about 80 cents. The Unit Trust will be
wound up in July of this year. The General Manager of that Unit Trust, his
wife, and the retirement fund have been buying the units. some hundreds
of thousands of them now. When the Unit Trust is wound up in July of
this year they will receive 80 cents, having bought at 50 cents. It is quite
within their trustee powers to do this. When I wrote to the Corporate
Affairs Commission about this situation I was told, “This is the fact of the
matter, they are acting within their rights". But how does one get
situations like this changed? What role does the Corporate Affairs
Commission really play? Is it just to uphold the law as it stands, or is it in
any way an activist group that can see things that are going wrong and
make submissions — i presume, to the Attorney-General’s Department? I
was just given a letter back, “There is nothing further that can be done
about this matter”, full stop. and more or less drop dead. And that is not
good enough.
Chairman:
I think we might give Sir Richard Eggleston, who is going to sum up
at the end, your question to deal with, Mr Pike, if you wouldn’t mind.
Now we have Mr Tanner, who wants to make an observation.
Mr. RJ. Tanner, Australian Shareholders’ Association, N.S. W. Branch:
My particular interest, Mr. Chairman, is as a Committee member of
the New South Wales Branch of the Australian Shareholders’ Association. I
would like to direct a question to any one of the panel, and it relates to
s. 125‘ of the Companies Act. Our Association for some good while now has
been directing particular attention to this section of the Companies Act in
relation to loans to associated companies..lt would appear to us that there
is a vast area here where unscrupulous directors have been exercising their
right within the present confines of the Act. Section 125 prohibits expressly
loans to directors but it does not prohibit loans to companies controlled by
directors, and I would suggest that certain members (one of whom is free
in Brazil at the moment) have taken advantage of this and the Stock
Exchange is littered with corporate debris in which other promoters have
used precisely this technique.
I38
( 'huirmun:
Mr Tanner. I am going to ask Sir Richard to deal with this after he
Ehas dealt with Mr Pike‘s question. We now have Mr Madgwick. -
ﬂ
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Mr W. W. Madgwivk. Solicitor oj' Iltc Supreme Court:
I am a solicitor. and as a solicitor l have also to fill the function of a
director on occasions. I find the proceedings tonight were of great value to
me. I came strictly to be entertained and I found the ﬁrst part of the
programme very much like a formal concert: it was very good Bach, and we
are very indebted to Sir Richard Eggleston, who gave us the correct formal
approach. Then in the second half we had the romantics, and it was~very
'broad and very entertaining. But, Sir, what I found was that throughout the
whole of the programme we were struggling to find the true rationale. the
base. or the purpose about which we are all talking. After a while I found
that we were drifting away from a subject which I rather suspected was to
do with the perﬁdy of people who take money from other people, and I
found myself confused about the extent of seriousness of the subject. I
wish Sir Richard Eggleston would deliver a supplement for our guidance on
this overall problem of perspective and tell us where we should start
regarding it as serious and where we can stop regarding it as serious.
I ﬁnd. for instance. that in the instance of motor car offences, in the
community we regard some driving offences as a bit of a lark and we all
get caught and that is tough luck, and that some are rather serious and
even some very bad offences. The community is confused as to how it
ought to treat the classic situation of “driving under the influence”. If you
get caught and are a few points above the mark (but you haven’t killed
some child at a pedestrian crossing) then, wasn’t that tough luck! However,
the community attitude is confused when you knock down and
permanently maiin someone and have in fact had the inﬂuence of alcohol
in you at the time. And so you start to elevate community outrage from
an attitude of “careless with bad luck” (a situation of non-consequence in
icrms of personal relations vis-a-vis the community) to an attitude of high
indignation in the more serious situations. ‘
‘ I find my attitude the same here. So, Sir, I ask Sir Richard, will he
give consideration to putting the whole of this intriguing subject into a
context, make the‘context valid. and then let us look at these deeply
divisive points concerning, for instance. section 306 Reports. 'Ofﬁcial
Liquidators have the job sometimes of acting as nothing more than
corporate undertakers — they take the dead body away from the Chief
Judge in Equity and they then bury it somewhere by sending in a
certiﬁcate of death to the Corporate Affairs Commission saying that it
didn't pay 50 cents in the dollar, and that is the end of it.
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 But there was some talk here tonight that was so serious about
corporate crime that transparently some of these liquidators are going to be
guilty of misprision of felony if they allow the burial certificate to be
issued without making some kind of protest or even bringing to the Crown,
as the duty of a citizen, the heinous and wicked offences that they have
apparently become cognisant of.
Sir Richard ought to give us a proper and detailed context in which
we can then read these papers and give them their due weight and gravity
as a social matter as well as just an administrative and good orderly
housekeeping matter.
Chairman:
Thank you, Mr Madgwick. Now, the last gentleman who would like
to Speak is Mr Santow.
Mr GIF. K. Santow, Solicitor:
I would like to deal brieﬂy with two things; one is the Trade
Practices Bill, and the other is the concept of business standards as matters
for a Companies—Act or as matters for some other form of regulation.
When the Commonwealth Attorney-General introduced the Trade
Practices BilI he made it quite clear that the'Commonwealth did not intend
to introduce the criminal odium that applied, for instance, in the United
States legislation. However, the penalty which applies under the Trade
‘ Practices Bill is as high as $250,000. Admittedly there have been provisions
added since then which indicate the course that the courts ought to take in
applying their undoubted discretion in ﬁxing a penalty.
The difﬁculty that I think one faces with this sort of economic
legislation is this: is the standard of proof to be matched to the penalty, or
is it to be matched to some label called called “criminal legislation” or
“non-criminal legislation”? After all, a quarter of a million dollars applied
to someone guilty of an offence under the Trade Practices Bill hurts almost
as much, I would think, as a quarter of a million dollars under the
Companies Act where it clearly is part of a regime of criminal sanctions.
Surely the problem lies in the fact that our categories have become
unduly rigid. Shouldn’t, for example, the standard of proof be related not
so much to the general character of the legislation but rather to the type
of penalty that'is being exacted? If one is seeking an injunction or if one is
seeking civil~damages under the Trade Practices Bill there seems no reason
at all why the civil standard of proof should not apply. If, on the other
hand, one is seeking $250,000 (or perhaps there should be an intermediate
range of $50,000) then I should have thought that the criminal standard of
proof should. apply.
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Now, turning to the question of business standards, one oi the
difficulties in regulating such matters as buying during a bid has been the
rigidity with which offences under the Companies At‘l have to be dealt
with. They are dealt with in accordance with the classic penalties of fine
or. ,in the case of takeover provisions, s.|>€0R. which suffers from the
notorious deficiency of being applicable only if there is a takeover Scheme
in existence, so if one breaches the takeover provisions to the extent of not
even producing a takeover offer, s. IKOR does not apply.
Now, I think there are two important needs in companies legislation.
One is the need to be able to deal with such matters as Mr. Valder
mentioned, that is, when a bidder is making a bid he should perhaps be
under an obligation to pitch his bid at the highest price that he may have
paid. But that is not so simple, because there may be exceptions to this,
and one cannot draft into a Companies Act those situations where there
should be exemptions given. Likewise, one can’t simply deal with this
problem in isolation, as Sir Richard Eggleston was quoted as saying in the
Parliamentary debate when Mr. McCaw introduced the Companies Act. One
has to look at the other side and see what competing buying is being made
by people perhaps opposing the bid who are not subject to the regime of
having to match the highest price they have paid with a bid to all
shareholders. '
Then one has the problem of what happens if the bidder, having
agreed to increase his bid, then chooses to withdraw his bid, and so on.
The answer, I would have thought, lies in having a body which is able to
do two things. One is that it is able to ,pass regulations fairly rapidly to
deal with abuses. and secondly, it does not use the traditional sanctions of
gaol or fine but rather uses the injunctive-type remedies that Mr. Rothery
has. referred to. Maybe there will be difﬁculties as to whether the
administrative body should itself provide the remedies or whether it should
have to apply to the court. The danger of applying to the court is that the
court may require admissible evidence and not the informal procedure that
grounded the administrative tribunal’s decision in the ﬁrst place.
In Securities or Trade Practices legislation, the better wa
y of dealing
with the problem of enforcement lies in having a trade-off. Where
criminal
sanctions are absent but are replaced instead by injunctiv
e-type remedies,
which are prophylactic, a fair trade-off for this dispensatio
n from penalties
would be the absence of strict proof beyond reasonable d
oubt that goes
with criminal offences. The same would apply to a reme
dy which required
restoration of a profit. say from insider trading, rather than
a ﬁne. Absence
of this onus of proof beyond balance of probabilities will
make the
prosecutor’s task easier, it is true. but it does not subject the
defendant to
criminal sanctions or quasi-criminal sanctions such as are found i
n the Trade
Practices Bill. Also it saves the community from the
enormous costs and
delays of a criminal investigation. ‘
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In the field of takeovers there is a distinction between basic offences
on the one hand. such as the failure to issue a takeover offer or making a
false statement and. on the other. suggested additions to takeover legislation
such as regulating buying during a bid. The latter really consists of proper
business standards rather than criminal-type offences. Where the criminal
sanction is inappropriate either because of the cost of an investigation and
the difﬁcttlty of it or because of the nature of the offence being more
against prOper business standards than criminal, there is a strong case for
the prosecutor being able to elect to pursue injunctive-type remedies rather
than criminal remedies even if he has the latter option as well. Mr Ryan’s
proposals offer much greater ﬂexibility and at less cost to the community
and are a sensible extension of the London City ‘Code approach because
there are sanctions built into the scheme proposed.
Chairman:
I will now ask Sir Richard Eggleston to sum up. I think the Institute,
arising out of this seminar, might well decide that we should re-examine
this matter a little further, and perhaps in a closer group.
Sir Richard Egleston:
First of all, may I deal with what Mr Tanner said and Mr Pike said. '
There. is a, common element in the two. With regard to section 125, it is
true that this section does not prohibit loans to companies of which a
director of the lending company is a shareholder or director or otherwise
beneficially interested. Tremendous difﬁculties would arise if such an
absolute prohibition were introduced. Nevertheless, the point does illustrate
the difﬁculty which Mr Rothery referred to, that it is very difﬁcult in a
system based on absolute prohibitions followed by criminal sanctions to
provide for every case. if the loan to the company is a dishonest use of
power, then .of course section 124. comes in, because it is the duty of
directors to act honestly in the administration Of the affairs of the
company under section 124. If the lending company suffers loss by reason
of the loan and it can be proved to have been an-unwise investment, then
again there is a remedy against the director. But one can imagine that there
would be tremendous difﬁculty if, for example, a banking company was
prohibited from lending to B.H.P., of which one of the directors of the
banking company happened to be a shareholder. One has got to be much
more speciﬁc than merely prohibiting cases of that kind. Beyond that I
can’t help Mr Tanner except to say that in the particular situation one has
to look and see whether there has in fact been an element of dishonesty in
it. I think each case must depend on its own circumstances, but the
prohibition doesn’t apply if the loan is to the company and not to the
director himself.
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sWith regard to Mr I’ike‘s point. I don‘t. of course. know the
circumstances. | cart assure him that having occupied a quasi-judicial
position for the last few years. and having received in that capacity a lot of
complaints from the public about trade practices, we leartted immediately
that even though you may be working behind the scenes to cure a
situation. the last thing a person in that position can do is to start giving
advice to the person who has made the complaint. lf he cannot in fact
immediately deal with his situation he can’t really‘ say, “Well i am going to
try to get this law changed”. That is for the people who have the
responsibility of changing the law. I cart also assure him that in my very
close experience with the Corporate Affairs Commission and with the
Commissioners and Company Registrars in the other States, which has
extended over about six years, the emergence of a weakness in the
legislation has very promptly been followed by recommendations to the
politicians concerned who have to deal with changes in the law if a real
difﬁculty has arisen. But it‘. as I understand him, the people who are
huyingback these shares are in fact trustees, then I suggest that he go to a
solicitor and get some legal advice about the duties of persons who stand in
a tiduciary relationship. But he is not, i suggest, entitled to ask the
Corporate Affairs Commission for that sort of advice — that is not their
job.
This leads me to another point. I firmly believe, and have in fact
recommended to the Attorneys in the course of my work with the
Company Law Advisory Committee. that not only should the costs of all
investigations be borne by the Crown, which is the practical position
nowadays (because no one who is properly advised would ask for an
investigation, they would only tell the Attorney-General that they had facts
to put before him and ask whether he thought there ought to be an
investigation), but that the Crown should in certain cases ﬁnance civil
litigation. Broadly speaking. the person who asks for an investigation, or the
person who is wise enough not to ask for an investigation, can’t now be
required to pay the costs of an investigation, but a company can, even
though the investigation is an investigation of the way in which the
company has been mulcted by its directors.* We have tried to get the
Attorneys to agree that all the costs of these investigations, as in the case
of other kinds of police action, should be borne by the Crown. We didn’t
succeed, the Attorneys were very reluctant, but we did get some
modification of the then existing position in relation to investigation. We
would have liked to go further, and indeed I think we did include such a
recommendation in one of our reports. that the Crown should back civil
proceedings wherever the general body of shareholders was of such a kind
*Sec Companies Act. l96l, section 179. as amended by No. 61 of 1971. Previously,
the Governor might direct the expenses of an investigation to be paid by the Company
or by any person who requested the investigation. in Victoria there is still provision
for the Minister to require that a person requesting an investigation give security for
payment of the expenses of an investigation - see section l69 (3) and 179 (7) of the
Victorian Act.
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 that it was unreasonable to expect any individual shareholder or any group
of shareholders to take proceedings. l believe that one of the biggest
advances that could be made in this ﬁeld would be for Governments to
accept this kind of responsibility. Governments are accepting responsibility
for legal aid in all sorts of fields and this is a very important one. I hope
to see some day that it will come.
These considerations lead to the reﬂection on Mr Rothery’s
proposition that no system of legislation which relies on laying down rules
and enforcing them by penalties can cope with all cases. When we
commenced our company law investigations we suggested in our ﬁrst report
the establishment of a Companies Commission. We envisaged that it would
have discretions which were not practicable under the existing system, and
originally we proposed a very Small role for it. but we conceived that if
there were to be discretions it was essential that they should be
administered on a uniform basis throughout Australia. That recommendation
was turned down ﬁat by seven Attorneys-General, and it was obvious from
then on that whatever else we did in the course of our recommendations
for the reform of the company law we could not depend on the setting up
of a Commission with discretions such as we had suggested on a very
modest scale in our first report. Now the force of other considerations has
led_to the setting up of an Interstate Corporate Affairs Commission which
may be able to exercise discretions, and perhaps some of the things that we
would have done if we had had a free hand might be done by the new
body. So that I think there is some prospect at least of development in this
respect.
I would like to say something about the comments Mr Goldrick made
about the entering of noIIe pmscquis. He said there were two things the
Attomey-General would have to consider: the likelihood of obtaining a
conviction and the cost of proceeding to a conviction. I would like to ask
whether anyone, in considering the likelihood of obtaining a conviction in
company matters, considers what percentage of convictions are obtained in
other criminal matters. 1" haven’t seen any ﬁgures in this State. but they
were given in England a few years ago. The percentage of acquittals ranged
from 40% in the metropolitan area up to 80% in Wales. Scotland has a
pretty good performance relatively. theirs I think is under 20%. But what I
am suggesting is that there is a different approach to. corporate crime. Other
people have referred to other aspects of it. but my impression is (and I am
not speaking of this State because I don’t know much about it and I can
only speak of other places where l have had experience of it) that the
approach is, in a company case. “Can we be sure of getting a conviction: if
we can’t, let us drop it." Now there are a lot of reasons why you should
do that. all of them pertaining to the comfort of the prosecutor and the
people who have to prepare the case -‘ they are difﬁcult. they are
troublesome. they take people away from their ordinary work etc. So you
say, “Can we be sure of getting a conviction? No, we can’t. Well. then. let’s
drop it." On the other hand. if you are sure that a person has committed a
crime of another kind, murder. larceny. or whatever it is. you know that a
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percentage of tltesypcople. a substantial percentage. a
re going to be
acquitted. but you don‘t for that reason drop the prosecu
tion. I suggest
there is a difference of approach. and again I say I atn not
speaking of this
State. it is just an impression I have got from a fairly e
xtensive study of
investigators‘ reports anti recommendations for action a
nd wltat has
happened about thettt. And if we are talking about the
expense. then i
think we wartt to reflect on Mr Olson's figures about the 8
160.000,000, i
think it was. which had been lost — not necessari
ly always through
dishonesty. But the cost of corporate crime, as Mr Hawkin
s pointed out, is
tretnendous in relation to other crime. and so we shoul
dn‘t really be
worrying about a few thousand dollars here or there.
I don‘t need to say much tnore, I think, except to say one
thing
which is perhaps not strictly relevant to the theme of tonight bu
t which
has been mentioned a number of times, and that is this q
uestion of
takeovers and the regulation of the takeover bid. A lot of people
have been
talking lately as if it was an oversight in the takeover prov
isions that
bidding on the Stock Exchange should be allowed to con
tinue while a
takeover bid is current. All I want to say is that it was not an
oversight
and it is my conviction that to allow Stock Exchange bidding to
continue
without penalty to the bidder is going to put a lot more mone
y into the
pockets of those who sell their shares than if you take the
alternative
course, tie one hand behind the back of the offeror a
nd leave the
opponents of the offer free to bid as high as they like in the marke
t with
no penalty except the acquisition of those shares that are act
ually sold. We
went into this, the Attorneys had the alternative proposition
put to them,
and after hearing both sides they decided upon our point o
f view. There
may be arguments the other way, but there are very strong argum
ents for
leaving the Stock Exchange free provided of course, the transaction,
as it
must be, is an ordinary transaction on the Stock Exchange. Afte
r all, every
shareholder has the chance to sell on the Stock Exchange. i will not
go any
further into that, but i just want to say that in this current d
ebate there
are two sides to the question. It is by no means certain that
either the
New York system or the London system is the right one,
and indeed the
London system works because it is a voluntary code and b
ecause when the
establishment don’t want to observe it they don’t, and
nothing happens to
them.
That is all i would like to say, except to thank
everybody for being
so patient and to say that I wouldn’t want anybod
y to get the idea from
what i have just said that we ever regarded wh
at we did in the seven
Company Reports that we presented as the last
word. We did have to get
our recommendations past seven Attorneys-General,
and for the ﬁrst four
reports, which were the only four ever consid
ered by the Standing
Committee, we got a very high percentage of our recomme
ndations (1 don’t
know how you would quantify it, but it must
have been getting close to
90%) actually embodied in law and in most of the St
ates. This is a pretty
considerable achievement, which would not hav
e been done if we had
simply presented an ideal system without
regard to the practical
possibilities. '
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Clwr'rman:
I will now ask Mr JuStice Street to close the evening by thanking the
participants in this seminar.
Mr Justice Street:
Mr Chairman, ladies and Gentlemen:
The signiﬁcance of this evening's proceedings is that they mark an
increasing awareness in our community of this problem of corporate crime.
The efﬁcacy of any law is directly related to how the community feels
about the need for that law. Until we develop in the community a sense of
public outrage at corporate crime we will not get from our legislature the
necessary arbitrary penal provisions. the necessary machinery, that is
required to stamp out, or_at least hold in check. corporate crime; we won‘t
create in the minds of jurors the willingness to convict. In short, until there
pervades this whole field of corporate crime an aura of moral turpitude.
such as pervades that of the more red-blooded crimes we are used to
encountering, I don’t see that we are going to be making great strides in
solving the problem of corporate crime. A proceeding such as we have had
this evening does, I think, take' us a considerable way along the road
towards the development of that awareness within the community of the
seriousnessgof the problem.
Tonight’s speakers have contributed much to our general understanding
— they certainly have contributed to my general understanding — of these
aspects of the company law and of the problem of corporate crime. In
1 thanking them, as I do on your behalf, I might perhaps not be regarded as
ungracious if I say that there were two things I would have liked to have
heard frbm the speakers. One might have hoped that Professor Harding,
with his experience in the Senate Committee, might have leaked some of
the more interesting parts of the report to us, and I would have liked to
hear the funny story which Mr Ford has left us to ﬁnd out for ourselves.
Mr' Chairman, on behalf of all those present I would, through you, thank
tonight’s speakers for the contribution they have made to our understanding
of this important problem.
146' 
SI ’3thle l"
l. The Julius and rt'spt-ulsilrililit's uj‘ (.in'purulc ofﬁcers“ under the
(innmuicx .~|(‘/. I/It.’ ('rimcx .'l('/ and MC .S'ct'urilicx lm/usnji' Arr.
The paper on this topic was delivered by the Honourable Sir Richard
ligglcston, Chairman of the Trade Practices Tribunal and Chairman of the
Company Law Advisory Conunittee to the Attorneys General of the‘various
5tates of Australia.
Sir Richard in his paper dealt with the “criminal” acts which can be
Committed by corporate ofﬁcers and the penalties that might be imposed
upon them. The sections .creating offences are extremely varied, and extend
fr'jom failure to file various documents with the Commission to
misappropriation and fraud. In the case of the duties of Directors to
present accounts and to report, this is not an obligation imposed upon a
company but upon the ofﬁcers of the Company individually.
The position of the Secretary of the company as an ofﬁcer, and the
complete lack of direction in the Act as to the role he should assume, were
also dealt with by the author.
Of considerable moment in the context of corporate crime is the
question as .to whether intent or knowledge of the prospective commission
of an offence should be an ingredient in the assessment of criminality or
not. Is an ofﬁcer who knows that a document ought to be ﬁled, and fails
to see that it is ﬁled, one who authorises or permits the omission to ﬁle
the document? Or does he do so in the absence of a duty? Does he do so
even though it is his duty? Does he do so even though it is his duty
internally so far as the Company’s affairs are concerned to ﬁle the
document? These are matters of moment, and in respect of which opinions
vary. , -
The greater number of indictable offences are couched in the context
of conspiracy. in order to lay a criminal charge of conspiracy it is not
necessary to establish either a tort or a crime. Cheating and deception may
be necessary, but not all agreements to conspire together necessarily entail
the'commission of a tort or a criminal act. If there is substantial damage
inflicted, this may be sufﬁcient. Sir Richard made reference to Murray’s
case, where it was decided that it is not necessary for a tort or a crime to
be established in order to constitute a criminal offence. Difﬁculty of pr
oof,
however, is encountered in every conspiracy case. Complicated company
frauds entail the adducing of extensive evidentiary material, and Sir Richard
was of the opinion that proof could be made simpler without depriving an
accused of his rights by the presentation of material in a summary form,
even if this entails the introduction of legislation making it clear that in
criminal cases, and indeed in civil cases. if there are complicate
d5
transactions, provided documents are produced or are available to the
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 accused or the defendant, experts should be able to he called to produce
written statements showing the system followed and how the transactions
Were carried out.
Mr John Valder, the President of the Sydney Stock Exchange. and Mr
Peter Grogan, the Executive Officer of the institute of Directors. both
commented'upon the paper of Sir Richard Eggleston.
Mr_ Valder emphasised the responsibilities already resting upon
company directors. Directors already ﬁnd themselves confronted with a very
large ﬁeld, and a growing ﬁeld, of legal responsibility. Referring more
speciﬁcally to the position of directors of listed companies. Mr Valder
stressed the additional requirements upon directors whereby they must
comply with the listing obligations of the Stock Exchanges. The contractual
obligation which company directors have to the Stock Exchange by virtue
of their agreement with it is a further ﬁeld for the introduction of
sanctions against them.
The opportunities available to directors of public companies to act in
breach of the rules and/or the corporate legislation was commented upon
by Mr Valder, and the dilemma facing the legislators, including the Stock
Exchanges, was a matter of no small moment. If there is too great a desire
to regulate and the law becomes too stringent, then there will be nobody
left to regulate. Nobody will be prepared to undertake the responsibilities,
bearing in mind the obligations that can be imposed upon ofﬁcers of
companies by the various Acts considered by the seminar. However. it must
always be kept in mind that the beneﬁt to an ofﬁcer breaching a provision
of the ‘Act may be commensurate with the risk that he runs. 11 may be
well worth breaching a particular provision, for example. in relation to
takeovers, because the penalty may be modest but the rewards great. Mr
Valder was of the opinion that from the investing public’s point of view
significant penalties may need to be available.
Mr Valder turned finally to the court scene and the delay which was
presently occurring in the bringing to trial of persons allegedly in breach of
the legislation. It seemed desirable that in the interests of the pub
lic
generally and the accused in particular matters should be dealt with as
expeditiously as possible.
Mr Grogan in his comments laid emphasis upon the incidence of'
corporate crime, having in mind the number of ofﬁcers of companies in
Australia and the money or funds with whichthey deal. He stated that the
number of company ofﬁcers dealt with for crimes under the Companies
Act, the Securities Industry Act and the relevant provisions of the Crimes
Act is less in a relative sense than the number .of persons in various
professions who, may be cited for breaches of rules relating to such
professions. When one has regard to the enormous volumes of money and
property handled by companies it is, said Mr Grogan, only a small
proportion of company officers who fail to comply with the duties and
obligations cast upon them by the Acts.
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llowcver. whilst the proportion of defaulting company officers is in
telativc numbers very small. clearly harm is caused to the corporate system
by even such a small nttmber of officers who damage its reputation
and
acceptability to the community.
Mr Urogan then outlined a number of matters which might be of
concern to the seminar and the community. Amongst the points made
were: the effect, deterrent or otherwise. of the penalty prescribed for a
specific offence: what effect. if any, would variations in the penalty have
on tltc conduct of those who may be inclined to commit an offence;
are
the administrative and judicial procedures appropriate for the nature o
f the
offence; is there any justification for a different emphasis in the treatment
or punishment of a person convicted of a corporate crime. Further, is ther
e
a lack of proper or desirable investigation facilities, and should there be a
n
examination of relative corporate behaviour now prohibited?
The range of pecuniary penalties generally associated with a prescribed
maximum term of imprisonment, raised by Sir Richard Eggleston in his
paper. was contended by Mr Grogan to be deceptive. He was of the opinio
n
that the imposition of a penalty is relative and that the pecuniary sanctio
n
of a fine may not be the most appropriate means whereby corporate cri
me
to a degree can be prevented. Again, the time and cost involved
is
prosecutions seemed to Mr Grogan to be not commensurate with the natu
re
of the crime with which the seminar was dealing. The existence of som
e
135 penalty provisions in the Act necessitated. in the opinion Mr Grogan
,
perhaps a separate code for dealing with his conduct and behaviour.
The duties and responsibilities of corporate ofﬁcers, and the unjust
enrichment of such an ofﬁcer, whether in the context of insider trading or
breach of Section 124 of the Companies Act, required specific attention.
The problems posed were not simple. and perhaps really entaile
da
corporate conscience and a greater awareness on the part of corporate
officers of their responsibility and their role to be played in the commerc
ial
society.
2., Function of the Investigation and Prosecution
Division of the
Corporate Affairs Commission.
Mr Peter Olson, Acting Chief Inspector of the New S
outh Wales
Corporate Affairs Commission, in his paper commented on th
e functions of
the Investigation and Prosecution Division of the Commiss
ion and provided
details as to the functions of the Divrsion und
er the Companies Act, the
crimes Act and the Securities litdttstr,i:_{4c't.._
The foundation of the Division. and indeed of the Commissi
on itself,
is to be found in the uniform company legislation introduce
d throughout
Australia in 1962. This legislation, whilst widening the res
ponsibilities of
directors and officers in the administration of compani
es' affairs, brought
clearly into focus the need for a higher degree of policing of
the provisions
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of the legislation than had previously been the case. Mr Olson referred to
the 'iritroduction of the Companies .-Ier. Nut. and the subsequent
enactment of the Business Nantes Aer, I902. the Companies (Transfer of
Domicile) Act. 1968. and the Securities Industry Aer. I070.
The extensive powers given to the Commissioner for Corporate Affairs
by the Acts was instanced. and the area outlined in which he is able to act.
The basic functions of the Investigation Section as they related to the
pursuit of the investigation function, the constant maintaining of a review
of company news and company information, the conduct of special
investigations pursuant to Part VIA of the Companies Act, the structure of
the Division and the breakup of its manpower, were all detailed as they
disclosed the coverage given by the Commission to its various functions.
Investigation is conducted as a result of information coming to the
Commission in various ways. Complaints may be made by members of the
public to the Commission. or to Members of Parliament and sent to the
Commission. The Commission maintains a close scrutiny over newspaper
.articles, and conducts a stock watching activity. Again, an examination of
documents lodged with the Commission, together with the reports of
Liquidators and official Managers pursuant to Section 306 (3), provides
plentiful material for such activities. Perhaps the source of greatest
information, or at least what should be such a source. is the requirement in
Section 167 (8) (9) of the Companies Act for an auditor to inform the
Commission immediately he becomes aware of the company or its directors
being in defaUlt in complying with Sections 136 or I62 of the Act. It can
of course be said that the Commission is here using the accountancy
profession as an informant. The utility of this source of material must now.
it seems, go unquestioned.
Mr Olson, having laid the ground for investigations, instanced the
‘ result of the Commission’s activities and the manner in which prosecutions
are commenced and brought to fruition. In valuable appendices to his paper
M: Olson itemized the visible results of the activities of the Prosecution
Division of the Corporate Affairs Commission. The continuing surveillance
of 'companies’ activities was highlighted by the author in his additional
rennrks. Mr Olson indicated that this was the first occasion on which the
functions of the Division and the form of its establishment had been
produced outside the confines of the Commission itself. He instanced the
growth of the Commission and the support that it seems to be increasingly
obtaining from the general public, the growth of the Investigation Division
itself, the creation of ' sub-sections within the Division, and the responsibility
given to each of the sub-sections. It was apparent that there has been, and
is being, maintained a close liaison between the Commission and the other
law enforcement agencies, and the attaching of police ofﬁcers to the
. investigation side of the Division was of inestimable value.
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('omment on Mr Olson's paper was made by Mr R. N. J. Purvis who,
whilst commending Mr Olson for the excellent presentation of information
and the thought-provoking manner in which he had commented upon his
own material. sought to ask whether the ('ommission was in fact doing
enough. or indeed what it should have been intended to achieve.
Can the Commission be availed of in aid of the prevention of
corporate crime. or is there a tnore effective means to prevent the
commission of such critninal acts, were the questions posed by the
cotntnentator. Debate was not to be had on the form the Commission
should take, but rather on the use that can effectively be made of it in the
context of corporate crime.
The commentator referred to the relatively small number of ofﬁcers
who could be classified as dishonest or unprincipled, but stressed the impact
that even a small number could have. There being nearly 110,000
companies registered by the end of l97l, it was conceivable that the
number of officers subject to the provisions of the companies legislation
would be over a quarter of a million.
The commentator endeavoured to instance the peculiar nature of
corporate crime, and to distinguish it, if possible, from other criminal acts.
He referred to the greater signiﬁcance of premeditation in corporate crime as
it is seen in the issue of a false prospectus, a dishonest director, a
misleading false statement, or deceiving the Stock Exchange.
Damage is well done by the time an offence is proved, and restitution
is rarely possible. If rewards are great enough and the chance of getting
away with it likely enough, then no penalty other than deprivation of
liberty would suffice to inhibit breaches of the Act.
The commentator then referred to the ways and means in which the
Corporate Affairs Commission can at the present time prevent acts resulting ,
in breach of various provisions of the statutes, and came to the view that it
was only by the creation of a review tribunal, part way between the
Commission and the Courts, sitting in camera, that acts about to be
committed which might result in a corporate crime might be prevented. The
structure. of such a tribunal and its achieving this purpose would necessitate
the obligatory filing of reports by directors on oath and a compulsory audit
of all companies. Whilst accounts need not necessarily be filed, reports of
auditors and declarations of directors would need to be on file. The Board
itself would need to be manned by persons with the necessary expertise,
and such members would need to have power to require the production of
relevant records and documents.
Finally, the commentator devoted some time to the question of trial
and committal proceedings, and innovations which might be introduced to
expedite the determination of alleged criminal acts pertaining to the
conduct of the affairs of companies.
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3. Treatment of persons offending against the provisions of tlu' Crimes
Act. the Companies Act and the Securities Industry Act.
Mr J. B. Goldrick, S.M.. delivered a paper in which he contended that
the type of crime with which the seminar was concerned should be looked
at as it affected the courts and their function, that is, the way in which
the existence of this type of crime and the attempts on the part of the
authorities to prove legally its existence so affected the courts.
The seminar was dealing with private corporations as opposed to
public corporations, but the offenders would not only be individuals but
also the corporations themselves. The corporations are subject. as are natural
persons, to "a huge range of obligations". Mr Goldrick referred in his paper
to Section 360A of the Oimes Act, under which every provision of an Act
relating to offences punishable upon indictment or on summary conviction
may, unless a contrary intention appears, to be construed to apply to
bodies corporate as to individuals. it is a matter for some concern in the
Australian environment that company ofﬁcers are not required by law to be
familiar with the legislation under which they operate and which may well
govern their very liability. Not only are they not so required, but it is the
exception for an officer of a company to be familiar with the relevant
legislation. The penalty provisions contained in the companies legislation are
extensive, and in Appendix A to his paper Mi Goldrick set out a sample of
the penalty provisions so contained in the Act.
The specific penalty provisions from Section 374 onwards in the
Companies Act are set out verbatim in Appendix B. The provisions of the
Securities Industry Act. the offences created by this Act and the penalties
that may be imposed, are also set out in the Table annexed to the paper.
The contravention of a large majority of the provisions of the
legislation the subject of the seminar might be said toconstitute mere
breaches of regulations for good corporate housekeeping. Such breaches will
often be symptomatic of corporate dishonesty and fraud, and good
housekeeping in the corporate sense should become almost an end in itself,
said the author.
Mr Goldrick then illustrated the significance of alleged corporate
'offences to the Courts of Petty Sessions, underlining the fact that whether
offences are to be disposed of summarily or on indictment they with all in
the first instance come before a Court of Petty Sessions. Thus, the manner
in which committal proceedings are conducted is of signiﬁcant importance
to the magistracy. Whether proceedings can be shortened and less time
spent 'on committal by the provision of declarations as to the evidence
which would be given by witnesses is a matter that warrants consideration.
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The need for bold and creative thinking when one comes to consider
corporate crime was becoming more and more apparent. The treatment of
offenders, whilst having received some attention from the corrective officers
and the judiciary, still was in its infancy. Whilst the reSponsible body might
well be achieving some success in ensuring good corporate housekeeping'tlie
author did not share the optimism of Mr Grogan of the Institute of
Directors as to the good conduct generally of a very large number of
directors and officers of companies. '
There are many corporate offenders who are never “brought to
book”. The problem of coming to grips with a swindler, be he big or small,
lies in the very nature of corporate crime. It is largely, thought Mr
Qoldrick, a problem of proving the actual commission of the crime itself.
The immensity of the problem of proof of the commission of major
corporate crime and of guilt should be obvious. ’
Mr Goldrick Concluded his remarks with the suggestion that our
society has hardly begun to comprehend the nature and extent of corporate
crime. There are those who are very much aware of the magnitude of the
problems involved and who are making constructive proposals in order to
attempt to solve them. It is very much the function of criminologists to
devise procedures and remedies that will allow corporate crime in “an
electronic age to be fought with more effective weapons than those which
have been inherited from the 19th century”.
Professor .l. G. Hawkins, commenting upon Mr Goldrick’s paper,
lnstanced the two questions that were primarily raised by it, namely,
whether ordinary principles of sentencing apply,and whether the element of
general deterrence is particularly relevant to this type of offence. Corporate
crime represents a very substantial amount of money, an amount vastly
greater than that involved in conventional crime such as burglary, larceny
and automobile theft.
Professor Hawkins was of the view that white collar criminals seem to
come into a special class — that generally they didn’t appear to be regarded
as really criminals,,and that certainly they don’t regard themselves as
criminals. The view that “we were just careless in doing what we did ——
everyone else in business is doing the same thing, but we were unlucky”
seems to be the view generally prevailing.
Deterrence is, however, the aspect that might well warrant further
attention. To be effective, a deterrent must ﬁrstly inﬂict such a punishment
(of whatever nature it might be) upon the corporate criminal as to persuade
others who might be likeminded to desist from the criminal act. Damages
must be commensurate with the nature of the crime that is committed, and
commensurate with the sum involved in the criminal act.
The Commissioner of Corrective Services, Mr W. R. McGeechan, in his
comments upon Mr Goldrick‘s paper indicated that his interest should
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properly be directed towards the people involved in this sort of crime as
'distinct from the corporation as an offender acting through its agents or
officers as the case may be.
Frightening sentences are available for the recalcitrant, the schcmer
and the swindler. Nine months’ periodic detention is “like going to gaol
thirty-six separate times”, and whilst a great deal of importance might be
placed on the physical connotation of imprisonment, consideration must be
given to the emotional and psychological aspects of it.
The corrective services are concerned with future crime. and not so
much with history. The particular area of coroporate crime will expand at a
dramatic rate because of the growth rate of the economy and the fact that
this particular form of crime is attracting attention and appropriate
legislation is being introduced to control it.
Corporate criminals are generally clever. educated people. who should
know better. The moral objection to this form of crime is already being
evidenced in our community.
Mr McGeechan indicated that he had a very ﬁrm view on the sort of
treatment that should be meted out to the so-called “white collar” criminal,
and he strongly objected to the maximum security concept. Considering the
per capita cost of maintaining a person in prison, it would seem
inappropriate to place a corporate criminal in this environment and subject
the average taxpayer to the burden of its cost.
Of greater significance is the magnitude of the embezzlement that
from time to time takes place, and the lamentable lack of supervision that
permits an individual in our community to put himself in this position. The
public and moral outrage is such that the corporate criminal at the present
time needs to be incarcerated to a greater degree than the circumstances
would otherwise warrant.
Periodic detention was one way in which such a person could be
sufﬁciently punished for his crime. Mr McGeechan was of the view that
within a few years detention at home will be practised in New South Wales,
the sentence being served at home, but in fairly strict circumstances.
One of the essential features of crime affecting the corporate criminal
is that he has very little to lose by the time society is through with him
and by the time compensation is levied. His wife and family have suffered
the social stigma of his crime. it is a question then of establishing him in
an appropriate job, establishing him, or re-establishing him, with his family,
and establishing him with a new circle of friends. Mr McGeechan indicated
that he was opposed to the punishment that is often inﬂicted on wives and
children of offenders and that in the case of corporate crime such people
received a higher degree of punishment than the families of other classes of
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criminal. The underlying factor of the comment was that the punishment of
the corporate criminal need not be physical.
4., Arc burial sanctions appropriate for corporate crime." Is the law
adequate."
Mr J. M. Rothery considered that the seminar was an appropriate
forum to debate whether present sanctions and punishments are appropriate
and whether the law is adequate in matters of corporate crime, or whether
opportunities are available to a person to become involved in corporate
crime.
The companies legislation at ﬁrst glance illustrates a wide choice of
offences which may be committed in corporate activities. Except for the
Oimes 'Act, no other piece of legislation is so studded with punishments
and penalties. Of the 385 sections in the Act, about l60 attract specific
penalties.
The Crimes Act also makes provision for speciﬁc offences directed at
officers or members of corporations involving imprisonment from 5 to 10
years. The Secret Commission Prohibition Act of New South Wales likewise
frowns upon certain designated activities of persons involved in the conduct
[of corporations. The Securities Industry, Act (1970 N.S.W.) defines offences
in relation to the making 'of false and misleading statements about
marketable securities.
Mr Rothery was of the view that it was interesting to note that a
corporation itself could be involved in a corporate crime, and that in
examining modern legislation two tendencies are very evident, namely, a
more embracive and inclusive definition of conduct to be outlawed to catch
the ingenious corporate offender, and a hardening and extending of the
penalties attaching to the forbidden act. As penalties and punishment are a
substantial part of such law, Mr Rothery 'said that the first question that
had to. be answered was, are such sanctions appropriate to such crimes.
A sentence imposed should accord with the general moral sense of the
community. The dark clouds of ﬁnes and imprisonment undoubtedly make
those responsible for the administration of the affairs of companies, whether
they be directors or management, more conscious of their obligations and
more careful in the performance of their duties.
The- policy of severe punishment, and a greater likelihood of being
caught. is appropriate in resPect of corporate crime, affecting as it does
wide sections of the public and, probably more importantly, reﬂecting the
general public morality.
is the law at the present time adequate? With the rapid growth of the
corporate structure there are increasing opportunities for double dealing and
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sharp practices inherent in such structure. Those who deal in securities. or
extend credit. or make capital investment. are forced to rely upon the
representations and judgments of those who request money. The corporate
structure, with its ramiﬁcations and opportunities for concealment, creates
possibilities for wrongdoing not otherwise available in the affairs of the
community. Mr Rothery was of the view that in determining whether the
law is adequate in these circumstances"‘one must ask whether it is
sufﬁcient that the community as" a whole is mtisﬁed and adequately
compensated with the publicity and drama of the revelation of some
corporate coup or loss of large sums of money and whether its moral
conscience is satisﬁed by the trappings and colosseum-like performance of
trial and imprisonment of those defaulters unlucky enough to be caught".
, In the concluding part of his paper Mr Rothery referred to the
position in the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and was
of the opinion that Australia is more likely to follow the American practice
than that of the United Kingdom. The apparent tendency will be to force a
fuller disclosure of facts, and to maintain the principle of severe punishment
where the facts are misrepresented or presented in such a way that a false
picture emerges.
It is Mr Rothery’s belief that the law should be certain, and an
inherent concern for administrative tribunals, with their discretionary
powers, was expressed.
In his concluding remarks Mr Rothery made reference to the
suggestion by the Commissioner of Corporate Affairs (New South Wales)
that a procedure might be instituted whereby directors could be called upon
to justify their conduct before an authority‘where the authority had
grounds for believing, by reason of complaint or otherwise, that the
directors were about to embark upon some course of action which on the
face of it appeared to be contrary to the interests of shareholders. The
procedure should be so designed as to enable matters to be dealt‘with
speedily and informally whilst preserving confidentiality.
. ln. presenting his own paper Mr Rothery ‘took up the lack of
preparedness of certain types of people to be involved in the activities of
corporations. He- instanced various types of people who get involved in
corporate crime - people who don’t know what they are doing; people
who work in bigger companies and should know what they are doing; and
people who are basically swindlers, cheats and crooks. Mr Rothery was of
the View that the law was completely inadequate in dealing with the latter
class of people.
For a responsibleperson, the fear of penalties may well be enough;
but the sheer crook who is out to do something wrong will not be deterred
by penalties, and in the meantime the damage is done.
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 In his commentary upon' the paper delivered by Mr Rothery, Mr J.
Ford, Q.(‘.. indicated that he entirely agreed with the stress and the
emphasis and the direction in which Mr Rothcry‘s paper tended to direct
the attention of the seminar. Mr Ford made reference to the practical effect
of Section I73 referable to fraudulently taking or rnisapplying money, and
the position that had arisen more recently in the United Kingdom whereby
a broad definition of larceny had rendered it unnecessary to have a special
section dealing with fraudulent misapplication of property by company
directors.
The question of the suitability of having alleged corporate criminal acts
dealt with by a jury was emphasized by Mr Ford. Where there is an
extraordinary complex set of circumstances one can’t really expect a jury,
which may consist of quite untutored people, people who are inexperienced
in business and inexperienced in accountancy, to give proper attention to
the matter. '
Professor D. E. Harding thought that what was needed was more
imagination, that a broad perspective on the whole area should be taken
and questions asked about what is going to be done and where the penal
sanctions ﬁt into the picture at all.
I
Regulation of economic activity, he thought, was likely to increase,
particularly in view of interest in the environment and concern about
consumers. The question is, to what extent should penal sanctions be used,
and how valuable, how appropriate, are they in achieving the objectives of
the kind of regulation the subject of the seminar. While there is a place for
penal sanctions for crimes, we ought to be trying more imaginatively to
divide administrative and civil remedies, to secure observance of the
regulations that are made, without always resorting to or relying entirely on
penal sanctions.
Amplifying his reference to penal sanctions, Professor Harding
indicated that what he was referring to were sanctions commonly in the
form of fines or imprisonment imposed by courts of criminal jurisdiction
after hearings which follow the rules of criminal procedure.
A penal sanction is a less than totally satisfactory way of enforcing a
lot of regulations as they are contained in the Companies Act and the
Securities Industry Act. The history of prosecutions under anti-trust
legislation provides evidence of the unwillingness of juries to convict what
they regard as “the respectable corporate executives of high social status”.
g In order to improve enforcement in Australia, what is needed is to
give attention to the proper equipping of enforcement agencies, to systematic
surveillance and detection procedures, and to using the Commissions in the
carriage and conduct of prosecutions. The question should also arise as to
whether juries should be used in such cases, or whether the expedient
adopted in the bankruptcy legislation might be utilized.
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 , Finally, Professor Harding emphasized the necessity of business
men
knowing the law' that they are supposed to observe. and that ways should
be' introduced of encouraging them to be self-regulatory. Directors of
companies should be licensed, and accordingly made aware of the legislation
which governs their activities. '
A number of, members of the seminar made comments further upon
the papers delivered and the commentaries upon the papers. In his closing
remarks to the seminar, Mr Justice Street indicated his view that the
proceedings marked an increasing awareness in the community of the
problem of corporate crime. He went on to say, “Until we 'develop in the
community a sense of public outrage at corporate crime we will not get
from our Legislature the necessary arbitrary penal provisions, the necessary
machinery, that is required to stamp out, or at least to hold in check,
corporate crime; we won't create in the minds of jurors the willingness to
convict. In short, until there pervades this whole ﬁeld of corporate crime an
aura of moral turpitude, such as pervades that of the more red-blooded
crimes we are used to encountering, 1 don’t see that we are going to be
making great strides in solving the problem, of corporate crime”. These
comments from Mr Justice Street quite succinctly sumarized the
deliberations and the accent of the evening. '
Rodney Purvis.
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